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THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN
HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

Under the Direction of the Departments of History,
Political Economy, and Political Science

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GEOPOLITIK

DOCTRINE OF NATIONAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY
AND EMPIRE

By
JOHANNES MATTERN

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"The History of the Past is a mere puppet-show. A little man comes out and blows a little trumpet, and goes in again. You look for something new; and lo! another little man comes out, and blows another little trumpet, and goes in again. And it is all over."

—*Longfellow*

It is all over—~~yes~~—for you! But not for him who follows you! For him the show continues—until he is, like you, no more. And so it goes until it ends some day. Until that day it is an endless lore.

—*Incognito*

PREFACE

This little book, modest in substance and form, is largely an elaboration and intensification of two essays on the subject of Geopolitik written previously by its author; one, "From Geopolitik to Political Relativism";¹ the other, "If the Geopoliticians Have Their Way."² It was written before the present war in its formal aspects had come to the United States. It was written on the assumption that war would come and that the United States, at the end of that war, would once more have a great, and perhaps a last, opportunity to play a decisive rôle in the settlement of international affairs and in the establishment of peaceful and livable conditions in all the lands from which its own present-day human stocks have sprung.

The book deals with a topic which without question had a fateful share in the coming of the war first to Asia, then to Europe, and now to the American continent. It does not aspire to offer an exhaustive history of that topic—the phenomenon known as Geopolitik and all that is not called by that name but is Geopolitik in fact. It does not purport to provide the unfathomable minutiae of the bibliographical apparatus for such a history. It aims to consider no more and no less than the essentials required for the natural setting of the subject of Geopolitik in its ideological, factual, and dynamic relationships of time, space, reason, and evaluation.

To be more specific, the book deals with the German and particularly the National-Socialist brand of Geopolitik which has given rise to the present popular interest in the subject. But it concerns itself equally with the non-German ancestry and kin of that troublesome phenomenon. To cite one of many of the ideological, factual, and dynamic relationships of Geopolitik, the book depicts the present-day National-Socialist application of that doctrine as a National-Socialist version of Marxian dialectic materialism, both in theory and practice, transferred to the sphere of international relations; i. e., as a National-Socialist revolution for the redistribution of the natural resources and wealth of this earth. In this revolution

¹ Published in *Essays in Political Science in Honor of Westel Woodbury Willoughby*, issued by The Johns Hopkins Press in 1937.

² Printed in *The Commonwealth*, of April 8, 1939.

the contestants are not private capitalists on the one side and the workers of the world on the other. In this revolution one set of states, the "haves," are viewed as the owners and the exploiters of the preponderant share of the wealth of the earth, and the other set, the "have-nots," as the propertyless, the exploited paupers of the international capitalist order. That revolution has become reality in the ever extending war between the "proletarian" Axis powers and the anti-Axis combination of the democratic "capitalist" powers, including of late, strange to contemplate, Communist or Socialist Russia among the capitalistic "haves."

The book attempts to look beyond that revolution and beyond the present war. What it finds beyond is the great IF at the crossroads of events in the making. It seeks to explore the nature and the end of the roads forking out from the IF. In brief, the emphasis of the book is not only on what has been and what is, but also on what will be when that which is will be no more. In the last analysis the emphasis is upon two vital questions: Will the peace to come be once more of the type that "to have" or "not to have" will continue to be a source of discontent and a cause for another bloody chase after the elusive phantom of national self-sufficiency? Or will it be a peace of the kind which will convince the "have-nots" that actual possession of all that would be required for national self-sufficiency is a physical impossibility, that the doctrine positing the inevitability of actual possession is an ideological fallacy, and that security of access to the raw materials essential to modern industrial life can be established by measures short of war and conquest?

In the selection and presentation of the material the author has sought to strike that happy medium between too much and too little, too hot and too cold, which, as he hopes, has resulted in a balanced treatment of the subject. In the attempt to fulfill his self-set task he has been as frank as the scholar had to be, and as circumspect as the nature of a highly provocative subject would permit. If and where he would seem to have erred in the selection of material, or to have failed in the proper degree of frankness and circumspection, he can plead only this: *Nihil humanum mihi alienum est.*

Baltimore, Maryland,
June, 1942.

J. M.

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CHAPTER I

GEOPOLITIK DEMANDS ATTENTION

Geopolitik with all it implies is occupying not only the policy-making agencies of National-Socialist Germany, but it is intriguing the speculation of thinking men and women in the rest of the world, particularly as they are or may be affected by Geopolitik. What does the term Geopolitik mean? What is the significance of its implications? What lies back of it? What are its real and final objectives? These and many more are the questions which anxious minds everywhere ask themselves. Here in the United States efforts are made to enlighten the interested public on this vital subject. Ever more numerous are the articles and pamphlets and booklets appearing in print. Radio commentators are adding their mite to the endeavor. Some of these attempts, most of them in fact, are fragmentary, all too fragmentary to give a satisfying answer to the questions asked. Many center their interest upon this or that meteoric personality connected with the doctrine or practice of Geopolitik, or upon this or that spectacular phase or event induced or assumed to have been induced by Geopolitik. What is not realized, because it is not brought out, or has not been brought out so far by the information offered, is the fact that Geopolitik is not a German monopoly. The Germans may have their particular thorough and ruthless way of squeezing the utmost out of Geopolitik. But the fact remains that a great deal has been going on in the past and is going on today everywhere in the world that is plain, unadulterated Geopolitik though it is not called by that name, even when it has been and is being called obeying Manifest Destiny or assuming the White Man's Burden.

What then is Geopolitik? It may be said to be a doctrine and a practice built upon that doctrine. Doctrines and practices have their origins in certain backgrounds, conditions, events. In order to answer the question of the nature of Geopolitik we must look into the background, condition, and events in which Geopolitik had its origin. In doing so we shall find that Geopolitik is merely one of the many attempted cures resorted to

for the correction of certain shortcomings, assumed or real, of the social and political situation of certain nations and at certain times. We shall find that Geopolitik, as such an attempted cure, is by no means the antithesis of this or that other cure, but may be part and parcel of any or all other patterns of national or group policy. To be specific in one direction, Geopolitik of the German prescription is, in one of its aspects, nothing short of the application of that part of the Marxian panacea which calls for the redistribution of wealth—with this difference: The Marxian formula envisages the accomplishment of this redistribution by way of the seizure of the means of production from the "capitalist, employing, and exploiting owners" by the "propertyless, laboring, and exploited proletariat." Geopolitik of the German type proposes the accomplishment of national self-sufficiency, if necessary by the redistribution of the natural resources of the world. It sanctions this redistribution by whatever methods it can be achieved, including that of forceful seizure by the states or nations lacking in resources from those enjoying an abundance of them, particularly from those who are, or are alleged to be, improvident and incompetent in the use of their resources. In other words, viewed as an ideology Geopolitik of the "have-not" nations brand is the *nationalist* counterpart of Marxian *international* "dialectic materialism," the allegedly scientific formula for the revolutionary seizure of the means of production by the workers of the world. As such, Geopolitik is an integral part and factor of the seething social and political world situation of the recent past and of the present time, a part and factor commanding consideration in the setting of all other allied parts and factors.

This revolutionary world situation, even before the outbreak of the present war, was threatening, to say the least. Even for the United States, with all its resources, with its potential power for national defense, military, economic, and ideological, this situation was pregnant with forebodings of danger from within and without. There were then and there still are today various aspects of that situation. In the first instance, three ideologies or isms were struggling either for supremacy or survival: communism and fascism for supremacy, capitalistic democracy for

survival. Communism and fascism were patently on the aggressive, while capitalistic democracy was on the defensive. The objective of the two former was that of winning the world over to their way of thinking and of doing; that of the latter, to save itself, at least to the degree to which it had survived. This was the picture up to the outbreak of the present contest of arms, and it still is the picture today, at least as seen by those who persist in seeing things in simple outlines. The recent but now past phase of overt cooperation between Soviet Russia and the National-Socialist and Fascist combination, the still more recent adhesion of Japan to the German-Italian cartel, the latest Russo-German War, and the somewhat guarded but none-the-less effective cooperation of France with the European Axis powers, all and everyone of these factors suggest the need for revision of that simple pattern. The need for such revision is measurably enhanced by the undeniable, even if unpalatable, fact that capitalism or laissez-faire democracy, like any other ism, never existed in the pristine purity in which theoreticians and political orators have in the past envisaged it and in which the same agencies today still profess to see it.

In the second place, the struggle among these three isms, if we persist in thinking in the old simple pattern, is not merely a conflict between political ideas and between systems of government built upon them. Modern democracy had its source in a reaction against dynastic political autocracy which failed to meet the needs arising from the intellectual, religious, and industrial revolutions. Communism and fascism owe their advent largely to a reaction against an ever growing political, economic, and social chaos resulting from the failure of democracy, as it developed into capitalistic democracy, to meet the steadily increasing demands, by rapidly multiplying numbers, for the establishment of social or industrial democracy. These demands had their basis in the apparent inability to provide for many millions the opportunity to earn a living for themselves and for their families, by the free choice of work or even any work, free choice or no choice at all. This inability of capitalistic democracy to provide work for all put into serious question the value of the right to vote and opened wide the gates for Communist and Fascist subversive propaganda among the idle

and the willing and unwilling recipients of charity or of government-created, semi-charity jobs.

To understand the fundamental issues involved we must connect cause and effect, and to do that we must distinguish between *provocation* as the immediate impetus for action, and *cause* as a less conspicuous but unmistakable conditioning factor of longer standing and of greater significance than provocation. The sinking of the "Maine" was the provocation, not the cause, of the Spanish-American War. The murder of the Austro-Hungarian heir to the throne was the provocation, not the cause, of the World War, just as the German seizure of Danzig with the coincident invasion of Poland was the provocation, not the cause, of the present war. This realization brings us to the apparently simple but in reality extremely complex question of the cause or causes of the threatening world situation which manifested itself in the struggle of the isms and in consequence of that struggle has led to World War II as the practical application of Geopolitik. The answer to that question is: There is not one but there are many causes of that situation, each one being the effect of a prior cause, the total of all causes forming a complicated hierarchy of causes and effects.

It is not reasonable to expect that state officials, public speakers, and writers for popular magazines exhaust the complex relationship of causes and effects in their discussion of world affairs, especially when such discussion takes place under the strain and stress of actual or threatening war. The most that can and must be demanded is that the enlighteners of public opinion present their subjective choice of causes without subjective, non-factual embellishments. The limitation implied in a choice of this or that cause or the confusion of provocation and cause is distortion enough. Even the most conscientious among the purveyors of information for a public craving some understanding of the aims and deeds of Soviet Russia, of Fascist Italy, of National-Socialist Germany, of semi-Fascist Japan, and of laissez-faire democracy, find themselves moved in favor of this or that choice of approach by their specific professional interests and environmental conditioning, or by the impact of the "imponderables" crashing the structure of their reasoned approach. The statesman responsible for the political security of

the nation, the religious leader, the economist, the political scientist, the capitalist employer, the wage-earning worker, the unemployed, the member of this or that racial stock, all have their particular interest and the desire to know what is to be known in regard to this particular interest—and to pass on what they know to their fellow men. They search, expound, and quote the platforms, pronouncements, and writings of the conflicting ideologies and their adherents and propagators. They are confronted by the confusion, the extravagances, the contradictions of the multitude of the real and would-be authorities of the hostile ideologies; they seize upon the doctrinal phase or phases to which their own training, their own interests, their own beliefs attract them most. The statesman centers his attention on aggression, violation of treaties, physical danger threatening to his own nation from communism, fascism, and national socialism. The minister of the gospel is alarmed by the danger to conventional religion and morals threatening from these forces. The economist favoring the so-called capitalistic democratic system goes to bat in favor of his choice against the nationalization of industry as accomplished in Soviet Russia, and the virtually complete control of industry in Fascist Italy and National-Socialist Germany; the political scientist is concerned chiefly with the political control systems of these countries and all that serves and is made to serve the solidification and extension of that control over the individual, the race, business, religion, art, culture, and what not. The political scientist, by his very calling, should be qualified and can be expected to take the broadest view in a treatment of the conflict of the isms. But so far not one of them has taken a view broad enough to give a satisfactory explanation of the advent and the nature of the hostile ideological forces threatening the very existence of the older and accustomed laissez-faire democratic way of life. This statement implies no condemnation of their caste. In the first place, even political scientists are human beings with human preferences and weaknesses. Some prefer to extol the system under which they have arrived; some knowingly or not, close their inner selves to the full truth or portent concerning the hated foreign isms; some have their hands full securing limited source material upon a limited aspect of the strange objects

upon which their natural curiosity or more or less involuntary efforts are directed by the necessities of their teaching.

But whatever the breadth or limitation of any man's concern and knowledge of these ideologies may be, he will, if he is willing to see, find hidden under their verbiage the economic aspect of the struggle as the one important aspect which all other phases are made to serve. Official communism admits quite frankly that all the trimmings of its doctrine are merely means to the one end, that of overthrowing capitalism, first at home, then in the adjoining lands, and finally all over the world. Fascism and national socialism seemingly have played hide and seek with the world concerning the essential phase of their aims and endeavors. Only lately has it become evident to all but a few of the extreme left that Fascist and National-Socialist economic, cultural, and religious policies, while catastrophic to all who are adversely affected by them, are designed chiefly if not solely to condition the nation for its chief objective and effort, the establishment of an economic system designed to make business the servant of the state which is owned and run by the party, and thus to enable the state to build an economic empire in competition with the rest of the empires of the world.

The realization that it is the economic aspect of the struggle between the isms which is at least one of the basic causes of the advent of the hostile ideologies has come to capitalistic democracies from two directions: first from within, as a result of growing domestic unemployment and a rising questioning of the soundness of the system which has permitted if not produced such conditions; second from without, in the form of Communist, Fascist, and National-Socialist propaganda, the military successes and conquests of the Axis powers, and the dreaded specter of a New European Order which is expected to frustrate the capitalistic system of trade in the rest of the world.

We are fairly familiar with what seem to be obvious facts as demonstrated in the Italian, German, and Japanese frantic attempts to establish self-sufficiency by way of intensified home economies and to supplement these efforts through imperialist expansion at the cost of their neighbors' possessions. Before the present war began it was first National-Socialist endeavors for national self-sufficiency and the recovery of German soil and

resources lost in 1918 which held our attention. Next the center of interests was shifted to the cry for *Lebensraum* (living space), the new symbol for the older labels of *Real-Politik*, *Drang nach Osten*, and a "Place in the Sun." Since the present war has been in swing the push for *Lebensraum* has assumed the proportion of imperialist expansion. Not many months ago the child was rebaptized "The New European" or "Neuropean Order." Soon Africa was added as middle name which would make it the "New Afro-European Order." A still later version is that of the "Eurasian Order." By the rest of the world this shift of terminology implying a corresponding shift of aspirations is looked upon as a shield or screen for world domination or world conquest, which it may be in fact. So crucial does this aspect of the Axis struggle for *Lebensraum* seem to the United States at this point that the very tenor of the conduct of our foreign policy has come to be that of counteracting and defeating every move of German, Italian, and Japanese military and political activity, even to the extent of actual war.

In line with this rather oversimplified approach to the infinitely more complicated problem, by way of this or that choice of this or that partial aspect, a number of writers have seized upon one or another of the many phases of the larger issue of Geopolitik as the essential and basic cause for the coming of the Hitler régime and its geopolitical ambitions. A favorable background for their articles had been created by the appearance of Rauschning's *The Revolution of Nihilism* with its challenging quotation from and references to the geopolitical productions of Professor Karl Haushofer who is the main feature of attraction and exposition in the writings to be reviewed. In the March number of the *Atlantic Monthly* of 1941, Professor A. Whitney Griswold presented an article entitled "Paving the Way for Hitler." The particular phase with which he deals in this article is *Lebensraum*, or rather the National-Socialist ideological and actual struggle for *Lebensraum*, as an important aspect and, as most readers will be likely to judge, the chief doctrine, of Geopolitik. From the multitude of exponents of the doctrine of *Lebensraum* he discusses chiefly Professor Haushofer, his writings and his work as Director of the Geopolitical Institute of Munich, and Hans Grimm, the novelist, who through his

eminently effective and popular novel, *Volk ohne Raum* ("People Without Space"), unknowingly and unintentionally has become a powerful force in the National-Socialist Lebensraum propaganda campaign. Professor Haushofer has been featured of late most lavishly in popular vehicles of information. In *Living Age* Haushofer is presented—quite erroneously, as we shall see—as "Author of Lebensraum."¹ In *Newsweek* Haushofer is discussed in "Nazi War Scheme" as prominently connected with "Hitler's Dream of Conquest Based on the Plan of an Englishman."² *Current History* has an article, "Hitler's Scientists," revealing all about "1,000 Nazi Scientists, Technicians, and Spies, working under Dr. Karl Haushofer for the Third Reich."³ In this article, reprinted in the *Reader's Digest* under the title "Thousand Scientists Behind Hitler,"⁴ Haushofer appears as the brains and the driving force, the alpha and the omega of his institute of a thousand scientists. In an article entitled "Who Rules Russia Rules the World," printed in the *New Republic*, Albert Horlings extols Haushofer and Ewald Banse as the master geopoliticians of National-Socialist Germany.⁵ *Survey Graphic*, in "Maps are Weapons,"⁶ by H. W. Weigert, deals with Haushofer, Lebensraum, and their relation to cartography as a new propaganda weapon of National-Socialist Geopolitik.⁷ The daily papers are joining in the popularization of Professor Haushofer in editorials and articles replete with repetitions of the material offered in the weeklies and monthlies. In the line of books there is Pierre Van Passen's duodecimo, *The Time is Now*, which gives a picture of Geopolitik as a doctrine and as an organized machine under National-Socialist control, with an outline of past, present, and future plans of world conquest and domination.

The gist of these attempts to inform the interested American reader on the subject of Geopolitik with its pet doctrine of Lebensraum, and of National-Socialist sponsorship of both, is briefly this: Scholars have searched for the roots of national socialism and its acceptance of Geopolitik as a doctrine and

¹ January, 1941.

² February 17, 1941.

³ June, 1941.

⁴ June, 1941.

⁵ July 7, 1941.

⁶ October, 1941.

⁷ See also below, p. 25

practice in the teachings of Hegel, Fichte, Nietzsche, and Treitschke. Hegel and Fichte were philosophers of the period of German defeat and humiliation by Napoleon Bonaparte nearly a century and a half ago. Both preached to their dejected fellow Germans the need for national unity and moral regeneration. Fichte is the author of *Reden an die deutsche Nation* ("Addresses to the German Nation") and of *Der geschlossene Handelsstaat* ("The Closed Commercial State"). The first of these works is often cited as containing an encouragement toward pan-German nationalism, while in reality these "Addresses" are a fervent appeal to his fellow citizens to seek salvation in cultural pursuits rather than in military exploits and conquests. In "The Closed Commercial State" Fichte expounds a system of corporate or guild socialism under state control as a reasonable coordination, synthesis, of the growing social and economic conflicts of his time. Nietzsche was the apostle of the creed of the superman. Treitschke, nineteenth century professor of history, was the exponent of German expansionism or, if you will, of the doctrine of *Lebensraum*. Scholars have recognized, but not sufficiently appreciated, the influence upon National-Socialist thought and action of Gobineau, Chamberlain, Feder, and Eckhart. Comte Joseph Arthur de Gobineau is best known for an essay first published in French in 1853-1855, and later in 1901-1903 in English as *The Moral and Intellectual Diversity of Races, with Particular Reference to Their Respective Influence in the Civil and Political History of Mankind*. In 1903 a Frenchman, Ernest Seillière, wrote a four hundred and fifty page essay entitled *Le Comte de Gobineau et l'arianisme historique*. As far as titles prove anything Gobineau's paternity of National-Socialist race theory would seem to be established—but, let us repeat, only as far as titles go. Houston Chamberlain, the English intellectual who became domiciled and naturalized in Germany, achieved fame, or notoriety as some insist, by his ponderous work *Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*, published in English as *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, which is said to have spurred Alfred Rosenberg, the National-Socialist would-be Chamberlain, to produce his *Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts*. Gottfried Feder, who died recently, was one of the original seven founders of

what now is the National-Socialist Party. He was the social economist, the technocrat, who supplied Hitler and the rest of the "founding fathers" with the social and economic features of *The Twenty-Five Points* of the National-Socialist platform. Dietrich Eckhart is, or was, for he too is dead, the official "poet-laureate" of the party.

All these worthies of past and present had and have something to do with the coming of Geopolitik and with its adoption and application by National-Socialist leadership. But the real driving forces of Geopolitik as a system of thought and action, so the story goes, are the apostles of the doctrines of Lebensraum and their present-day head and master, Professor Haushofer, the disciple of Friedrich Ratzel and Rudolf Kjellen, earlier advocates of the doctrine. Haushofer is conceived and pictured as a kind of medicine man or witch doctor of the National-Socialist geopolitical tribe. He is presented as the man who, through his student Rudolf Hess, initiated Adolf Hitler, chafing in his fortress prison, into the mysteries of Geopolitik and interested him in its possibilities. Haushofer is the director of the Geopolitical Institute in Munich and as such the overlord of a thousand scientists who work out the plans for the conquest of Lebensraum, plans which Hitler is said to accept and follow—presumably as his own. He is the man whose travels and studies have given him the knowledge which enables him to train and direct his army of spies and fifth columnists for their share in the conquest of Lebensraum in the countries designated in the plans prepared by his scientists. He is the man, who, as we are informed, though married to a Jewess, enjoys the confidence of the National-Socialist grandees, and whose sons have been granted the status of Honorary Aryans.^a In fine, we are given a schedule of the geopolitically determined military conquests of Lebensraum already accomplished and of those still to come, the details of which have proved correct in some instances and erroneous in others.

^a *Time* of June 16, 1941, has an interesting sketch of another of the high power type of geopoliticians portrayed in the popular literature. Under the heading, "The Durable Dränger," it tells about Baron von Oppenheim's services in the cause of Geopolitik in general and Lebensraum in particular. Baron Max is a Jew, and according to *Time* was "raised to Honorary Aryan status."

Ewald Banse and Hans Grimm have been assigned the rank of minor apostles of Lebensraum, but are held to be of sufficient importance to receive mention with Haushofer, the master, in the present-day Lebensraum and Haushofer literature. Ewald Banse is the author of more than several dozen books, large and small. He has written on the subject of travel in many countries of the world; of Harems, Slaves, Caravans, Bedouins, Dervishes, and Sons of the Sun. He has produced modern geographies of many lands. He is the compiler of *Ewald Banse's Lexikon der Geographie*, published in 1923, in which he writes, under the item "Abessinien," that "Abyssinia would be a blessed land without the Abyssinians." Two chief works brought him fame, notoriety, and trouble at home and abroad. The first of the two is *Raum und Volk im Weltkriege, Gedanken über eine nationale Wehrlehre* ("Space and People During the War, Thoughts Concerning a Doctrine of National Defense"), published in the original in 1933, and in English translation as *Germany Prepares for War, A Nazi Theory of National Defense*.⁹ While the title of the American edition does violence to the original German title, it does no injustice to the contents of the book. The other work is *Wehrwissenschaft* ("Science of Defense"), published in 1935. In these two books Banse developed the theory of modern total war with practical applications to a European war of the kind which now is in full bloom. Challenging the prevailing idea that national socialism could not possibly become and be a lasting force in highly industrialized Germany, he predicted that not only in the social and political sphere would it conquer its adversaries, but that as a military force it would establish its competency. He predicted or foreshadowed the penetration of the Maginot Line, the division of Poland between Russia and Germany, the German counterblockade of the British Isles, the softening of the British defense by way of starvation, and the conquest of Britain by successful invasion. The British, so he felt, with the *Brotkorb* (breadbasket) hanging high, would not fight to defend their soil. These were the indiscretions of Banse, *enfant terrible* of the National-Socialist régime, indiscretions indeed, in 1933 and

⁹ New York, 1934.

1935! At the time Banse was Professor of Geography at the Technische Hochschule at Hanover. The storm of indignation abroad, and particularly in England, forced the National-Socialist government to announce the suppression of the two books as not representing the opinion and intention of the Government. It seems that Banse also held, at that time or somewhat later, a state-supported chair of Military Science at the Technische Hochschule in Braunschweig. This too was denied by the German government, but this denial has been put in question by what seems to be tenable evidence.¹⁰

Hans Grimm's *Volk ohne Raum* is the outpouring of a weary traveler's haunted soul. After a brief schooling in Southwestern Germany, Grimm was sent to England for apprenticeship in the import-export trade. In 1896 he went to South Africa as clerk in a British company and soon established himself as an independent merchant in various business centers of the Dominion. From 1910 he traveled for a while through German Southwest Africa and the Cameroons. The experiences of these years furnished him with the material for his fateful book. He did not serve in the World War. But the results of the peace, as manifested in the territorial losses to the Reich, he saw at close range in South Africa. The economic consequences in the form of starvation and inflation he witnessed in person after his return. *Volk ohne Raum*, which swept the country from East to West, from North to South, was Grimm's own Odyssey—and Grimm's own Odyssey was the Odyssey of his nation, the *Volk ohne Raum*; it was the story of the trek from the farm to the industries of the city; the shift from strained and crowded urban centers to promising transatlantic colonial ventures; the forced surrender by the *Volk ohne Raum* of its hard won colonial possessions, and retreat to a homeland now smaller, tenser, poorer than when it set out in the search for more space and for greater opportunities. That is in essence the story of Grimm's book which, with or without the design of its author, served to add dynamic force to the National-Socialist drive for the revival of the pre-war policy of economic

¹⁰ The essence of the Banse case, or controversy is found in the *London Times* of February 26 and March 6, 1934.

expansion, for a place in the sun, for Lebensraum, as it now is called.¹¹

Every time one thinks one has brought the onrush of literary offerings into line with the story of the text, more articles appear. One or two of the latest crop require attention because they claim and to some extent do strike out in directions of their own. "Geopolitics," by Robert Strausz-Hupé, published in *Fortune*,¹² begins the discussion of the subject with a brief sketch of the life of Friedrich List, German professor of what we in the United States would consider a combination of political science and political economy. Professor List is well known to American economists and political scientists for his brief career (1825-1832) in the United States where he was befriended by Henry Clay. Ideologically he is to be classed with the neomercantilists and what we today would call the economic planners. As Strausz-Hupé points out, List was impressed with the economic strength of the United States and the vast expanse of its territory. In the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine, he saw the United States spread its protecting wings over the many lands to the south of her frontiers. When he returned to his native land as United States Consul in Leipzig, he became active in the establishment of the *Zollverein*, the German customs union, which prepared the way for the eventual political unification of the German states. He began to think and write about the fatherland in terms and ambitions acquired in his experiences in the United States. According to Strausz-Hupé: "Memories of spacious early America flavored List's book, published in 1841: *The National System of Political Economy*. Germany, List argued, should expand her industry and commerce through protective legislation and a navigation act. But for her economic progress she needed *an extended and conveniently bounded territory reaching from the North and Baltic seas to the Black Sea and the Adriatic*." "Thus List," Strausz-Hupé concludes, "the friend of Henry Clay and student of Alexander Hamilton, originated the theory of *Lebensraum*." To this may be added the comment that what List did was to apply

¹¹ A fuller description of Grimm's novel is given in Griswold's article cited above p. 17.

¹² November, 1941.

the theory of Lebensraum, with which he had become indoctrinated in the United States, to his own little country in which, to use the phraseology of Strausz-Hupé, "men still haggled over rival claims of petty principalities no larger than a county in Rhode Island." The bulk of the article deals with Haushofer as the chief exponent of Geopolitik or at least of National-Socialist Geopolitik. It contains extensive quotations from Haushofer's writings and reveals many points missed in previous accounts by other writers. Probably the most vital point brought out by Strausz-Hupé is Haushofer's own estimate of the extent, the limitations, and the basic objective of his own writings. Strausz-Hupé quotes from Haushofer's "most popular book," *Weltpolitik von Heute* ("World Politics of Today") as follows:

This work is to furnish guidance in the study of world policy. It is based on the method of geopolitical observation. Whosoever seeks in it a science drawn to individual situations will be disappointed. . . . What matters in our times of vast upheavals is that each individual, each group, and each great power should know the motive forces of world political developments. Only thus can the leaders of the great powers determine the just division of the earth. . . . But the decisions . . . of world policy are set against a background of infinite variety. Certainties exist only on paper. This book can be completed only by living the problems of policy and matching oneself against the will of the world political opponent.

Expressing his own view on the subject at issue, Strausz-Hupé states that "nowhere in all of Haushofer's writings is there a master plan for German foreign policy."

Strausz-Hupé continues to show the existence of a degree of infiltration of geopolitical theory and terminology into Italian and Japanese political literature. Italy has her *Geopolitica* founded in 1939, the counterpart to the German *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*. He asserts that "the Japanese press plagiarizes Haushofer's terminology and some of the official Japanese press releases on Japan's 'New Order' in East Asia read like verbatim transcripts of Haushofer's writings." He points to the fact that recent German literature produces books of a geojuristic and geomedical nature.¹⁸ He has discovered that "concepts curiously

¹⁸ One of the former type is Manfred Langhans, *Die Grossen Mächte geojuristisch betrachtet* ("The Great Powers Viewed Geojuristically") (Munich, 1931).

similar to those elaborated by the geopoliticians have seeped into the American discussion on world policy." "In the article by James Burnham ["Coming Rulers of the United States"¹⁴] and more particularly in his book *The Managerial Revolution*, the reader," as advised by Strausz-Hupé, "may study a brand of thought that bears a remarkable resemblance to that of Haushofer."

Another article by H. W. Weigert, entitled "German Geopolitics, a Workshop for Army Rule," appeared in *Harpers Magazine* for November, 1941. As the title indicates, the main emphasis lies with National-Socialist geopolitics as exemplified by Haushofer, his Geopolitical Institute at Munich, his *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, and the National-Socialist army as the beneficiary of all that National-Socialist Geopolitik makes available by way of information, plans, and what not. Weigert is not much impressed with some of the material published on the subject prior to his article. Thus he writes: ". . . American journalists and authors have belatedly discovered the existence of the *German Institute for Geopolitics* and its founder and head . . . Dr. Karl Haushofer. . . . As usual, when writers discover the existence of a pertinent theory and rush to explain it, the American reading public has been treated to a brief but intensive course in geopolitics, in which facts, opinions, and speculations have been thoroughly brewed and garbled," and he adds, "typical is a recent article in *Current History* by Frederic Sondern, Jr., which was condensed by the *Readers' Digest* under the title '1,000 Scientists Behind Hitler.'" Mr. Weigert proposes "to digest some of the most important publications on geopolitics, especially Haushofer's dignified monthly magazine, *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, to try to describe the real meaning and the *Weltanschauung* of German geopolitics, and also to apply it to the war strategy of the German General Staff." He carries out what he proposes to do.¹⁵

That, in essence, is the history, a kind of case history, of Geopolitik and Lebensraum as presented in the popular literature of the day, the history of a desperate, a hopeless case. There

¹⁴ *Fortune*, November, 1941.

¹⁵ A more technical treatment of the subject of Lebensraum is found in an essay by Charles Kruszewski: "Germany's Lebensraum," published in *The American Political Science Review* of October, 1940.

is nothing specifically or fundamentally wrong with the story as far as it has been told, or with the treatment of this or that personality, or this or that phase of the subject of Geopolitik in general and Lebensraum in particular. What is wrong with it, or one thing that is wrong with it, is that it is not the whole history of the case; it does not begin where that history begins in reality, nor does it end where and how it might end. It is like the conventional account of the case of the sick man. The patient says he is Napoleon. According to simple diagnosis he is demented. Cure there is not, but permanent detention in the abode of his like. The patient writhes in convulsions. He suffers from epilepsy, St. Vitus dance. Cure is doubtful. Treatment will be temporary hospitalization, followed by temporary normalcy till the next attack. The patient is raving in agony. He is found to be in the painful stages of a malignant growth. Treatment is opiates to reduce his pain and end his raving, and perhaps radical surgery to remove the cancer at the risk of killing the patient too. But the conventional story of the sick man does no longer satisfy the present-day intelligent layman and will no longer be accepted as satisfactory by him. For he knows that the psychiatrist will seek out the patient's real or imaginary grievances, the causes of his inferiority complex; that he will attempt to heal the wounded ego of the patient and thus remove the need for the overcompensation by way of playing Napoleon. The modern intelligent layman knows that the surgeon has learned from post-mortems that small injuries suffered in infancy may be the cause of the so-called epilepsy and its like; the intelligent layman expects from the physician that he apply the knowledge available to the informed profession. The intelligent layman knows that modern medicine applies in a scientific manner the age-old wisdom popularly acknowledged in the adage: An ounce of prevention is better than a pound of cure. He knows that modern medicine is making serious efforts to discover the causes of cancer in the hope of preventing the ugly disease from seizing and destroying one healthy individual after the other. He knows that even though the ultimate aim of prevention has not been reached, modern medicine strives to discover the presence of the disease in its incipient stages in the hope of preventing its development

into the advanced and hopeless state. What has been said about the case of the sick man applies with even greater force and significance to the story of social and political pathological phenomena, such as Geopolitik, or rather the practice of Geopolitik, in its present-day violent form. To tell the essentials of the story of Geopolitik we must dive deep into the recesses of the consciousness of those preaching and practicing the doctrine. We must, like the psychiatrist, seek to uncover the innermost driving forces which have created in their minds the conviction of the need, alleged or real, of greater living space. We must attempt to begin the story where it begins, we must follow it in the setting in which it has grown—and finally we must apply the knowledge thus gained to the consideration of that which is to take the place of Geopolitik, if and when that doctrine and its practice are to make way for a less violent method of settling national and international maladjustments.

CHAPTER II

A NEW NAME HIDES AN OLD DEVICE

A study of the antecedents of Geopolitik reveals the fact that what afflicts our present generation as a social and political malaise was conceived originally as a cure for ills considered insufferable and pains held unbearable. These ills were very old ills and very old pains and the cure prescribed for them was an equally old cure which, in its manifold applications, has taken sometimes more, sometimes less, violent forms. In spite of extreme violent manifestations that cure has been recommended and applied time and time again, generation after generation, by nation after nation, until today in the National-Socialist prescription and dosage it looms for us no longer as a cure, but as an ill and a pain, overshadowing all previous ills and pains of its kind. In more specific terms, Geopolitik with all that it implies is something for which neither the National Socialists nor the Germans of the imperial era hold or held the patent. Indeed even the choice of the term Geopolitik for that which it implies, is not to be credited to the well-known imaginative proclivity of Germans, but to the inventive genius of a member of another branch of the Nordic race.

The search for the antecedents, the nature, and implication of Geopolitik leads beyond fleeting superficialities into ever-present fundamentals. Men do not live, plan, and act in isolation. They are organized into groups and nations. Groups and nations are organized into political units called states. Men, groups, nations, states are motivated in their behavior by biological, cultural, and psychological needs, real or imaginary. Some of these needs are to be filled through the processes of agriculture, industry, and trade; others are satisfied by way of ideas, beliefs, ambitions, and the accomplishments of these ambitions. Food is grown upon land or bought in exchange for gold, or goods or services when gold is not available. Industry and trade require basic materials and the machinery with which the materials are transformed from their raw state into finished goods for the market. Raw materials are found in or upon the land, or if not, must be secured in exchange for gold, and if that is lacking, for finished goods or services. But if finished

goods and services are not wanted or not needed by the possessor of the raw materials sought, if the attempt to gain markets for this or that commodity, if the endeavor to secure this or that raw material run counter to the policies of other states, if they clash with corresponding pursuits of other states—what then?

To secure the required or allegedly required resources and to realize their ambitions men strive, scheme, and fight. To do all these things with the prospect of maximum efficiency and result, men plan not only in a physical sense as they plan their industrial equipment, their military machines, but they rationalize their ambitions and their determinations into "moral" justifications for their actions. They build not only factories, highways, and dynamos; they also construct the ideological equivalents of all these material instrumentalities, in the form of social and political doctrines such as laissez-fairism, socialism, communism, fascism, new deals, five-year plans, and perhaps Geopolitik—all of which are designed to serve as a kind of psychological drive belt for the more efficient realization of the material needs.

Even the nature of organization into groups, nations, and states is subject to notions and conceptions varying according to changing needs and changing ambitions of the social order. In a simple agricultural and trading society the political institutions of the state may be looked upon chiefly as a machinery for the preservation of peace and order at home and of security against attacks from without. According to this concept the state is the lawmaker and the keeper of the peace. It is the business of private enterprise to grow the food needed and to produce the quantity of goods required. It is the task of the open market to strike the balance between supply and demand, between cost and price, between price and wage, between wealth and poverty. This simple notion of the relationship between the state and private enterprise, carried over into modern industrialized society, is struggling for survival under the label of laissez-faire capitalistic democracy. But when a nation becomes industrialized to the extent of overreaching its own resources; when the operation of industry is interrupted again and again by strikes, or by lockouts, or by overproduction, or by decline of purchasing power in the domestic and in the foreign markets;

when unemployment results and further decreases the demand for goods on hand; when any or all these things come to pass, then the laissez-faire competitive system ceases to be popular because it has ceased to be effective. People begin to shout for the intervention of the state or the government as the somebody who is expected to fill the dinner pails which have remained unfilled, to put an end to crises and depressions, in short, to accomplish the miracle which private industry and trade could not and would not perform. The people cry out for government intervention, for government regulation, even for government ownership of the means of production if measures short of such ownership fail to stock Old Mother Hubbard's empty cupboard. When that situation arises, the concept of the state changes or has changed. The machinery of the state is expected to operate no longer merely to preserve law and order; it is called upon to provide for the individual's economic needs which the so-called laissez-faire economy of the capitalistic era failed to satisfy. The state has come to be looked upon no longer merely as the burly and somewhat slow-witted policeman, but also and perhaps preferably as the omnipotent and bountiful provider for the underprivileged, as the tireless and ample nursemaid for the submarginal of the human multitudes. In the notion of the needy, of the weak, the state becomes policeman, provider, and nursemaid all in one, three persons in one statehood. And when the state, i. e. those who run the government for the state and as the state, has become conscious of its threefold personality, then that state in turn begins to get and to beget notions of its own, as for instance the one of setting out to fill all the empty cupboards of all the Old Mother Hubbards, and perhaps the subsequent notion of accomplishing the replenishing of the barren larders by way of practicing Geopolitik and all that which is the equivalent of Geopolitik without answering to that name.

It is with one and all of these factors reacting upon each other, pushing and turning in a ceaselessly churning and seething cauldron that so-called Geopolitik made its appearance and is playing its part today, just as its more primitive ancestry did in their time, in the form of Roman imperial expansionism; of the wars of Medes and Persians; of the campaigns of Alex-

ander and Philip of Macedon; of the great migrations of the early Middle Ages; of the plundering and scorching escapades of an Attila, a Ghengis Khan, of the Norsemen, of a Cortez; of the Hundred, the Thirty, the Seven Years' wars; of the grand tour and retour of Napoleon Bonaparte; of the War of American Independence; of the Orgeon episode characterized by the slogan "Fifty-four Forty or Fight"; of the War between the American States, and all the other countless manifestations tinged with a geopolitical flavor.

As if all of these revelations and considerations were not enough to put into question our conventional picture of Geopolitik in its National-Socialist or pre-National-Socialist manifestation, we have not yet reached the end of the complexities that must be faced. Going back to fundamentals of the past and reaching out for them into the future, as one patently must, one is confronted by another, and perhaps even more disturbing, experience. Popular opinion alleges that experience is the best teacher. If that allegation were correct, mankind should have discovered long ago a form of social and political living which would avoid the ever recurring failures to meet the ever changing needs of man as an individual or as a group. Or, if experience had proved such discovery impossible, mankind should have learned that the advent or creation of ever new social and political doctrines and systems built upon them may be a symptom of an evolutionary social and political process of growth, but that this evolutionary process is not, or has not been so far at least, the means of bringing about a lasting cure of the world's social and political ills in whatever shape or form they may afflict us.

The evidence of the past and present seems to demonstrate that pre-eminently in the sphere of the social and political activities of man, authors or creators of new theories concerning the relation of man to the social and political order have posed time after time as the discoverers of new cures for the ills of human society, in the field of economics, politics, education, morals, or what not. Ever new systems of social and political organization and theories have been and are devised and applied as the "truth," as "reality," as the "solution" of man's problems, despite the fact that time has never failed to expose all

such successive systems and theories as products of the reaction to preceding systems and theories which had forfeited their claim to truth, reality, and permanence because of altered basic conditions; because of adulterations, misconceptions, hardening of forms and categories; because of the impossibility of keeping an ever changing subject matter within a rigid structure.

To be specific: every historic form and concept of the state lays claim to truth, reality, and permanence. Every one of them embodies part of truth and of reality and possesses a measure of permanence, insofar as it represents a shifting of emphasis dictated by the changing conditions of the social order. Thus every successive form and concept of the state is part—but only part—of the “whole truth” of the “whole reality” of socio-political existence. Recently certain political thinkers and practitioners have allowed themselves once more to be captured by one of the allegedly new concepts of the state. This new school, known as Geopolitik, purports to do two things. In the first place, it seeks to establish as the whole truth, the whole reality, with expectation of permanence, its particular conception of the nature of the state and of the organization and functions appropriate to the state of their design. In the second place, it insists, or to be more exact, an important section of the school insists, upon constructing, on the basis of that particular idea of the state, what is alleged to be a complete methodology of comparative politics, i. e., a general system of political science as both preceptor and handmaiden of practical statecraft.

While it is correct to say that in a formal way the school of Geopolitik represents a new ideology or system of thought and action for the social and political control of modern human group life—it is equally correct to insist upon the fact that the basic ideas with which it operates or upon which it is built are as old as the hills and the vales, the mountains and the plains, the rivers and the seas with which it deals. One of these old and basic ideas is the conception that man as individual and group is a part of nature, and that the state as the political organization of man and the group, or man in the group, is a biological organism subject to the law of nature with regard to birth, growth, decline, and death. The second of these old and basic ideas is the notion or realization that the object of primary

and ultimate organization of man in group and state is the desire for physical security, for the guaranteeing of the means of subsistence of the population and of that degree of growth compatible with the innate energy and ambition of the individual and the group. Old, in the third place, is the geopolitical aspect of self-sufficiency, of planning for such self-sufficiency, and of resorting to war and conquest as the last resort or supplementation of the less radical approaches to self-sufficiency. The ancient empires of the East had planned economies. Self-sufficiency was the objective of their planning and of their imperialistic conquests. The Codes of Hammurabi and of Manu bear this out. The difference between these ancient systems and their modern counterparts is this—that the ancients considered their systems as normal while we today, or at least some of us, look upon planned society, be it the Communist or Fascist or National-Socialist or any other type, as an unwelcome because disturbing phenomenon threatening to cut short the life span of what has been called the *laissez-faire* system of free, individualistic enterprise.

What has been referred to as the normal social and political systems in the ancient totalitarian theocracies of Babylon and India, and as we may add, in Persia, Egypt, in the old Roman Empire of the Caesars, in some of the more or less totalitarian city states of Greece, was followed at least in the West, after the disintegration of the Roman colossus, by what may be termed feudal individualistic atomism. Under this system the strong personality came into his own. Allegiance, submission to one still stronger, was at least technically voluntary; it was pledged by way of contract, subject to termination if one yet stronger offered better prospects of liege service. It seemed the ideal, divinely established scheme of things for the strong of this earth, just as the totalitarian systems which feudalism seemingly had replaced had claimed to be the ideal, divinely established scheme of things during their time. But even in the feudal order totalitarian social and political rule prevailed in the atomistic feudal entities of the manor and castle. For long periods of time each of these units was a self-sufficient entity under the autocratic rule of the baron and lord.

With the gradual enforced submission of the feudal lordlings

under one stronger national overlord, there appeared the national monarchical administrative state and with it the phenomenon of state control over social and political affairs as a matter of national concern. This tendency was accelerated and intensified as a result of the discoveries of a new world, its gold, its resources; with the establishment of trading posts in the newly discovered spheres of the globe; with competition between the trading posts of different nations; until there evolved a system of social and political trade rivalling that of the totalitarian empires of the far past. Mercantilism was the label attached to this system by the critics emanating from the economic fraternity; autocracy it was called by those of the political persuasion. Both united in their support of those commercial and trading elements who felt slighted by the favors bestowed upon the more successful beneficiaries of trading charters, subsidies, and protective tariff legislation. Both joined the intellectual revolt against the Tudor and Stuart and Bourbon political autocracies exercised under the aegis of the doctrine of divine rights of kings. The writings of Machiavelli, Bossuet, Bodin, Filmer, and Hobbes tell the story of the emergence of this system of post-feudal totalitarian and autocratic monarchy, while in turn the teachings of Hooker, Locke, and Rousseau symptomize the reaction against this system, a reaction which ushered in or accompanied the birth of what came to be known as *laissez-faire* democracy. It came to be known as democracy, insofar as it forced the extension of the feudal individualism of the barons and lords down to the level of the sovereign voter wherever feudalism was forced to give way to the supremacy of parliaments or representative republican government or whatever the choice of democratic rule might be. It came to be known as *laissez-faire* democracy, because it restricted government or dynastic control to a minimum and established, at least for a time, comparatively speaking, freedom of production, of commerce, of trade and labor.

Laissez-faire democracy was hailed by free and self-respecting men as the form of social and political control suiting and fitting their type. If all men, or at least the majority of men, had proved to be capable of self-restraint as well as self-respect, *laissez-faire* democracy might have been proved to be at least a tolerably successful form of living and governing even where it

has failed. But the facts of life seem to contravene the basic and implied suppositions of the free and self-respecting men. In the sphere of politics, the new concept of the political order was one based upon the supremacy and sanctity of law as enacted by a political majority, real or technical, of the voters. Correspondingly it rested upon the acceptance of and obedience to this law by all, including the opposition or dissenting minority or minorities. This man-made law was called positive law as distinguished from natural or divine law which had been considered as the ruling law of the period of ecclesiastical supremacy over individuals, kings, and nations. With the extension of the right to vote, groups organized into political parties designed to write into the positive man-made law the particular versions of what their particular group interests wanted the law to be. These different interests began to conflict; they clashed, they blocked each other to the extent of making decisions by majority vote difficult and often impossible. Pluralities, i. e., minorities, enacted the law for the nation, elected the governing and legislative representatives of the whole political unit.

In the economic sphere *laissez-faire* enterprise met with its first check as a result of the abuses accompanying the industrial revolution. With the transition from home to factory industry there arose the crying need for a return to state interference and control in industry and trade, interference and control designed to combat excessively long hours, barbarous child labor conditions, cruelly inadequate wages—and dangerously unsanitary conditions of working and living quarters. But with the change from individual factory enterprise to trustification of industry, trade, and finance, with the coming of mass production, made possible by the intensification and extension of mechanization of the processes of manufacture—particularly the constant increase of labor-saving devices—so-called *laissez-faire* industry was always several jumps ahead of government regulation and control of ever present industrial and business malpractices. Freedom of labor to contract for work by individual action, established with the smashing of the guilds, was lost as a result of the growing financial power of the manufacturer, mass production processes, and the demotion of the worker from the position of artisan to that of mere servant of the machine. The advent of labor organization as a force sufficiently strong

to represent the worker in his dealing with the employer in the matter of employment, wages, and hours added a new element to the complexity and intensity of the slowly but visibly increasing struggle between employers and workers. The conflict between competitive business interests, between hostile labor groups, between the adherents of "all the profit the traffic will bear" and the advocates of production for use only, between government and business, the clashes between rival national interests for the markets of the world, all, in varying degrees, have served to render ever more intense, manifold, and ruthless the struggle between the dynamic forces involved. Overproduction, under-consumption, maldistribution, in various combinations or all three together, the First World War with its destruction of priceless irreplaceable resources in human material and moral values, the loss of markets, and consequent disruption of all balance of world trade sped the sequence and enlarged the scope of pre-war depression cycles. Where periodic unemployment figures before the war were counted in hundreds of thousands, they were now registered in millions. Laissez-faire economy stood at the crossroads; it faced the judgment bar of history. The moderates among the reformers asked for and secured legislation to restrain the great corporations and to check unfair methods of trade. They called for international conferences, agreements, the quota system for wheat, sugar, and what not; they cried out for collective security in the economic as well as in the political sphere; they pressed for compulsory arbitration by the government of embittering and paralyzing combats between the conflicting interest groups; they pleaded for self-restraint and voluntary cooperation on the part of multiple political parties which were making sport of government and playing tenpins with ministers, premiers, and cabinets, and thus were adding still greater difficulties to an already disheartening situation. Laws the reformers got and ever more laws; international conferences were held and ever more of such conferences. Even agreements were reached and treaties signed for arbitration and fair trade. A League of Nations, and International Labor Office, foreign loans to the gold-poor, moratoria for the bankrupt—all were established, given and granted—but all to small avail. Individuals, business, labor, political parties, nations, all equally selfish, willful, unscrupulous, always

found ways to evade the law, to bend the law, to force objectionable law upon unwilling minorities or even majorities. They found a way or ways to appoint or elect as officials willing accomplices in this orgy of evasion, twisting, and imposition. They found ways to sabotage international treaties and institutions. Well-intentioned executive and administrative agencies found themselves time and again forced to resort to extra-legal measures because even the multitude of laws, treaties, and institutions were insufficient—or ineffective.

There evolved, as a consequence of the malpractices indicated by these facts of life, various reactions to the laissez-faire economy. For that economy, on the one hand, had sought to confine the state to the position of a glorified policeman keeping peace and order in the strictly legalistic sphere of conventional human relationships, and, on the other hand, had demonstrated its capacity for the evasion of the restraining laws which had been passed against its will. In consequence the honest, well-meaning, moderate reformer, believing that he can supply the right law in the proper quality and quantity, demands for his group the chance to try his hand at the job of supplying the law and of enforcing it. The demagogue, ambitious but dishonest, seeks to ride into power on the basis of the same demand. The result in either case will be and in some instances has come to be, tutelage, dictatorship in varying degrees, and the totalitarian state in one form or other. Modern socialism, sovietism, fascism, and national socialism are creations of these reactions. But all find support in their criticism of private enterprise economy, as practiced under laissez-faire democratic regimes, in still another trend hostile to laissez-faire economy, in a reaction altogether too much neglected by students of recent social and political speculation and organization, in a manifestation which has crystallized in what has already been introduced as Geopolitik. As a formally proclaimed school of thought Geopolitik was of course a new venture. But in reality it was little more than a consolidation, a kind of codification of old, very old, practices for modern application. For what were the ancient totalitarian social and political empire control systems if not unconscious or even conscious applications of the doctrines, or at least some of the doctrines, of Geopolitik? What were the granting of trading charters for trading posts

in the newly discovered world, what were the acquisition of colonies and the establishment of empires by the industrial and trading nations of the world, old and new, but manifestations of the age-old striving for *Lebensraum*? What were the alternating restrictive and expansive tariff laws of the corn and wool and beer control era of England and France except the practices of certain aspects of the doctrine of self-sufficiency as extolled in Geopolitik? What have been such enterprises as the construction of the Suez Canal, the Panama Canal, and the attempts of particular nations or of groups of nations to secure political and functional control of these canals, if not the application of the principles of Geopolitik? What are the more recent establishments by way of negotiation or outright seizure of strategic army and naval bases in the four corners of the earth and the seas, if not Geopolitik applied in the sphere of military policy, defensive, offensive, or both? What has been the century-old history of British Empire building but the story of English Geopolitik—even where and when it was hallowed as the litany of the White Man's Burden? What has been American expansionism from East to West, from North to South, from the mainland to the islands of the far flung seas—if not American Geopolitik, proudly heralded under the chapter Manifest Destiny? What is present day hemisphere defense with all its accomplishments to date and its ventures yet to come—unless it be categorical, imperative Geopolitik with a doughty, lusty vengeance?

In the wake of the obvious answer to all these questions, one outstanding fact demands recognition: Some Geopolitik including that which is Geopolitik though not called by that name, is adjudged to be good, some bad. Some Geopolitik is held beneficial by and for some people and vicious by and for others. It should be clear that what makes Geopolitik good or bad, beneficial or vicious, is the nature of the objective of Geopolitik in point of reference to the effect of that objective, and the character of the means employed to achieve that objective and to cause that effect.

The Monroe Doctrine and the Pan American Union are unquestionably examples of Geopolitik. They have been indubitably good and beneficial for all who approve and are benefiting from their application. They will be considered bad

and vicious by those who may entertain designs upon the political independence and economic self-determination of the countries protected by the Doctrine and the Union, and by their latest manifestation, Hemispheric Defense.

Monroe doctrines and unions for Asia and Europe, pronounced by Germany under the label "New European Order" and by Japan under the name of "Co-Prosperity Sphere of Asia," are examples of Geopolitik. As such they will be good and beneficial if they find the approval and the voluntary support of the nations of Europe and Asia. They will be bad and vicious if they are forced upon these nations against their will by methods violative of the political rights, injurious to the economic needs, and repulsive to the sense of self-respect of the nations concerned.

Present-day public opinion is, quite normally, focussed upon past and present Geopolitik of National-Socialist Germany, Fascist Italy, and near-Fascist Japan. It is concerned over the proclaimed intent of establishing the New European Order and the New Co-Prosperity Sphere in Asia, as means considered necessary for the accomplishment of the objectives sought. The objectives, as has already been stated, are essentially those of national and continental self-sufficiency, economic, political, military, in one word, total. As will be shown in the chapters to come, these objectives are unsound and, as we have had occasion to observe, the means employed for their accomplishment are painful and fateful for all who resist or refuse to cooperate in a positive way.

But the chapters which follow do not confine themselves to presentation and analysis of such present-day Geopolitik. They search with equal earnestness into the ancestry from which present day Axis Geopolitik has sprung and the environment in which it has thrived. They venture to consider that which will come after Geopolitik—after Geopolitik of the present German National-Socialist, the Italian Fascist, and the Japanese brand, and Geopolitik of whatever brand. They will concern themselves with the monumental question: What is to be done to strip all future Geopolitik of all unsound objectives and to prevent in the future the application of all methods of Geopolitik which are vicious in kind and as such provocative of more war in the train of their effect?

CHAPTER III

GEOGRAPHY EXPANDS ITS LEBENSRAUM

The doctrine and school of Geopolitik had its formal inception in modern geography. In the setting of history and politics it holds a position similar to the place occupied by commercial geography and anthropogeography in relation to old-fashioned geography. For the older generation of today, formal teaching of geography has been not much more than a cataloguing and description of countries, frontiers, capitals, rivers, mountains, etc., except when and where a genial soul, combining a fancy for travel with an eye and understanding for more than earth, water, and air, chanced to enrich his accounts of the scenery traversed with all possible and impossible tales of peoples and their real or imagined behavior.¹ Today geography concerns itself with the configuration of the soil and the nature of the climate. Thus geography becomes physiography. It deals with the type and character of the inhabitants in relation to physiographical conditions. As such we speak of it as anthropogeography. When it centers its main interest upon trade and industry as conditioned by natural resources it becomes commercial or economic geography. Finally, when, as it has done, geography reaches out to concern itself with the influence of earth and mountains, of oceans, lakes, and rivers upon the development of the state, particularly, the modern state, and upon the behavior of particular states to other states, it finds itself promoted to the rank of political geography. Not yet can it be said to have advanced to the status of Geopolitik, at least not officially—by way of formal graduation and diploma. Political geography is descriptive and analytical rather than normative. It deals with what is, not with what ought to be, or rather what some of its disciples

¹ A very useful sketch of the bibliographical history of the development of geography from ancient to modern times is found in a twenty-page supplement (*Political Geography Before Ratzel and Its Most Recent Development*) to Ratzel's *Politische Geographie*. A thorough treatment of the modern expansion of geography into the social and political sphere, of geography with one foot in the social and the other in the political arena, is found in Alfred Hettner's *Die Geographie, ihre Geschichte, ihr Wesen, und ihre Methoden* (Breslau, 1927), of which no English translation appears to be available.

and preceptors think or teach as what should be. Geopolitik concerns itself with both—that which is and that which "ought to be," and chiefly with the latter.

The impetus for this vast expansion of the spheres of interest and investigation of modern geography may be sought and found in many related factors, such as: increased knowledge acquired by the discovery of formerly uncharted lands and seas; contact with peoples and races in the newly discovered lands; wider travel and development of new methods of communication; enhanced trade, doubled and trebled by greatly multiplied production and shipment of raw materials and merchantable goods; the race for trading posts in foreign lands; the competition for colonies; the craving for Lebensraum in the form of foreign markets, colonies, and empire. In the realm of thought, rationalization, based on some or all such contributing factors, may be detected in the doctrines of nationalism, mercantilism, laissez-faire, free trade, manifest destiny, Hegel's "March of God in the World" brought closer to earth by Marxian "economic determinism." All and every one of these factors in many varying combinations contributed, in their span of time and in their allotted space, their share to the growth of modern geography into a house in which there are many mansions.

Geographers of many nations have made their contribution, large or small as the case may be, to this work of modernizing geography and extending its spheres of interest and investigation. A general historical study of this development in the field of geography was undertaken at the University of Chicago as a doctoral dissertation. The author of this timely and fruitful enterprise is Armin Hajman Koller. The title of his work, *The Theory of Environment: An Outline of the History of the Idea of Milieu and its Present Status*, gives some indication of the nature and scope of the study, which contains an ample list of books and articles on the subject for those who have the desire and the time to penetrate deeper into the realm of the relationship of man and his milieu.² For it is with this aspect of the larger topic that Mr. Koller occupies himself, i. e., with anthropogeography. An investigation and report of a broader

² Part I was published in 1918, by the George Banta Press of Menasha, Wisconsin.

range, under the title "Recent Developments in Political Geography," appeared in *The American Political Science Review* of 1935. In a series of two articles Professor Richard Hartshorne, of the University of Minnesota, as the earnest and determined scholar tackles a task well-nigh impossible. He strives to bring some kind of order into, and to give some sort of a survey of, something which, at least as far as the German phase of the story is concerned, proves to be an overwhelming and unmanageable mêlée of political geographers and geopoliticians—or both in one. If there be any one, layman or specialist, who craves the paralyzing experience of getting lost in the jungle of the multitude of the titles of the books and articles of the German geopoliticians and political geographers with geopolitical leanings, of their contributions, real or banal, original or repetitious, of their approvals and criticisms, their agreements and disagreements, let him venture into the thickets of the literature on the subject of political geography, of Geopolitik, and of the interrelation of the two. When or if he escapes from that jungle with a mind not entirely and permanently unfavorably conditioned against all things politico-geographic and geopolitical, he may seek and find relief in the other extreme of almost complete lack of dependable information concerning the subject in the vast barren spaces of the desert of the daily, weekly, monthly, and quarterly sources of popular knowledge. His interest may be temporarily revived, kept alive, stirred, and fed by occasional appearances of promising, gleaming, flashing cases—which on closer approach, may, as they usually do, vanish into the emptiness of the delusion of the mirage. For those who desire some knowledge of the subject without going to the extremes in either direction, a few of the pathfinders of many lands are here introduced, together with the titles of their works or rather some of their most pertinent productions in the field of pioneering in geography and in geography's striving for a new and enlarged sphere of vitalized activity.

The history of their pioneering is here offered in the form of the titles of their public prints, somewhat in the same fashion in which the museum exhibit presents the history and development of this or that school of painters, sculptors, and what not; or perhaps, as the tabloid tells its story in pictures.

To begin with France, we meet Elisée Reclus (1830-1905), with: *La terre, description des phénomènes de la vie du globe* ("The Earth, Description of the Phenomena of the Life of the Globe"); *L'homme et la terre* ("Man and the Earth"); *L'Empire de milieu, le climat, le sol, les races, la richesse de la Chine* ("The Middle Empire, The Climate, the Soil, the Races, and the Wealth of China"); *La Chine et la diplomatie européenne*; *Estados Unidos de Brazil: Geographia, Ethnographia, Estatistica*; *L'évolution, la révolution, et l'idéal anarchique*; and his *magnum opus* of nineteen volumes, published in English as *The Earth and Its Inhabitants*. Some of these works were written in collaboration with his brother Onésime. We meet Paul Marie Joseph Vidal de la Blache (1845-1918), who wrote among other things: *États et nations de l'Europe* ("States and Nations of Europe"); *La personnalité de la France* ("Personality of France"); *Principes de géographie humaine* ("Principles of Human Geography"). We meet Lucien Paul Victor Febvre (1878-), as the author of *La terre et l'évolution humaine, introduction géographique à l'histoire* ("The Earth and Human Evolution, Geographic Introduction to History").

Among the English writers of this class to be mentioned are: Sir Halford John Mackinder (1861-), author of *Britain and the British Seas*; *Eight Lectures on India*; *The Rhine, its Valley and History*; *The World War and After*; *The Modern British State*; *Democratic Ideals and Reality*; *The New World, Problems in Political Geography*; and *The Geographic Pivot of History*, a brief but significant essay cited by Strausz-Hupé in his article "Geopolitics" discussed in Chapter I. Another name to be cited here is that of James Fairgrieve (1870-), author of *Geography and World Power*; *The Gateways of Commerce*; *Children of Many Lands*; *Human Geography*; and other books of note.

In the United States we have a goodly crop of geographers of the advanced schools. Among them are: the Swiss-American, Arnold Henry Guyot (1807-1884), with *The Earth and its Inhabitants*; *The Earth and Man*; and *Tables, Metereological and Physical, Prepared for the Smithsonian Institution*; Charles Clifford Huntington (1873-), author of *Environmental Basis of Social Geography*; Ellsworth Huntington (1876-), author of

Civilization and Climate, and of *The Human Habitat*. There is Ellen Churchill Semple (1863-1932), author of *Geography of the Mediterranean Region*, and of *Influence of Geographic Environment on the Basis of Ratzel's System of Anthropogeography*. We have Roy Hughes Witbeck (1871-), author of *The Geographic Factor, Its Role in Life and Civilization*. We have Isaiah Bowman (1878-), author of *The New World, Problems in Political Geography; The Pioneer Fringe*; editor of *Limits of Land Settlement*. We have Derwent Stainthorpe Whittlesey (1890-), author of *The Earth and the State; Environmental Foundations of European History*; and *Environment and the Student of Human Geography*. We have Owen Lattimore with *The Desert Road to Turkestan; High Tartary; Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict; Mongol Journeys; The Mongols of Manchuria*; and above all, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*.

Russia of the Tsarist era has its Lev Il'ich Mechnikov (1838-1888), who wrote *La Civilization et les grands fleuves historiques* ("Civilization and the Great Historic Rivers"), and *L'Empire Japonais* ("The Japanese Empire"). Even India boasts of her Radhakamal Mukerjee (1889-), author of *Regional Sociology and The Regional Balance of Man*, both dealing with the influence of environment and anthropogeography; of *The Foundations of Indian Economics; Land Problems of India; Asiatic Migration*; and others.³

The preceding list of authors and their works, incomplete as it is, will afford the sociologist, historian, economist, political scientist, and lay reader the essential of that phase of the background of Geopolitik which covers the growth of geography and its expansion into a number of related enterprises which, within the scope of the works cited, include the stage of political geography but do not yet indicate a transition into Geopolitik.

³ Most recently a number of works on political geography written by authors born in the Netherlands but now connected with American universities have appeared or have been announced to appear in the United States, such as *Elements of Political Geography*, by Samuel Van Valkenburg, (New York, 1939); *Workbook-Elements of Political Geography*, by Carl Louis Stotz and Samuel Van Valkenburg (New York, 1939); and *America's Strategy in World Politics*, by Nicholas J. Spykman (New York, 1942).

At this point the reader would be justified in asking the question: What is, not in theory but in the concrete, the difference between political geography and Geopolitik, between political geographers and geopoliticians? Or to put it another way: When does one become the other? To answer that or both of these questions one will have to enter the dangerous realm where "fools rush in but angels fear to tread." With reservations one might venture to say that where and when geographers extend their sphere of investigation to include the configuration of land and sea, and the relationship of both as factors of nation- and state-building and of practical politics, but confine their endeavors to a purely analytical and descriptive treatment of the subject, they may be classed as political geographers. On the other hand, where they proceed, *ex cathedra* and on the authority of Science, to develop and propose rules of conduct and means of procedure for application by the state and by those conducting the affairs of the state, internal and external, then they are to be classed as geopoliticians. This differentiation of the two topics may not find the approval of certain geopoliticians, such as Professor Haushofer, but it is here offered on the basis of a fundamental differentiation of approach and objective in their writings, and particularly on the basis of the official definition of the term Geopolitik, to wit: "Geopolitik is the science dealing with the dependence of political events upon the soil . . . Geopolitik aims to furnish the armature for political action and guidance in political life. . . . Geopolitik must come to be the geographical conscience of the state."⁴

To classify the legion of names that might be cited, and have in large part been cited in Professor Hartshorne's articles, would

⁴ See Chapter VI, p. 74. The way in which geopoliticians of this stamp claim for their own school and point of view political geographers whose scientific standards could hardly be questioned is illustrated by a statement made by Professor Haushofer in the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, April, 1941, p. 236, where he writes as follows: "Soliciting and classifying articles, announcements, correspondence, reviews of 'Pacific Affairs,' and their entire organization; the basic structure of the 'Institute of Pacific Relations' in Australia, Canada, China, France, Great Britain, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, the Soviet Union, and 'last but not least,' in the United States, betray a geopolitical masterhand. It is that of O. L., the famous author of 'Inner Asian Frontiers of China'—probably the best book of Owen Lattimore."

be rather hazardous business. In some cases this might be done without chance of contradiction, in many cases it would not be possible—for the simple reason that an individual may start out as geographer or political geographer and later on, gradually or suddenly, promote himself to the position of a geopolitician. Or in some of his works he may remain the one and in the rest of his works he will be the other.

Among the geographers cited as pioneers in the task of expanding their sphere of interest and investigation there are a few who, as the titles of their works indicate, have earned the right to be included in the ranks of political geographers. But none of their works cited shows a definite transition into the realm of Geopolitik. Nevertheless, there are geographers, even for the period covered, who by evidence of their writings plainly belong to the latter category. Elisée Reclus, as his works reveal, was the geographer of many interests, including that which made him a political geographer, but it seems safe to say that he did not turn geopolitician. However his brother Onésime (1837-1916), who collaborated in the writing of some of Elisée's works exhibits unmistakable signs of the geopolitician not in all but in a number of his productions. His chief books, including both types are: *Terre à vol d'oiseau* ("A Birds-Eye View of the World"); *La France et ses colonies*; *Le plus beau royaume sous le ciel* ("The Most Beautiful Kingdom under the Sky"). So far Onésime Reclus is the geographer or even the political geographer, but in the titles to follow he most definitely enters the society of the geopoliticians with: *Un grand destin commence* ("A Great Destiny Opens"); *Lâchons l'Asie, prenons l'Afrique* ("Let Asia Go, Take Africa"); *Le Rhin français* ("The French Rhine"); *L'Allemagne en morceaux: paix draconienne* ("Germany in Pieces: a Draconian Peace"). Another case in point we have in a product of domestic vintage, a case which deserves closer attention if for no other reason than that of its illustrative value of the practical difference between the political geographer and the geopolitician. Professor Derwent Whittlesey, included in the list of progressive geographers, is essentially the political geographer in *The Earth and the State*, though the frequent use of the term "geo-

political" might give a different impression;⁶ but in his article, "A Utopia for Europe," published in *The New Republic* of February 12, 1940, he performs as geopolitician with a skill, daring, and verve which not only equals but puts to shame the most brilliant acrobats of the Swedish-German geopolitical circus. In *The Earth and the State* Professor Whittlesey presents to American readers pre-eminently a comprehensive analysis and description of the influence of the condition, configuration, resources of the soil upon the settlements of man; the effect of rivers, lakes, the sea upon such settlements; the significance of all of these factors for the development of states, of empires and for the relations of states and empires with each other. He makes available for an interested American public neither more nor less than what one can read in many other works of the more conservative practitioners of the calling. But, in "A Utopia for Europe," he makes the alleged or planned National-Socialist "New Europe" look like a timid and modest venture. All Europe is to be consolidated into one state with four subdivisions. All existing political states would be erased and the affairs of men, released from the trammels of tradition of past political conceptions, would be ordered "with reference only to the limitations enforced and the opportunities afforded by the nature of their unique continent." But this reorganized Europe is to consist of more than the conventional Europe as we know it today. "Our Utopian Europe," so the American Whittlesey writes, ". . . would be much larger than the conventional Europe of today. Because, to find suitable boundary zones, it would have to reach across the Mediterranean Sea to the barrier desert and draw its southern boundary, as did the Roman Empire, in the Sahara. . . . It would also have to transcend the fragile bar of the Ural Mountains (long since overstepped by the Russian Empire), to attain a suitable barrier boundary in the broad highlands of Central Siberia." The four subdivisions of this European or pan-European state would be Atlantica, Mediterranea, Nordland, and Grassland. Atlantica would include what now constitutes the British Isles with Ireland, the western half of Germany, and the larger part of

⁶ This use of the term "geopolitical" finds its explanation in the glossary where Whittlesey defines geopolitical as "politico-geographic."

France. "The location of the capital should be on the mainland, but not far from the Strait of Dover." *Mediterranea* is to be composed of Spain, the southern edge of France, Italy, and Central Europe, with its capital in central Italy. *Nordland* is to cover the Scandinavian countries, the Baltic States, a large stretch of Western Siberia, Poland, and eastern Germany; the capital "may be approximately at the outlet of the Baltic, i. e., the location of Copenhagen." *Grassland* is to comprise European Russia plus the region beyond the Ural Mountains referred to, the territory including the Caspian and the Black Seas, the Western Asiatic coast, in other words, Western Turkey, the Eastern Balkan states and Greece, and possibly part of the Northern African desert. "An inland location, reasonably central to the vast territory, suggests itself for the capital of this interior state. Some point where the Volga is crossed by overland routes leading from the Urals and Siberia to the Black Sea may be the most suitable place. Perhaps the site of Saratov is the best." The geopolitical rationalization of this scheme is in the best style of the "best" of the official disciples of Geopolitik. Professor Whittlesey's article is accompanied by a physiographical map without a trace of the present political states which the Utopia is to relegate to the memory of the past. In all seriousness, Professor Whittlesey's Utopia is so much more fundamental than the New European Order or Neuroman Order which the Haushofer-Hitler combine is said to contemplate, that all who hope for eventual peace in Europe and peace in the rest of the world dependent upon a peaceful Europe might well feel inclined to root and shout for its early realization. Unfortunately, its consummation would be premised on a few conditions. It would seem that the realization of this most radical plan would require a military force infinitely more powerful and ruthless than anything that even Hitler's National-Socialist Germany has yet produced. Or, it would require the exhibition of a degree of intelligence and self-denial on the part of the peoples and leaders of the present political units which would seem to our generation to transcend all chance of possibility. Finally, it would require as an indispensable prerequisite the benevolent attitude and the positive consent or actual acquiescence of the United States and the

British Empire. Whatever the merit of Professor Whittlesey's "Utopia for Europe" may be in the realm of political actualities, it serves to clarify the difference between political geography and Geopolitik, between political geographers and geopoliticians. It demonstrates what the political geographer can do when he ventures into the realm of Geopolitik, or what he has to do to become a geopolitician.⁶

Before we leave this simple survey of the evolution of the non-German geographers into their larger field of enterprise, an *addendum* should be given to the list of names and works cited. What should be added is another equally brief roster of names and works of writers who may or may not have formal vocational affinity with the pioneering geographers discussed, but who certainly manifest a flavor all their own which most

⁶ Nicholas J. Spykman's challenging book, *America's Strategy in World Politics* (cited in note 3), has been honored with many thought-provoking reviews. All stress Spykman's realistic or pessimistic outlook upon the post-war international situation. A review in *Time* of April 20, 1942, has an appraisal of Professor Spykman which goes beyond that of mere realism or pessimism. This review assigns Spykman to the company of the geopoliticians in general and of Haushofer in particular. As stated in *Time*, "A geopolitician, Professor Spykman wrote with the colossal calm of the new fatalism in which geography is destiny. . . . In two lines Spykman condenses the viewpoint about which German geopoliticians have written volumes: 'Geography is the most fundamental factor in the foreign policy of states because it is the most permanent. Ministers come and ministers go, even dictators die but mountain ranges stand unperturbed.'" In *Time's* review the picture of "geopolitician Spykman" faces that of "geopolitician Haushofer" on two opposite pages. An inspection of the text of Spykman's book, made on the basis of the differentiation between the political geographer and the geopolitician adopted in the present work, can leave no doubt about the justification of *Time's* characterization of Professor Spykman as "geopolitician." The conclusion of Spykman's book is definitely of a normative character, normative in the sense that he rejects as falling under "the terms of dream world" any and all attempts to establish international peace which do not operate with the artifices of balance of power and power politics of old-fashioned *Realpolitik* or Geopolitik à la Kjellen and Haushofer. In an authoritative way he sets forth the nature and practices of "the foreign policy of a state which is to be practical," and "sound." Such a foreign policy, he states, "should be designed not in terms of some dream world but in terms of the realities of international relations, in terms of power politics." It may well be that in the forthcoming peace Professor Spykman's prescription will be applied as assumedly "practical" and "sound." If this is to happen, then Kjellen, Hennig, Haushofer, and the multitude of the lesser followers of Geopolitik can hardly be pronounced in error to the extent to which this has been done by those, including the author of these lines, who have been striving, arguing, and working for what Professor Spykman calls "a dream world."

assuredly entitles them to membership in the fraternity of the geopoliticians. From the hundreds of politicizing writers of this sort in our own midst, citation of a few will indicate the type, and should suffice as a guide for the reader in spotting the rest as they cross his path in everyday life. There is or was our Homer Lea, who wrote *The Day of the Saxon*, and *The Valor of Ignorance*, dealing with the defenses of the United States in the Far East. There is or was Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, author of the *Influence of Sea Power upon History*. There is prolific Theodore Lothrop Stoddard with *Lonely America*; *The New World of Islam*; *Present Day Europe*; *Racial Realities in Europe*; *Re-Forging America*; *The Revolt Against Civilization*, *The Menace of the Underman*; *The Rising Tide of Color Against White World-Supremacy*; and other works. There is Sinclair Kennedy with *Pan-Angles, A Consideration of the Federation of the Seven English-speaking Nations*, with a huge map painting the United States in the same florid Pan-Angle red in which the British Empire appears. There is Clarence Kirshman Streit with *Union Now*. There are many, many more, each in his own way demonstrating his belief in the influence of environment upon man, state, life, and politics, but differing in the choice of a particular sector of environment for his particular point of approach. The names of these authors and their works are shown in parade here with the sole and charitable intent of gradually and as painlessly as possible conditioning the reader for the eccentricities and anomalies of geopolitical reasoning and erudition to unfold with the impending revelation of all and sundry ideas—sound, silly, and in-between—which will be found to be part of the contents of the writings of full-fledged, officially recognized disciples of regular codified, exhibitionist, and applied Geopolitik, as it will appear from the chapters to come.

CHAPTER IV

THE GERMANS CHART THEIR COURSE

No German geographers were included in the list of geographers of many lands cited in the preceding chapter. That omission is not meant to signify that Germans did not contribute to the evolution of the new science of the earth and all it embraces. On the contrary, consideration of the names and works of German geographers was reserved for separate treatment for the reason it was their group from which developed the formal differentiation between political geography and that something which soon was to be called Geopolitik. Among the German geographers who have contributed to the modern expansion of geography, three stand head and shoulders above the rest. These three are or were Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859), Karl Ritter (1779-1859), and Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904). Of the three, von Humboldt and Ratzel were more than geographers, more by inclination, interest, and training.

Alexander von Humboldt began his career as a student of the natural sciences on a broad scale. Soon he centered his interest upon specific topics, such as zoology and botany. Even geology and astronomy came within the field of his scientific researches. Extended travels in Europe, the United States, Latin America, China, Russia, and the tropics finally brought him to the subject of geography as his major vocation. It was to geography that he decided to apply the scientific methods of the natural sciences. Geography was thus to be made a "science," or more of a science, at any rate, than it had been up to his time. But geography to become a science had to be more than what geography had been and still was. It was to become the knowledge of the physical nature and structure of the globe. His researches in the natural sciences served him as stepping stones into the new enlarged geography as the science of the physical earth. In consequence von Humboldt became known as the founder of "climatology and plastic geography," of the physiography of the sea and of plant geo-

graphy. Of the multitude of his books a few enumerated here will give an idea of the breadth and intensity as well as the character of his work. Most of them have been translated into several languages as in the subsequent instances of Karl Ritter and Friedrich Ratzel. They are here cited in English in order to facilitate the lay reader's task in following the trend of the expansion of the subject matter in the direction indicated. The representative works of von Humboldt are: *Aspects of Nature in Different Lands and Different Climates, with Scientific Elucidations*; *Central Asia, Investigations Covering Mountain Ranges and Comparative Climatology*; *Cosmos, a Sketch of a Physical Description of the Universe*; *Geognostic Essay on the Strata of Rocks in the Two Hemispheres*; *Critical Examination of the History of Geography of the New Continent and of the Progress of Nautical Astronomy in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries*; *Isothermic Lines and the Distribution of Heat on the Globe*; *Fragments of Geology and Climatology of Asia*; *Voyage into the Equinoctial Regions of the New Continent*, consisting of 30 volumes in six divisions: 1. Historical Aspect; 2. Zoological and Anatomical Observations; 3. Political Essay concerning the Kingdom of New Spain; 4. Astronomical Observations, Trigonometrical Operations and Barometric Measurements; 5. General Physique and Geology, Essay on the Geography of Plants; 6. Equinoctial Plants; *Political Essay on the Island of Cuba . . . with a Map and a Supplement Supporting the Considerations Upon the Population, the Wealth of the Territory, and the Commerce of the Archipelago of the Antilles and Columbia*; and many others.¹ Judging from what has been said in the previous chapters it will not be difficult to recognize

¹The "Political Essay on the Island of Cuba" was a later addition to the "Political Essay Concerning the Kingdom of New Spain," cited as Section 3 of "Voyages into the Equinoctial Region of the New Continent." The original titles are: *Ansichten der Natur, mit wissenschaftlichen Erläuterungen*; *Asie centrale. Recherches sur les chaînes de montagnes et la climatologie comparée*; *Cosmos, Entwurf einer physischen Weltbeschreibung*; *Essay géognostique sur le gisement des roches dans les deux hémisphères*; *Examen critique de l'histoire de la géographie du Nouveau Continent et des progrès de l'astronomie nautique aux quinzième et seizième siècles*; *Des lignes isothermes et de la distribution de la chaleur sur le globe*; *Fragments de géologie et de climatologie asiatiques*; *Voyage aux régions équinoxiales du Nouveau Continent . . .*; *Essay politique sur l'île de Cuba. . .*

in Alexander von Humboldt's writings the makings of the political geographer.

The expansion of scientific geography was carried forward by Karl Ritter, von Humboldt's contemporary. After completion of his university studies Ritter secured a tutorship which allowed him to travel in Switzerland, France, and Italy. Upon his return he was appointed to a professorship in the Gymnasium of Frankfurt a. M. which led to a call from the University of Berlin as Professor of Geography. The Professor of Geography soon gave additional courses as Instructor at the *Kriegsschule* (The War College). Among other books he wrote: *Geography in Relation to Nature and to the History of Man*. This was revised in a second edition on a vastly enlarged scale. Of this second edition, the first volume covers Africa only; the following nine volumes in nineteen parts deal with Asia alone; the rest of the "Geography" was not completed. He wrote: *Europe, a Geographic-Historic-Statistical Picture*; *The Antechamber to the History of the Peoples of Europe before Herodotus*; *Introduction to a General Comparative Geography*; and *Treatises for the Founding of a More Scientific Treatment of Geography* which constitutes a collection of his articles and papers.²

Alexander von Humboldt and Karl Ritter are called the founders of scientific, comparative geography, and, we may add, of German political geography. It remained for the third in the galaxy, Friedrich Ratzel, to develop political geography to the point where it soon was found necessary to create for his new creation a new name, that of Geopolitik. Ratzel, like von Humboldt, started his career as geographer with an approach on a much wider scale. Ratzel, the young apothecary, turned to the study of natural sciences. Then, from 1871 to 1875, he travelled as correspondent for the *Kölnische Zeitung* in Italy, France, Hungary, North America, Mexico, Cuba, etc. In 1875 he accepted the position as lecturer (*Docent*) on geography at

² Original titles: *Die Erdkunde im Verhältnis zur Natur und zur Geschichte des Menschen*; *Europa, ein geographisch-historisch-statistisches Gemälde*; *Die Vorhalle europäischer Völkergeschichte vor Herodot*; *Einleitung zur allgemeinen vergleichenden Geographie*; and *Abhandlungen zur Begründung einer mehr wissenschaftlichen Behandlung der Erdkunde*.

the Technical College in Munich. In 1876 he was advanced to a professorship and in 1886 accepted a call to the University of Leipzig as Professor of Geography. From his many works the following items, arranged in the sequence of appearance, will show the nature of his many interests and the growth from one to the other in the direction of political geography and Geopolitik. His outstanding books are: ^a *Being and Becoming of the Organic World* (1869); *Travelling Days of a Naturalist* (1873-1874); *History of the Antecedents of the European Man* (1875); *Pictures of Cities and Culture of North America* (1876); *From Mexico* (1878); *The United States of North America* (1878-1880); *Anthropogeography* (1882-1891); *Ethnology* (1886-1888); *Political Geography* (1897); *Germany, Introduction to Knowledge of the Homeland* (1898); *Situation, the Center of Interest of the Teaching of Geography* (1899); *The Sea as Source of the Greatness of a People* (1900); *The Earth and Life, a Comparative Geography* (1901). But even more significant from our point of interest here is a lengthy article entitled "Die Gesetze des räumlichen Wachstums der Staaten" ("The Laws of the Territorial Growth of States"), published in 1896 in *Petermanns Mitteilungen*, the foremost scientific geographical journal of the Germany of Ratzel's time. The journal emanated from the Justus Perthes Geographical Institute and was edited by Prof. Dr. A. Supan, one of the school of German geographers. The journal even at that time expanding in many directions including that of political geography was replete with material characteristic of the trend. The principles and doctrines laid down in Ratzel's article definitely laid the groundwork for those who soon were to be known as devotees of Geopolitik, even though Ratzel confines himself to the term political geography as the label descriptive of the nature of his contribution.

In this dynamic essay Ratzel analyzes the growth of historic

^a The original titles are: *Sein und Werden der organischen Welt*; *Wandertage eines Naturforschers*; *Vorgeschichte des europäischen Menschen*; *Städte- und Kulturbilder aus Nordamerika*; *Aus Mexiko*; *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika*; *Anthropogeographie*; *Ethnologie*; *Politische Geographie*; *Deutschland, Einführung in die Heimatkunde*; *Die Lage im Mittelpunkt des geographischen Unterrichts*; *Das Meer als Quelle der Völkergrösse*; *Die Erde und das Leben, eine vergleichende Erdkunde*.

states and deduces from his analysis what he considers seven basic norms or laws regulating or dictating such growth. Let us in the briefest possible form review the gist of Ratzel's analysis and deduction, by citations where necessary and by paraphrasing or summarizing the rest. He begins with the definition of the territory of a state as determined by international law. The territory of a state is "the part of the earth subject to the dominance by the state." But he adds that political geography is concerned also with all those factors which carry the influence of a state beyond its formal frontiers, over adjoining seas, including the legal or political right of use of such seas and even the seashores, and ports of other states adjoining the same seas. He criticizes the fact that political maps do not indicate such factors. To illustrate he cites the absence from political maps of any indication that the Austria-Hungary of his time exercised police control in maritime and sanitary affairs over the coast of Montenegro. He refers to the extension of the German customs régime over the Duchy of Luxemburg as a factor which should be shown on a political map. Such situations should be indicated for several reasons. One of these reasons is the fact that as a rule such extension of influence or control occurs "on the periphery of a state where the growth of the state takes place, a growth for which these situations prepare the ground by way of a softening process." They should be indicated for another reason, to wit, that "they are the symptoms of either a growing process in preparation for, or remnants of such growth in the past." Implied in the appearances of maps as they are is the conception of the territory of a state as a static, completed affair, an inorganic entity. Implied in his criticism of existing maps is the doctrine that the state is an organic, living, growing being, a living growing organism. To be sure, soil, territory as such, is rigid, it does not grow on its own initiative or by its own inner force. What then causes such growth? "With the territory of a state are connected a number of people who live upon the soil, who draw their sustenance from it, and are tied up with it by way of spiritual relations. Together with this piece of earth they form the state." For political geography "each one of such people represents a living body upon a piece of rigid soil, separated from other peoples on this earth" by ideal

frontiers or empty spaces. These different "peoples are in a constant inner motion" which turns "into movements directed toward the outside, progressive or recessive, whenever a piece of earth is occupied anew, or one formerly occupied is abandoned," giving the impression that "the people like a slow liquid mass moves forward or backward." Significant is Ratzel's observation that "seldom in known history . . . has such movement extended over unoccupied space. As a rule it has led to penetration or dispossession; or smaller territories joined with their populations to form larger units," without change of location of the inhabitants involved. On the other hand, as time goes on the resulting larger states disintegrate again into smaller entities. This growing and decreasing has had and still has its historic reaction for neighboring states, for all Europe and the entire globe. The transmission of this movement from one region to another constitutes one of "the mightiest causes of historic development." At this point Ratzel introduces a particular name for this mightiest cause. He calls it the *Raum-motiv*, the Lebensraum motive, the space motive. "This Raum-motiv," he writes, "has two tendencies: enlargement and imitation (*Nachbildung*) which endlessly function as driving forces for motion or movement." He insists that all philosophical theories of historic development which neglect this most immediate condition of the development of states are faulty, whether they are so-called theories of progress in a straight line, in a spiral, or what not. As a third motive of this movement for enlargement and recession of states he adds the manner or type of cohesion of state and soil, which determines the process of growth and the duration of its results. This brings him to the formulation of the seven laws for the growth of states.

The first law: "The Space of states grows with *Kultur*." The meaning of *Kultur* will become somewhat evident from the discussion which follows. "The enlargement of the geographical horizon," he writes, "the fruit of bodily and spiritual exertions of countless generations, has made available ever new territories for the growth of peoples." It was only with *Kultur* and through *Kultur* that these new territories were brought under control. To dominate, to amalgamate, to insure cohesion required new energies, ideas, and material possessions which

could be developed only with Kultur and through Kultur to serve in turn as new means of discovering and of securing new territories. New nourishment is furnished for these driving forces by the growth of populations proportionate with Kultur. For according to Ratzel, growth of population, serving first to increase Kultur as a result of increase of density, i. e., as a result of the necessity of meeting the needs created by increased density, leads through need for space to expansion. Ratzel then proceeds to prove in a rather technical survey of historic examples, the scientific character of his first law. The essence of the survey in simple terms is this: Not all great bearers of Kultur have been the great founders or the strong builders of states. But all great states of history have been, and are today, the states whose peoples are *Kulturvölker*, people with Kultur. All these states of today are located in Europe and in Europe's colonial possessions; China, he says, is the only exception. In 1896, when Ratzel's article appeared, the Japanese had not yet arrived as a people with Kultur, nor Japan as a great state. But if the space of states grows with Kultur, then all states with low Kultur will be organized on a small state basis. The lower the degree of Kultur, the smaller the states, "for part of this measure of the height of Kultur is the largeness of states." Among the examples of the past he cites the Persian, Alexandrian, Roman, the medieval German, the British, the Russian, and the United States Empires as great or large states. Among the small states he cites Egypt, the African tribal units, Australia, the nomadic temporary conquerors, the realm of Montezuma, and the Inca "Reich." The old Greek and the medieval Italian city states he does not mention, nor modern small states such as Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries.

The second law: "The growth of states follows other manifestations of the growth of peoples, which must necessarily precede the growth of the state." Such manifestations are ideas, commercial production, missionary activity. These manifestations, Ratzel points out, are older than states; they have a tendency or law of expansion of their own. They precede the expansion of the state; expansion of the state follows in their wake. Hence, states in which these manifestations are highly developed have inherent in them the impetus of these driving

forces which by their own inner energy expand outward and force the state to follow them wherever they lead. There follows the historical documentation of the truth of the "law." Terms such as "dollar diplomacy" and "the flag follows the trade" serve to lend color to Ratzel's version of the same phenomenon, real or alleged as the case may be.

The third law: "The growth of states proceeds, to the degree of amalgamation, by the addition of smaller units." With amalgamation the union of people and soil becomes increasingly more intimate. Mere annexation of smaller entities is not sufficient to ensure lasting union. Amalgamation of people and soil and people with people alone can prevent easy separation and disintegration of the large state built by addition from the outside. Even a strong controlling and unifying will cannot in the long run hold together what has not been brought to intimate coalescence. The old Roman Empire was threatened with disintegration until the creation of a great military force, the establishment of economic supremacy, the extension of magnificent roads put an end to the threat, at least for a time. The tribal disunity of Gaul was checked by the advent of the Roman trader, followed by the Roman colonizer, and finally the Roman soldier. In order to ensure duration, people and soil must be welded together. To speak of "the mere greed for land of the ancient conquerors particularly of the Romans," indicates a rather unclear idea of reality. "Acquisition of territory was only a parallel phenomenon. Power, slaves, riches, were, especially in the wars of the Asiatics, the prize of war; hence the 'passing' nature of their growth." It was evidence of Caesar's greatness that he superimposed upon the enlarged territories of the realm "the more binding frame of secure frontiers."

The fourth law: "The frontier is the peripheric organ of the state. As such it is the bearer of the growth and of the security of the state and suffers with the state all changes of its organism." The meaning of this statement would seem to be self-explanatory.

The fifth law: "In their growth states strive for the absorption of politically valuable sections." Such valuable sections are coastal regions, rivers and river basins, plains, regions rich

in resources, such as metal ores, grains, oil, and precious stones. In connection with the reference to precious stones Ratzel points to the discovery of diamonds in the Vaal region of South Africa, in 1867, and the subsequent expansion by England over the Oranje River and beyond.

The sixth law: "The first impetus for territorial growth comes to primitive states from without." This means that the notion of expansion, the desire to expand, is brought to primitive peoples by outside nations, by great states possessing Kultur and bringing Kultur to the primitives. Fearing the increase of their population beyond their limited means of existence, the primitives use the most cruel and effective means of limiting such growth. Having been given the benefit of Kultur by the administrations of expanding peoples full or too full of Kultur, these primitives are shown the way of increasing their means of production. They then relax their methods of repressing the growth of population. Their population increases and with this increase comes to them their own need for expansion according to the pattern of their newly acquired Kultur. Colonization of outlying districts and islands begins. The way to state building is opened. The histories of the tribal organizations of Africa, Borneo, and Melanesia, before and after contact with foreign or neighboring peoples, are cited as historic evidence of the processes described.

The seventh law: "The general tendency toward territorial annexation and amalgamation transmits the trend from state to state and increases its intensity." The evidence adduced may be summed up in the statement that the history of expansionism and empire building supports what the French characterize by the *bon mot* "l'appétit vient en mangeant"—translated according to Shakespeare as "the appetite grows by what it feeds on."

The evidence which Professor Ratzel has marshalled to prove the validity of his seven laws of the growth of states is expanded into some five hundred and more pages in his *Political Geography* published in 1897, a year after the appearance of the article discussed in the preceding pages. If we accept the concepts of the organic character of the state, of the organs of the state, of the biological necessity of the growth of the state by way of securing essential missing organs by force if need be,

and finally the formulation of the seven laws of such growth, we will find the purely factual or historical documentation of state and empire building in any of the recent political geographies cited in the preceding chapter. Ratzel's approach and treatment of the subject differs from that of the political geographers cited in this: Not only does he demonstrate how, in the past, expansion by colonization, conquest, and absorption has taken place, but he proceeds to deduce from the historical record the seven laws of such growth, with the implication that this is the natural law, the norm set by nature to be followed as such by all state and empire builders. He posits the seven laws as something binding upon states and empires and their builders, prospective and actual, in the same way in which the natural law of growth is controlling in the sphere of all biological organism. In the assumption of the normative character and in the insistence of the impelling nature of the seven laws of growth of the states, are found the dynamic element, the driving force, which made possible, if not inevitable, the transition from political geography, the scholar's pursuit, to Geopolitik, the statesman's or politician's preoccupation with the scholar's product; yea even the scholar's transfiguration into statesman or politician.

The significance of Ratzel's version of political geography, and specifically, the formulation of the seven laws of the growth of states will be gauged if we realize that at the time of Ratzel's advent and writing both English and German public opinion was becoming conscious of the impending competition and conflict between the two nations in the realm of commercial expansion. In Germany the growth of industrialization after the Franco-Prussian War necessitated the search for foreign markets for the growing output of industrial products. This search led to competition with England in the still free markets of the world and to a new venture on the part of Germany, the search for colonies under her own flag expected to serve as sources of raw materials on the one hand and as dumping grounds for her surplus manufactured goods on the other. The period of Ratzel's activity was the time when the London *Saturday Review* inaugurated its critical analysis of Anglo-German relations in a series of leading articles which sounded

and echoed the warning of danger to England, of war as the inevitable result of the growing tension between the two rivals, and of the need of defeating and destroying Germany. In one of these "leaders," entitled "England and Germany," the *Saturday Review* states: "Three years ago, when the 'Saturday Review' began to write against the traditional pro-German policy of England, its point of view made it isolated among leading organs of opinion. When, in February, 1896, one of our writers, discussing the European situation, declared Germany the first and immediate enemy of England, the opinion passed as an individual eccentricity. A month later the German flag was hissed at a London music-hall, and when on a Saturday night in April an evening paper sent out its newsboys crying 'War with Germany'! the traffic of Edgeware Road stopped to shout. The outrageous follies of William the Witless, the German schemes in the Transvaal, the German breaches of international law in Central Africa, what Bismarck calls the 'undue nagging of the English' in all diplomatic relations, the notorious set of German policy in the council of Ambassadors at Constantinople, and above all the fashion in which England has been made to learn the real extent of German commercial rivalry, have all done their work: and now England and Germany alike realize the imminent probability of war." Describing the trade struggle of the two in some detail, the *Review* writes: "In the Transvaal, at the Cape, in Central Africa, in India and the East, in the islands of the Southern sea, and in the far North-West, wherever—and where is it not?—the flag has followed the Bible and trade has followed the flag, there the German bagman is struggling with the English peddler. Is there a mine to exploit, a railroad to build, a native to convert from breadfruit to tinned meat, from temperance to trade gin, the German and the Englishman are struggling to be first. A million petty disputes build up the greatest cause of war the world has ever seen. If Germany were extinguished tomorrow, the day after tomorrow there is not an Englishman in the world who would not be the richer. Nations have fought for years over a city or a right to succession; must they not fight for two hundred and fifty million pounds of yearly commerce?" The article concludes with this resolve: "To this pass has the mud-

dling of the German Emperor brought Germany, and at a time when England has awakened to what is alike inevitable and her best hope of prosperity. 'Germaniam esse delendam' [Germany must be destroyed]."

While the *Saturday Review* was thus holding forth to apprise the Germans of the dire consequences of their iniquitous challenge to British commercial supremacy, the German counterparts of the *Saturday Review* blasted into the world, day in and day out, their contempt of "the senile *Krämerseelen*" (shop-keeper minds) of the "tottering little isle" across the moat, topped with the cocky challenge to retire from the scene and leave industry and trade of the future to their younger, more energetic, more enterprising, more competent betters.

The date of the leading article of the *Saturday Review* cited above was September 11, 1897, the same year in which Ratzel's *Political Geography* appeared and one year after the publication of the article expounding the seven laws of the growth of states. Considering the circumstances of the then existing relations between England and Germany and the state of mind of that part of press and public which was aware of the situation and eager to see fuel added to the flames, the effect of Professor Ratzel's contributions and all of their kind that were soon to follow could not have been other than that of the waving of the proverbial red rag. Their influence upon corresponding German circles may safely be said to have been that of a welcome and bolstering rationalization of the expansionist history of the world powers of past and, by implication at least, of Germany's impending venture in the same direction.

CHAPTER V

POLITICAL SCIENCE ADOPTS GEOPOLITIK

Of the three German geographers presented in Chapter IV as the leaders in the expansion of modern geography in Germany, Alexander von Humboldt and Karl Ritter may be classed with the political geographers. The third of the group, Friedrich Ratzel, too, is to be included in that classification, but in Ratzel there is evident something more, something which was soon to be called Geopolitik by his followers, even though he himself did not use that term. In other words, with the advent of Ratzel and particularly with that of his disciples, the stage is set for the appearance of Geopolitik defined as the "science" which "aims to furnish the armature for political action and guidance in political life" and which "must come to be the geographical conscience of the state."

Professor Ratzel's German followers are legion. A representative array of their names and works may be found in Professor Hartshorne's two articles cited in Chapter III. Some, particularly those of the geopolitical persuasion, may be traced through the files of the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* as editors and contributors, and in the journal's announcements of a number of impressive works on the general and specific topics of their interest, in which they figure as authors, editors, and both. A goodly number of that category will be found in Professor Griswold's article referred to in Chapter I. The most significant of the tribe will appear in review, with their writings, in the further pursuit of our subject.

The first of Ratzel's disciples who enlarged upon the master's ideas and applied the term Geopolitik as a kind of scientific halo designed to dignify age-old, cold-blooded, world-wide *Realpolitik* as a means of securing national self-sufficiency and empire, was not German. He was a Swede by the name of Rudolf Johan Kjellen. Kjellen was born in 1864 and died in 1922. From 1890 to 1916 he was Professor of Political Science at the University of Göteborg, and from 1916 at the University of Uppsala. *Minerva* defines his position as that of Professor

of "the Science of States and Statistics." Kjellen represented, from 1905 to 1917, the "young Conservatives" in the Swedish legislature. During the World War he was an ardent "activist," and in 1915 he advocated Swedish participation in the German war against Russia. He favored the German cause in many articles, lectures, and, impliedly, in a number of larger works, most of which appeared in German translations during the War and after, such as: *The Great Powers of the Present* (1914); *Political Problems of the World War* (1916); *Sweden, a Political Monograph* (1917); *The Great Powers and the World Crisis* (1920); *Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, Diplomatic Antecedents of the World War* (1921). Of the works published during that period, there are two of special importance for the subject of our particular concern here: *The State as a Form of Life* (1917); and *Foundations for a System of Politics* (1920).¹ It was in *The State as a Form of Life* that Kjellen, as Professor Griswold expresses it, "projected Ratzel's theories into the realm of political science where he greatly expanded them and applied them to current world politics," and, one should add, where he made Geopolitik the basis for a new political science, or rather where political science seized upon Geopolitik as the *Leitmotiv* for all its branches or aspects.

Ratzel was the geographer led by his geographical investigations to the consideration of politics as motivated and directed by the potentialities of geography. Kjellen was the political scientist turning to geography for guidance in his attempt to

¹ The following list of Kjellen's important works in the original Swedish, in German translations, or in German, is taken from Walter Vogel's item on Kjellen found in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences: Stormakterna* (2 vols. Stockholm, 1905; 2nd ed., 4 vols., 1911-13); *Samtidens stormakter* (abr. ed. of *Stormakterna*, Stockholm, 1914), German translation by C. Koch as *Die Grossmächte der Gegenwart* (Leipzig, 1914; 22nd rev. ed. by Karl Haushofer as *Die Grossmächte vor und nach dem Weltkrieg*, 1930); *Stormakterna och världskrisen* (new rev. ed. of *Samtidens stormakter*, Stockholm, 1920), German translation by W. A. Berendsohn as *Die Grossmächte und die Weltkrise* (2nd ed. Leipzig, 1921); *Staten som livsform* (Stockholm, 1916), German translation by J. Sandmeier as *Der Staat als Lebensform* (4th ed. Berlin, 1924); *Grundriss zu einem System der Politik* (Leipzig, 1920); *Sverige* (Stockholm, 1917); *Politiska essayer* (3 vols. Stockholm, 1914-1915); *Världspolitiken 1911-1919* (Uppsala, 1920). The item contains also a reference to two comprehensive articles on Kjellen in two German journals, one by Walter Vogel, the other by O. Haussleiter.

create a new political science, or as he would have it a political science which is a real *political* science. As taught in Sweden, and we may add, in the Germany of that time, political science was not what Kjellen thought it should be. It was nothing but a legal science, it was pure, unadulterated jurisprudence. The reason for this situation, as correctly stated by Kjellen, was that the state, the subject of study by the political scientist, was conceived as an institution existing for and by the law. The modern state, "the creation of the Manchester school of laissez-faire," was considered as no more and no less than the creation of law, the dispenser of law, and perhaps as the creator, the sole creator, of the law. That interpretation of the modern state would and, in fact did, reduce political science to pure legal science. It would and did explain the fact that it was the law-trained, the jurists, who in Sweden, in Germany, and to a large extent in the rest of continental Europe practiced what in the Anglo-American systems is known as political science.

The underlying idea of this legalistic or juristic conception of the state, so Kjellen argues, is the mistaken idea that the state is something apart from society, apart from the people living in or under the state; the idea that the state and society are opposites. Society is the living, teaming mass of people of many interests, friendly, competitive, conflicting, and even hostile. The state, according to this conception, is nothing but the law-setting and law-enforcing agency, standing as the supreme law-giver, the burly policeman, and the blindfolded goddess of justice over the social order or disorder as the case may be. Or, quoting the words of Anatole France in *Monsieur Bergeret in Paris*, the state is no more than "a grouchy, impolite old gentleman behind a shutter." But, says Kjellen, in Sweden, as in Germany, where this conception seemed to prevail, the exigencies of modern administrative requirements have led some people to question the reality of this notion of the state, to the extent that in both countries a widening of the legal curriculum was prescribed for candidates for government positions, to include a more intense study of the social sciences, in addition to the older formal study of the law.

It was upon this background that Kjellen proceeded to re-examine the nature of the state. He proposed to re-examine it,

not as an isolated legal phenomenon in the life of society, but as an integral part of society, national and international. He proposed to do so not by way of speculation, of theory, but on the basis of man's experience with the living state, or rather with living states.

According to Kjellen then, the first experience of the individual citizen with the state would seem to be negative, at least from a superficial point of view. Normally, the state is not seen nor heard in the course of the individual's daily life and labor. But it would be a fallacy to reach from this the conclusion that the state does not exist. The state is present all around us, like the air we breathe. "It exists in the legal order. Commit a crime and see what happens": Arrest, trial, punishment to the extent of legally inflicted death. The state, hidden before, suddenly appears as by magic, as serene and severe reality. It manifests itself in relation to the individual as a coercive, retributive, and protective agency, restricting the offender and shielding the offended. It acts as the guardian of the legal order, interfering with the liberty of the individual, as avenger and protector in the interest not of the individual but of the totality of individuals. Thus the citizen's first positive experience with the state would seem to support the conception of the state as a legal institution.

In a second experience the state asserts itself without the instigation of the citizen. It demands and levies taxes; it enforces army service, even in peace time, and takes control of the entire life of males and females of military age, or any age, in war time. In extraordinary emergencies it controls the entire economic activity of the nation. All this it does apparently on its own responsibility and in the interest of "the state."

So far, the picture resulting from these two experiences may still be considered as conforming to the concept of the ideal of the state held by the older liberalism of the *laissez-faire* school of thinkers who viewed the state as a purely legal institution. A third experience, however, will prove that the state, even in normal times, tends more and more to transcend in its activities the mere legal sphere and that, to the same extent, it encroaches upon the cultural and social life of its citizens. To quote Kjellen somewhat freely: "Daily we see around us cases in

which the state assists the individual with advice and in deed, with subsidies for the erection of homes, the drying of moors, the building of roads, the professional training by way of travel, and by many other methods of a similar kind." The modern state goes even further in the expansion of its functions. It interferes with the activities of the citizen by "blocking his way, crossing his plans, demanding the securing of concessions and of licenses for all sorts of occupational pursuits." Such practices surely transcend the purely legal aspect of state functions and "in the case of complete or partial administration of education in all stages, the horizon of the state's activities covers the entire cultural life of society."

In a fourth experience we see the state administering its own domains, in the form of estates or of land held in the same manner in which private property is held by private individuals or corporations. Such domains come into the possession of the state by the absence of legal heirs, by default of taxes, and by various other means.

Finally, coming to what we may call a fifth experience, Kjellen reminds his readers that the modern state, in particular the theoretically conceived, legalistic German state of pre-World War I days, had gone far in the field of social welfare and commercial and vocational enterprise. Kjellen points out, that even of old, states have always assumed certain business tasks, such as the financial administration of its domains, the management of public roads and of instruments of communication. But, he adds, "modern soil-, forest-, mining-, and water-power-*Politik* far surpass such older enterprises. Their aspect is economic, their field of operation the entire community and the whole land." Speaking of the situation during World War I, he writes: "Finally, in this war we have been given evidence of the degree to which the state has brought under its regulation and control nearly all phases of the economic and social life; and one would greatly err to believe that this augmentation to the point of patriarchal guardianship will disappear completely after the war."

Hence, Kjellen concludes, the state must be viewed as, or admitted to be, more than an institution for the creation and enforcement of law, more than a mere keeper of peace and

order after the old laissez-faire pattern. State and society must no longer be looked upon as contrasts, but as two categories to be harmonized, to be synthesized. Society must become the content matter of the concept state. Or, rather, the state must be viewed as consisting of several contents: the old accepted law and order-keeping activity, plus "social welfare or progress," plus "economic welfare or progress." To be sure, in all three contents the state will continue to act through legal machinery, and the jurist will continue to concern himself with that aspect of the state's function, the formal legal aspect. But the future political scientist must enlarge his sphere of thought, investigation, and teaching to cover the factual, the objective aspect of this enlarged nature of the state. The new political science must fill "the legal skeleton with social flesh and blood." Kjellen points out how sociology has attempted to broaden its scope so as to include within its realm the functions which he assigns to a future, more adequate, political science. Political economy has shown similar designs based upon or justified by the modern state's ventures into social welfare services and into control and management of business enterprises. Modern geography, as political geography or as Geopolitik, is another aspirant in the race. It can point to the fact that the very names of many states denote the territorial character of the state by way of the suffix "land" or "reich" as attached to the part indicating the human, or racial, or national aspect: *England*, *Russland*, *Frankreich*, *Deutsches Reich*, etc. Still another competitor in the field is ethnography, which can point with a show of justification to the fact that even public opinion gives force to its claim when it speaks of the United States as Uncle Sam, of Britain as John Bull, of France as Marianne or la belle France, of Sweden as Moder Svea, of Russia as Mother Russia and as the bear that walks like a man, when it spoke of Germany as the sleeping Michael, and of Turkey as the sick man of Europe. But, says Kjellen, by way of the self-imposed restrictions implied in their special approach, each and every one of these claimants rules itself out of the race. Every one of the particular aspects of the states favored by them is only part of the complete state. The complete life of the state is the life of the state considered as a complete organism, a living organism, acting as a living organism within its own body and in relation to other states

considered as and acting as complete living organisms. Only a science of the state which embraces all of these aspects is the complete and true political science. It is the sort of political science which adopts and adapts the geopolitical approach in its analysis, description, and prescription of the normal behavior of the state within its own realm and, above all, in its intercourse with other states.

We now reach the sixth and final experience of man and the state. The old legalistic or juristic science of the state centered its approach upon the individual in his relation to the state. It ignored the relation of state to state. Modern political geography must consider the state in its territorial aspects and implications. Geopolitik as adopted and adapted by political science treats the state as a living organism acting as such in relation to other states. It views the state as a "power," "*puissance*," "*Macht*." It views states in their relation to each other. Referring to the political situation of the Balkan crises preceding the First World War, Kjellen recalls phrases used in the world press such as these: "Austria stands there as armed champion of despotism"; "Austria has enticed Bulgaria into its crude attack"; "One sees Germany's hand in the turn of events"; "The case of Serbia is one of life and death"; "Italy is expected to come forward with claims"; "England is irritated"; "France has her feelings spared, finding satisfaction in the rôle of mediator"; "Berlin speaks to Paris and London"; "Wilhelmstrasse spins intrigues against the Quai d'Orsay and Downing Street"; and others of the kind.

In the older legalistic conception of the state, in the Manchester laissez-faire view, writes Kjellen, the state stands in the forefront as a legal phenomenon, behind which appear a social, an economic, and finally, far in the background, an ethnic and a geographic specter, "all of which seem not to disturb the impression of a predominant juristic aspect." There is, however, another perspective, in which we see the same reality, the state, differentiated not from private individuals as citizens or subjects, but from other states as equals in the family of states. In this perspective there appear first and above all the geographic and the ethnic elements as the differentiating criteria. Then, "behind the geographic and ethnic appear first the economic and social and, hidden in the background, the legal order."

But, Kjellen cautions, the state seen in the two perspectives is after all the same state, "so to say with two souls, an inner soul, legally bound, an outer soul, free." In the geopolitical approach the juristic conception of the state is the narrower one, concerned with the legal life which binds the inner soul. In the geopolitical approach the state, viewed as power in relation to other powers, is the wider conception. In this broader geopolitical aspect, in the relation of power to power, the state leads a life free from binding strictures of the legal life. This dual nature of the state is the natural corollary to the concept of the state as a biological organism, especially if the comparison is that to the human being. While Ratzel was cautious in the extent of his comparison of state and natural organism, and while he recognized the limitations or complications in such comparison or analogy, Kjellen goes far in the direction of placing state and the human being on the same level. As stated by Kjellen, in the view expressed by Ratzel "states are to be considered in all stages of development as natural organisms. They may be natural organisms in an incomplete stage, but tending in the higher ranges more toward the spiritual and moral. Primarily states are political organizations of territory and of the people which belong to it. 'The state is a piece of mankind and a parcel of organized soil.'" Kjellen himself is much more specific and daring in this respect. In his earlier work, *The Great Powers*, he wrote: "Viewing them in a certain aspect, one cannot but recognize in the great powers biological facts. Out of their own life force, by favor of circumstances, turn of events, in constant competition with each other, and by way of natural selection, they stand there on the surface of the earth. We see them being born, growing up, and we have seen them die like other organisms. They are forms of life, among all forms of life the most imposing." He quotes the German historian Ranke, who, almost a hundred years earlier, had likened states to "superindividual living beings, which are as real as single individuals, only incomparably mightier in their development." In other words, Kjellen views the state as a kind of a million-headed superman. The legal aspect, the inner soul, of this superman serves as the instrument toward a higher cultural and moral objective and as the means of protecting that which has thus been achieved. The outer soul follows the

law of nature as it applies in the struggle for existence and survival. "In the internal struggle of interests every state stands before its own people as the champion of the legal order, conscious of its internal task as the conservator of the legal conscience. In the internal affairs the natural side of the state stands in the shade." Even in its inner affairs the state may be compelled to give sway to its natural inclinations, as in case of internal crisis. But "in the relations of state to state the legal aspect is neither the only nor the essential side of the state." For in the international life there reigns as a rule the maxim "necessity knows no law." Kjellen refers to the experiences of World War I. "We do not judge," he writes, "we merely observe." "No experience in history is more self-explanatory than that on land and on the sea the law means comparatively little when the powers see their vital interests endangered. Law may be dear to them, yet life is dearer." But, he continues, "we do now understand, too, that states are not very conscious of such conflicts. What they themselves do, appears to them in the last analysis always right. Only the enemy, they are convinced, fights exclusively for naked interests. When the English statesman exclaims 'right or wrong, my country,' he resorts merely to a paradoxical paraphrasing of his real opinion that his country can never be wrong." Kjellen claims that "we here see the clear reflection of the apparent fact that the nature of the state consists of both legal and power elements, of morality and of organic impulses, just as every earthly personal life." But he does not wish to give the impression that he desires to deny to philosophy the right to apply to the state the measure of the ideal; nor to deny the actual tendency of development which carries the dualism of state life in the direction of the supremacy of the law. Least of all does he intend to deny that this "evolutionary tendency is good." All he proposes to do and does is to present the fact that "states, as we follow them in history and as we find them in reality as our personal abodes, are sensual-rational organisms, as are human beings (*wie die Menschen*)."

These are the broad lines of the general directives of the new geopolitical science which Kjellen proceeds to build and which will be considered in its detailed flourishes in the chapters to come. It is a new geopolitical science which is to consider

the state as it is and states as they are in relation to other states. In this new geopolitical science "the place of prominence formerly held by the legal order and its study is now assumed by the chief motive—that of historic reality of the state: its political purposefulness or conformity with the political objective, advantage, and necessity. Here the state has its moral principle. Here the science of the state has its unity in multiplicity . . . and its own appeal . . . the demonstration of its full independence and equality within the republic of sciences." Historic reality, that is the keynote of the new geopolitical science, historic reality particularly as it manifests and plays itself out in the relation of state to states. It does not deny the philosopher's dream of the ideal state, it does not even question the desirability of wishing and working for such a state. But it is not concerned with the philosopher's or the moralist's idea of the nature of the state; it is concerned with historic reality, and historic reality means reality of past, present, and future. That is the "creed and faith" of the political science of the geopolitical denomination, and as many of us, half cautiously, half regretfully, or approvingly, may feel inclined to add, the creed and faith of all too many who are not officially or admittedly members of that description. It is the creed and faith of the "new political science" which had its conception in the German geographer Ratzel's "seven laws of the growth of states"; which found its maturation in the Swedish political scientist Kjellen's elaboration of the "new science of states"; and which manifests its acceptance and application in the writings and activities of Kjellen's German present-day followers, such as Hennig, Haushofer, and many more of lesser renown.

The formal content and methodology of this new political science Kjellen elaborates at considerable length and in language which, to say the least, is somewhat technical. In the next chapter the attempt will be made to present in greatly simplified form what Kjellen has to say on that aspect of the subject. The method of presentation will be that of paraphrasing Kjellen's own words, of illustrating his text by occasional references to present-day circumstances, and of giving literal quotations where the subject matter seems to require that Kjellen hold forth in his own terms.

CHAPTER VI

THE NEW SCIENCE HOLDS FORTH

Kjellen, as will be recalled, has shown, at least to his own satisfaction, the need for a new political science which will do justice to the realities of the life of the modern state and of the modern state's relation with its kind. His next step is that of developing the content and the methodology of his new political science. Kjellen pointed out that the real, living state has many sides or many contents: the legal, the geographical, the ethnical, the social, the economic. He showed how each one of the sciences, corresponding to these five aspects, had sought to capture the status of official science of the state. He concludes that only a new, all inclusive geopolitical science will be capable and, as such, entitled to assume that position. It is that new geopolitical science which he sets out to expound. Thus he starts with an analysis of the state in its five aspects, "as five elements of the same force, five fingers of the same hand, working together in peace and fighting together in war." In *The State as a Form of Life* he presents these five elements in the following sequence: territory or realm (*Reich*), people (*Volk*), household (*Haushalt*), society (*Gesellschaft*), and government (*Regierung*). The significance of this sequence is to be found in the fact that the legal element, of old considered the only element to be studied by the science of the state, forms the rear guard of the five-fold array, and that in Kjellen's new geopolitical science the territorial element marches in front. Let us see in brief what Kjellen has to say concerning each of these five elements.

I. *The State viewed as the Realm.* The starting point in Kjellen's system of the new geopolitical science is the realm (*das Reich*). It is the criterion which differentiates state from state in their relations to each other. As mentioned before, the realm or territorial element asserts itself in such names as *England*, *Deutschland*, *Russland*, *Finnland*, *Netherlands*, *Denmark*, *Sverige*, etc. Geopolitik is a specific branch, a subdivision of the larger new science of politics. Considering the state as a

living organism, Geopolitik views the realm, the territory, as the body of the state. The possession of a realm as organized territory into which the *Volk* has grown distinguishes a state from a non-state such as the Catholic Church, the Jesuit Order, the Hansa, the North-German Lloyd, nomadic hordes, or to give examples more familiar to the Anglo-American reader, such as the Masonic order, the Ku Klux Klan, the Communist Party, the German-American Bund. Geopolitik recognizes various types of states, the type being determined by the character of the body, the realm, such as city states, empire states, continental states, island states, and others.

Now if the state is a biological organism, and if the realm is the body of the state, then it follows, say Ratzel and Kjellen, that the state, like every other biological organism must grow and have organs; the organs needed to live: a heart and lungs—the capital and administrative center; arteries and veins—rivers, roads, railroads; limbs—regions containing the various raw materials and producing the food required. According to Kjellen it would follow that the realm as the body of the state is more essential than the people living upon the land, for the simple reason that the people replenish themselves while the loss of territory is like the loss of an organ of the body. A violation of the territory of a state is a crime against the person, not the property of the state. Geopolitik is concerned with the consequences to be drawn from this conception, i. e., with the duty of the state to preserve the territory of the realm and its resources as analogous to man's obligation to preserve his body and his health. Geopolitik is concerned with the duty of the state to intensify the development of the realm in the case of the loss of a limb, and as we shall see later, of securing missing limbs if need be in any way they can be secured. Hence Geopolitik, as Kjellen defines it, "is the science which conceives the state as a geographic organism or as a phenomenon in space." Or to give the official definition worked out in conference by the German editors of the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*:

Geopolitik is the science dealing with the dependence of political events upon the soil. It is based upon the broad foundations of geography, especially political geography, which is the doctrine of political organisms of space and their structure. . . . Geopolitik aims to furnish the

armature for political action and guidance in political life. . . . Geopolitik must come to be the geographical conscience of the state. . . .

In and through its territory the state becomes geographically individualized—becomes a geographical individual. The outward manifestations of its individualization are the frontiers of the state. Thus Geopolitik concerns itself with the various types of state frontiers—natural frontiers, such as the sea; common frontiers, such as rivers and mountains. It considers the implications of frontiers for the life and safety of the state in relation to neighboring states. It deals with harmonious cohesion of the realm within its frontiers; it distinguishes between types of harmonious territory, such as the potamic, the mesopotamic or circumfluvial, and the circummarine or seacoast type. Examples of the potamic type are Nigeria, the Congo state, both built around the rivers which have given them their name and roughly bounded by the watersheds of these rivers. Examples of the mesopotamic or circumfluvial type are the ancient Babylonian and Assyrian empires, the predecessors of modern "Mesopotamia," broadly speaking bounded by the Euphrates and Tigris rivers; or Portugal, created around three parallel rivers and their watersheds, the Douro, the Tagus, and the Guadiana rivers. The significance of these types in modern times for self-sufficiency and power politics lies in the possibility that part of these rivers, either the mouth or the source, may be in a competitor's or in an enemy's hands. The source of the Rhine lies in Switzerland, the mouth in Holland. Of the circummarine type there is the insular type, such as the British Isles, with its expansion towards other seacoasts far across the seas; or the ancient Greek and Roman types of the peninsular states expanding in fan shape to the adjacent islands and seacoasts. The geopolitical or *real*political interest here is the problems raised with regard to efficiency, safety, and defense of sea routes. Geopolitik applies to the realm the criterion of natural territory, i. e., it examines the capacity of the realm to feed its population as the basis for a self-sufficient economy. According to Kjellen, this conception of the realm as the body of the state, and the resulting obligation of the state to preserve and develop the realm, resolve the great conflict of laissez-faire liberalism and socialism with regard to their respective doctrines concerning

property rights in the soil. The state, says Kjellen, shares its body with individuals only on condition that private owners use their property in a manner which does not violate the interests of the state. In other words, in deference to, and as a matter of preference for laissez-faire liberalism, the geopolitically conceived and managed state preserves formal ownership of land by private individuals. Equally in deference to, and as a matter of preference for socialism, it grants such private ownership for use only.

Geopolitik considers the realm from the point of view of space (*Raum*), size (*Lebensraum*), shape; from the aspect of situation, a location in relation to the sea or to other states, and of changing situations, the change being effected by alteration of power status of one or more neighboring states; from the aspect of "historic sides and of shifting historic sides," i. e., of the geographical focus and shift of geographical focus of political tensions in relation to other states. Consideration of the state from the point of view of space (*Raum*, *Lebensraum*) implies the study of the growth of the realm as the body of the state. Historically considered this means that Geopolitik is concerned with the expansion by colonization or acquisition, peaceful or enforced, of neighboring territory. Says Kjellen: "Vitality strong states with limited space are compelled under the categorical imperative to enlarge their space by colonization, amalgamation, or conquest. In this position was England, and are today Japan and Germany [and, he might have added, Italy]. This is clearly not a case of lust of conquest, but of natural and necessary growth. . . ."

II. *Volk, the People Living upon or in the Realm.* The branch of the new geopolitical science dealing with this element of the state is Ethnopolitics. It considers the state as an ethnic personality. It has to do with the relation of the people to the state. It considers *Volk* as past, present, and future generations and posits responsibility on the part of the state to regulate the life of the present generation so as not to harm the interests of the generations to come. Ethnopolitics has to do with the relation of the nation to *Volk* and state, of nationalities to all three, and with the relation of race to *Volk* and nation. It considers all these relationships genealogically, linguistically,

psychologically, and biologically. It studies the relation of *Volk* and state under the dual aspect of loyalty to state and to nationality, and the conflict between the two. It studies the position of the state with regard to the controlling and balancing of the two. Finally, ethnopolitics deals with the mathematical relation of the realm and people, i. e., the population policy as a power factor in relation to the outside world. It is concerned about falling birth rate, the two children system, birth control, as phenomena affecting the quality and vitality of the nation. For such phenomena constitute a "taking leave from history" by the nation failing to avert these dangerous practices. Ethnopolitics must concern itself with the influence of people upon the territory and of territory upon the people as a factor determining their respective degrees of growth. It must concern itself with the responsibility of the state to guarantee or facilitate such growth. Among many other vital problems facing Geopolitik from the point of view of the ethnical aspect as well as that of *Autarkie* and power politics, are or were the two conflicting pan-Slavic and pan-German movements of Kjellen's time, and the contemporary plan for the creation of a Middle Europe under German hegemony, a plan which contemplated the inclusion within the Middle European realm of Teutons, Slavs, Turks, and Finns. Professor Friedrich Naumann was the chief proponent of that dream as described in his *Mittel Europa*, first published in 1915.¹

¹ Translated by Christabel Margaret Meredith and published in New York in 1917. A name to be mentioned with or next to that of Naumann is Paul Rohrbach, author of more than two dozen books and booklets on the topic of pan-Germanism, pan-Slavism, the struggle between the two, and particularly the subject of German actual and projected expansionism. Of the many works, a few are here cited in chronological sequence: *Die Russische Weltmacht in Mittel- und Westasien* ("Russian World Power in Middle and Western Asia"); *Deutschland unter den Weltvölkern* ("Germany Among the Peoples of the World"); *Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt* ("The German Idea in the World"), published in English as *German World Politics*; *Um Bagdad und Babylon*; *Der Krieg und die deutsche Politik*, published in English translation as *Germany's Isolation, an Exposition of the Economic Causes of the War [1914-1918]*; *Zum Weltvolk hindurch!* ("Striving Towards a World Outlook"); *Russland und wir* ("Russia and We"); *Der Kampf um Livland, deutsch-russisches Ringen durch sieben Jahrhunderte* ("The Struggle over Livland, German-Russian Conflict through Seven Centuries"); *Deutschland! Tod oder Leben?* ("Germany! Death or Life?"); *Deutsch-Afrika, Ende oder Anfang?* ("German-Africa, End or Beginning?").

III. *The State as Household.* The third aspect under which the state appears to the new geopolitical scientist is that of the household. The particular branch of geopolitical science dealing with this aspect is Politics of Economics. The term political economy would not suit, because it fails to emphasize sufficiently the political or governmental planning aspect. Politics of economics goes beyond the concern with public finance, administration of state property, such as nationally owned forests, mines, waterways, roads, industrial enterprises such as postal and telegraph services, and the like. The significance of the economic aspect of the individual state is often expressed in its name: Argentina is the silver country, Brazil that of the brazil tree. But such names fall far short of covering the extent of interest of the politics of economics and of the making of such politics. Growth of population and "materialization" of existence have increased the importance of the economic aspect, while on the other hand, politics of economics have enhanced both, by furthering production and industry and their mechanization.

The realm is the body of the state. It is the house and soil in which the *Volk* must find its living. Organization of the realm must be directed to that purpose. Self-sufficiency (*Autarkie*) lies latent in the soil. It must be realized by efficient and ever more efficient exploitation of the soil. The state must organize this work so that it produces the greatest degree of self-sufficiency. But if the realm, the territory, becomes too small, or if it fails to offer the resources needed, it becomes the duty of the state to find both room and resources for its people outside of its own realm. Thus the state becomes a *ménage*, a household, with a planned economy, an economy planning for self-sufficiency. Political economy or politics of economics deals with the different types of state household: the commercial type, the *rentier* or investor type, and the colonial type. In the commercial type, import and export resemble the circulation of the blood. Theoretically, export of manufactured goods is to balance import of raw materials. Where it fails to do so in practice the deficit is met from other income, from interest on capital invested abroad (invisible exports), from shipping profits, etc., so that the negative export balance forms

part of the positive general trade balance. This, says Kjellen, is the normal stage in all industrial countries.

But as the lending abroad of earned capital increases, this type develops into the *rentier* (*Rentner*), the investor type of state household. At this stage the commercial state becomes a creditor state, in varying degrees, of course. Before the World War, England was approaching that status. France is, or was, its typical representative. It is the status in which commercial profits are invested not in new production enterprises, but in loan reserves.

The colonial type of state household is found where the center of concern is agrarian production, as for instance in Russia before the World War. The essence of this type is export of agricultural products and raw materials balanced by the import of manufactured goods, usually with a positive trade balance in favor of agricultural exports. But the financial balance may nevertheless be negative, as a result of loans for financial expenditures of the state. In that case the state household is in the category of the debtor economy. Russia before World War I was in that position, serving as a kind of unofficial colony to both Germany and France. The colonial type is the status of a relatively primitive economy. It is eventually replaced by industrialization, but even such industrialization usually leaves the country "in a dependence upon the outside hardly more satisfying than the former immature and backward status as a colony."

It would then seem that the ideal state household type is to be found not in one extreme form or other, but in a status of balance between extremes. This ideal is found, according to Kjellen, in *Autarkie*, in self-sufficiency, the situation in which a country or state succeeds in supplying from its own soil or within its own realm the essentials for the maintenance of its population. The German philosopher Fichte, the contemporary of Hegel, both mentioned by Professor Griswold as among those to whom scholars have retraced their steps in the search for the sources of the German dream of *Lebensraum*, has anticipated this sort of state household in the form of a socialist corporate or guild system under state control in his still famous book, *Der geschlossene Handelsstaat* . . . ("The Closed Commercial

State, a Philosophical Sketch as a Supplement to Jurisprudence, and a Test of a Future System of Politics"). *Autarkie* or the closed commercial state means the absence of over-developed industry depending for existence and survival upon exports of its manufactured goods. It means a status of industry capable of existing in dependence upon the home market. It implies an agricultural production which does not depend upon foreign export but which is capable of supplying a country industrialized to support home consumption of industrial goods. *Autarkie* is a closed system of national economy which in case of emergency is capable of functioning by and within itself. It is self-evident that *Autarkie* presupposes the availability within its system of all the prerequisites for a self-sufficient agriculture and industry and the acquisition of such prerequisites by the means indicated.

Autarkie is economic individuality of the state, just as the realm with its frontiers manifests geographic individuality and nationality indicates ethnical individualization of the state. *Autarkie* says Kjellen, is the latest reaction to the cosmopolitan industrialism of the nineteenth century, which placed the national household at the mercy of the competitive forces of the world market. In this struggle of competitive forces the strong swallowed the weak. An earlier reaction against the competitive system was the protectionism of the middle and second part of the century. Under protectionism the state household sets up tariff walls against trading invaders who threaten to upset the natural internal economic balance and bring home the realization that the state is in the last analysis more secure within its own *Reich* and *Volk*. This, Kjellen concedes, is an oversimplified picture. The cosmopolitan industrial trading state did not withdraw and cannot withdraw entirely from world markets. Instead it replaced the system of "the open door" by that of "the closed interest sphere," the next best to the "closed commercial state." Kjellen points out that England followed this policy in various agreements with France in 1904, in the Chamberlain program of "the commercial union" with the autonomous colonies, and, if Kjellen had written later, he would have added, in the Economic Conference in Canada of 1933. All these agreements were made on the basis not of free trade, but of protection and the closed interest

sphere. In the case of Great Britain it is a policy of concentration of trade within the orbit of the British Empire as the natural interest sphere of England. In the case of the Middle Europe planned by the pan-Germans of First World War days, it was the prospect of trade within the orbit of Middle Europe as the natural interest sphere of Germany. In the case of the Hitler-planned New Europe, it is a case of the revival of that plan and enlargement of that orbit.

Kjellen cautions that the system of self-sufficiency should never go so far as to attempt the exclusion of all foreign trade. The policy of the closed doors of Japan, China, and Korea was maintained at a price stifling national growth. The same applies in the sphere of industry. The autarkic state, Kjellen warns, cannot afford to confine itself chiefly to one type of industry "monoculture," the one crop system in agriculture for instance. In its prevailing system of currant growing, ancient Greece ran the risk of bankruptcy with every crop failure. The risks of a failure of rice crops in China, of wheat crops in imperial Russia, of the cotton crop in our southern states would be modern examples fitting the situation. Hence the self-sufficient state, or rather the state striving after self-sufficiency, must develop all the possible kinds of production and agriculture of which the nature and content of the soil are capable.

And thus, according to Kjellen, and according to geopolitical science, the ideal type of the state or of the state household is found in the balance of all types, in self-sufficiency (*Autarkie*), as a mean between the investor and colonial types, and as the best guarantee of the greatest degree of independence. Politics of economics deals with the activity of states as households. The state considered as household is concerned with the flow of capital and production; with the exchange of raw materials and manufactured goods; with the ways and means of establishing as nearly as possible *Autarkie*, self-sufficiency, and of remedying insufficiency by reciprocal exchange of the available raw materials and manufactured goods of one state for the available but different raw materials and manufactured goods of other states—not by the exchange of raw materials by one state for manufactured goods of another, or vice versa.

IV. *The State Viewed as Society.* From Aristotle down to

modern times the social order has been considered as subordinate to the state. In his treatise on the Greek city states, Aristotle goes so far as to say that the state is the highest of all human association, that it existed prior to all other human associations, just "as the whole precedes the part." The reaction of modern sociology, and political science to an extent, goes to the other extreme of subordinating the state to the social order. Modern sociology, says Kjellen, considers society, its nature and needs, from the larger aspect of humanity as dissociated from, or rather as transcending, the particular state. Socio-politics, as a branch of the new geopolitical science, looks upon the social order in its direct relation to the specific state. Kjellen rejects the doctrine which views society or the social order as superordinate to the state. This is the doctrine preached by the political pluralists, the Frenchman Duguit, the Hollander Krabbe, the American Follett, and for a time at least, if not still, the Briton Laski. It is a doctrine to which all free and self-respecting souls will incline whenever a bureaucracy, or a single party, usurping the functions of the state turns berserk in its reaction against the libertine antics of excessive democracy, but which the same souls will readily abandon whenever political, social, and moral chaos endanger or destroy law, order, and national security within and without. Considered empirically, as Kjellen insists it should be considered, the relation of state and society is one not of contrast but of identity. The two are not opposites, but one and the same object looked upon from different angles or vantage points, just as the state and the people are not opposites but two phases of one and the same phenomenon. "Society, considered from a specific angle, is the state and every state so considered is a society." Society thus considered is the sum total of the natural interest spheres or groups of the citizens or subjects of the state. This grouping is based on the natural divisions of occupations and cultural variations. "Society is a working unit in the cultural world, while the nation is a physical type of humanity." Or, according to another definition, "Society is the momentary [the passing] generation in the living world of changing interests and thoughts, while the nation is the uninterrupted cohesion between [or unity of] generations."

The household of the state is the phase representing the totality of the economic interest groups. In this capacity the household of the state connects or deals with both politics of economics and social politics. The two activities of household and social order are essentially different—but intimately connected. The state household is concerned with the conflicting interest groups as far as they affect the very life of the state; it is concerned from this angle with the struggle between "producers and consumers, agrarians and industrialists, protectionists and free traders, defenders of export-industry and home manufacture, capital and labor, and large and small property owners," etc. All these problems or relationships are the concern of the state, all fall within the scope of the politics of both the economic and the social order. Under the aspect of the household, the state deals with the problem of provisioning and feeding the nation; under the aspect of social politics, the state is concerned with the social interest groups, as far as they affect, for good or evil, the state's task of provisioning and feeding the nation. Socialism, says Kjellen, recognizes only economic needs as the basis of human society. But an unbiased study of the situations created by the successive types and different stages of development of society challenges the correctness of the socialist view. To be sure, modern society is to a large extent the creation of science; still, the basis of society, Kjellen cautions, is older than science. In the sphere covered by the politics of economics, Kjellen writes, "the state lives only by bread"; in that of social politics we learn to know other, higher needs, increasing to the most refined demands of spiritual culture (*der geistigen Kultur*). Social politics traces the development of the modern social order from early clan society through the subsequent neighborhood or community state, the occupational (*Stände*, estates) stage, and the interest group stage of today, as transitions to a new order in the offing, in which a new sense of sociality (*Sozialität*) will serve to relieve the state of its coercive coordinating activity as part of its social politics. In other words, modern socio-politics as a necessary state function at the present time will eventually lead to a situation in which the coercive functions of the state will become superfluous and then disappear.

In the first or clan order of society, men were held together by blood relationship as the normal unifying element. That was before division of labor took place. Whether still in the state of migration or in that of early domicile, the clan order had one paramount interest, the daily bread or meat or what not, and security and protection from other, hostile, clans. As clans settle in a definite territory, they begin to cultivate the land. Slowly the blood tie loosens. Blood community is replaced by labor community, blood relation by labor relation. Man feels a closer tie to his neighbor with whom he shares the daily tasks of life than with his blood relations in other village communities. The territorial aspect, says Kjellen, replaces the genealogical. That is or was the second stage in the development of the social order.

The third stage is the occupational (*Stände*, estates) stage. In the agricultural economy a gradual differentiation of needed activities takes place. It is a differentiation dictated by the changing requirements of living conditions transcending those of food and security. Need for defense requires protection and measures for permanent defense in permanent locations. Primitive education, primitive manufacture of consumption goods and trading, all become differentiated from the function of agricultural pursuits. Vocational occupation replaces the neighborhood principle as the vivifying element of the social order. The vocational groups take the place of the community as the basis of society. Man now becomes conscious of belonging to the Nobility, the Clergy, the Burghers (*bourgeoisie*). But the occupational groups, while united within themselves, soon begin to split the nation into conflicting interest groups. The French Revolution blasted the ties of the estates to restore the unity of the nation and restore the freedom of the individual. Liberty, equality, and fraternity as established in the new political system of revolutionary France brought the individual into direct relation with the state. The objective of the Revolution was that of establishing social equality; the method of establishing it was political. The result was political, rather than social, it was equality and liberty. The individual voted, as far as he did, no longer as one of the three estates and for the interests of the estate, but as a citizen, in his own name. As a citizen he was

expected to have only one common interest, that of the state or nation. The same change took place wherever the principles of the French Revolution gained a foothold.

This change ushered in the fourth stage of the *Vereine* and *Fachgenossenschaften*, associations and labor organizations of many types. In the new liberal laissez-faire state or liberal laissez-faire social order, it was the political aspect of both state and society which became the *Leitmotiv* of the time. The individual was cut loose from all other ties but the state. He could vote as he pleased, he could seek employment where and when he pleased, without interference from the guilds, which were no more. But men's occupations still varied, their skills varied, the occupational opportunities varied. With the industrial revolution and the concentration of manufacture in the hands of the few, the freedom of labor and of the office clerk began soon to dwindle. A new sense of social and occupational interest and solidarity or need for such solidarity soon appeared. It eventually became so strong that it transcended once more the sense of solidarity of nation and state. Labor began the struggle for the right to organize within the nation. Soon labor came to the realization that its interests, as it conceived them, transcended the political frontiers of the nation. International labor unions came upon the scene. International labor conferences followed suit, or vice versa. The First International, the Second International, and later the Third International, socialism and communism as formal social organizations devoted to the interests of the international brotherhood of labor, became the new element of social solidarity as a threat to national and political individuality. This development has created a conflict of interest between employer and worker. But it has not stopped there. Differences of doctrine concerning the method of fostering the interests of either group have led to corresponding differentiation within the camps of both employer and workers. Finance, industry, agriculture, the professions in the non-worker groups—all specialized in organization for the protection of their specific interests. The struggle between industrial and craft unions, between free unions and company unions, between open shops and closed shops manifests the same tendency among the workers.

Parallel with this ever increasing differentiation of society into socio-economic interest groups the doctrine of equalitarianism of the liberal era implied the conception of the equality of all these groups, an equality to be guaranteed through the devices of political citizenship and of direct political relationship of the interest groups to nation and state. This situation, of course, led *per se* to the concomitant doctrine which conceived the state as the stabilizer, the harmonizer in the conflicts of the many interest groups. This conflict, says Kjellen, indicates a transitional stage of the social order, a stage of crisis which will be succeeded by the "full grown, ripe status" of the social order consisting of interest groups in a state of harmony, called sociality (*Sozialität*).

V. *The State as Government.* Thus Kjellen reaches the fifth and last aspect of the state: government, rulership, and the politics of governing or ruling.

Nationality as we are told by Kjellen signifies solidarity of the nation; loyalty is solidarity under the aspect of law; sociality in turn is solidarity among interest groups. All three are barometers of the strength of nation and state. Failure of the interest groups to coordinate their conflicting interests paralyses both nation and state. Furthermore, in this conflict, anyone of the interest groups is ever ready to use the state for its own purpose and to blame the state if the latter refuses to favor the group's special interests. Thus lack of sociality brings in its trail lack of loyalty and vice versa. Kjellen cites as illustration the conflict between the Patricians and Plebeians of ancient Rome and the latter's withdrawal from Rome and from the state in time of war. It was a case of lack of loyalty as a result of lack of sociality. He cites the situation of the English working class on the one hand and the capitalists on the other after the industrial revolution. In 1845 Disraeli, criticizing the situation, spoke of the two Englands, the two nations—the "upper and lower classes, living together, but separated in sentiment and interest as far as if an ocean lay between them." Numerous illustrations could, of course, be found elsewhere and in our time.

The degree of success in the coordination of these interest groups indicates the success of statecraft. Successful statecraft

presupposes the coordination of the conflicting interests, but not in favor of one group. Hence it should preclude the attempted coordination by a single group. To accomplish this successful coordination the state is under the obligation of resorting to all legitimate (legal) means to suppress lawless assertion of special interests by groups, such as strikes, sabotage—as preached and practiced by organized syndicalism in France and Italy, the France and Italy of Kjellen's time. The state, says Kjellen, may even resort to foreign war as a means of deflecting internal strife into the field of foreign politics. At the time of which Kjellen writes, going to war was a legitimate act, at least as considered from the aspect of international law. Bismarck's wars in the sixties, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, and the First World War may find their explanation in such attempted deflection. But as Kjellen admits, such a policy is dangerous, as Russia found after the loss of the war in 1905, and Germany in 1918, if we assume that they went to war to deflect internal conflict. The safer solution would be prophylactic action to forestall more drastic steps. According to Kjellen, the state has created two agencies for such prophylactic treatment. They are agencies for the "pacification and coordination" of the "conflicting economic interest groups." What are these two agencies? The bureaucracy and the army. Yes, this is correctly quoted—"the bureaucracy and the army."

The function of governing is not to be confused with the subject of constitutional law and jurisprudence. The subject of consideration by constitutional law and jurisprudence is the state as a subject of law. That of the politics of government is the activity of the legally constituted government. The study of constitutional law deals with documents, with laws; that of the politics of governing with the willing and doing of the state. It concerns itself with the question of the actual constitutional form of the state and with the sphere, extent, and imitations of the activity of the state as determined by its "sovereign will." This phase of state politics is also indicated in the name of states or countries, as for instance in such names as the United States of America, the Swiss Confederation, the British Empire, the Hapsburg or Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. As in all other aspects of the state, the real guiding principle in the

shaping of politics of governing is not the law but political purposefulness, utility (*Zweckmässigkeit*). The state, says Kjellen, applies law because of the utilitarian value of the law. In every day practical life this fact may not always be realized by the ordinary citizen, but it is so, nevertheless. "In that sense the law serves the state to establish itself as a personality endowed with reason. Hence the rulership of the state based on law is the purest expression, the spirit, the mind of the state." Herein is found the kernel, the essence of the cultural nature of the state. The nation has feeling, sensation; society has interests; the state in its governing aspect has duties. The state guides the sensual life of the nation by its reasoned purposeful objectives. Then the state curbs the conflict of interests by its permanent institutions, such as the bureaucracy and the army. "It secures legally protected freedom to an unfree society." It secures such freedom through such institutions by way of preventive, prophylactic, action as preferable to other harsher measures.

The form of government and the method of governing activity are largely determined by geographical, ethnical, economic, and historic factors. "Tropical India cannot be governed as freely as cool Canada," writes Kjellen, quoting or referring to John Morley. An industrial people demands greater liberties than an agricultural group. It is difficult to rule great empires constitutionally. He points in proof to the Brazil of 1824-1889, and to Russia since 1905. Such empires require the rule of the Caesar—or a federal régime such as we find in the United States, and in Brazil since 1889. Historic and cultural levels are important factors. Each nation is unique in that it injects its own peculiarities even when it follows the pattern of other nations in the selection or creation of a new constitution. Kjellen points to the mixing of foreign with domestic ideas, Roman and Germanic, in the Prussian constitution of 1851; of the monarchical and democratic elements in the constitution of 1875 of France. But such mixtures lead eventually to struggles in which one or the other base of the mixture will come to the surface. Life will always prevail over legal or constitutional forms. Custom, conventional law, precede and supplant written law.

Government politics and the science concerned with the politics of government, therefore, deal with various forms of political control corresponding to changing conditions of society. They deal with changing forms of the constitution; with the inadequacy of the simple quantitative element as differentiated from the qualitative element in the liberal democratic system of representation and election. They deal with the alternating of proportional voting and representation on the basis of the vocations and interest groups. They deal finally and most importantly, with the attempted synthesis or coordination of the present-day conflict of the interest groups, a conflict ever growing in extent and intensity, until at times and in places it overshadows all other exigencies of state, national, and social life.²

The preceding outline presents in greatly simplified form the essence of the teaching of Kjellen's new geopolitical science of states. It must be admitted that the subject matter seems to wander rather far from Geopolitik, except in the material dealing with the first aspect of the state, i. e., the state considered as realm. But since the other four aspects—people, household, society, and government—are essential attributes of the state, all come under the consideration of Geopolitik as it is to be practiced by the state according to the new geopolitical science. Hence all five aspects of the state are considered the legitimate subject of concern and ministration by the new science.

² Page references to specific quotations from Kjellen and to particular ideas given here in paraphrased form are found in the author's "From Geopolitik to Political Relativism," cited above.

CHAPTER VII

HISTORY PRESENTS A PUPPET SHOW

So far the story of the advent of Geopolitik has been brought forward to show Kjellen's efforts to prove the need of a new science of the state, a geopolitical science, and his actual exposition of the content and methodology of that science. But Kjellen has a great deal more to say on the subject. In a chapter dealing with "the state under the law of life" Kjellen proceeds to marshal the "historical" evidence in proof of the correctness of his teaching. His new geopolitical science, he says, is a system which deals with states existing not in a vacuum of abstract thinking and reasoning, but in the world of hard reality, a world constituted by the totality of states meeting each other in the struggle of life just as all organisms meet each other in the world of reality, i. e., in the struggle for existence. For the state, he asserts in agreement with Ratzel, is an organism, a living being—which requires the necessities of life in a biological way. It is a personality, with cultural and spiritual needs and wants. This concept of states as biological organisms and as personalities is basic for the conclusions reached. It is basic insofar as it furnished the justification, or rationalization for certain aspects claimed for the very nature and behavior of states. Such aspects are a self-sufficient economy and the method of establishing self-sufficiency by way of totalitarian control over all phases of human endeavor, and if necessary, expansion for the purpose of securing the resources required for a self-sufficient economy.

The theory of the organic character of the state is as old as political speculation itself. Menenius Agrippa, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Livy, Seneca, St. Paul, Thomas Aquinas, John of Salisbury, Marsilius of Padua, Spencer, Hobbes, Herder, Goethe, Ranke, Treitschke, Bluntschli, and many later thinkers are said to have described the state or to have spoken of the state in terms borrowed from the life and behavior of living organisms.

They all are said to have subscribed to the organismic doctrine of the state in some form or the other. Some of the figures cited

draw from their analogies conclusions similar to those of the geopoliticians. But none go so far as does Ratzel in his presentation of the seven laws of growth of states, and as does Kjellen in his work on *The State as a Form of Life*. Even where they favor or demand for the state the kind of territory which must provide the necessities for the self-sufficient state, they do so without any particular analogy to the biological necessity of growth of the state, i. e., by way of securing the organs missing in the organism of the existing state. They justify and advocate conquest, but they do so on the basis of less sophisticated reasoning. Where they do sanction such conquest they do so on the basis of the more direct principle of conquest as sanctioned by prevailing state and international practice. A few illustrations will serve to show both the similarity and the difference in their treatment of the subject and in the conclusions offered.

In the section of Plato's *Republic* dealing with wealth, poverty, and virtue, Socrates and Adeimantus are conversing on the subject of the man who through his profligate habits has ruined his health and seeks cure for his ills in any and all of the remedies offered him by his fellow citizens, wise men or quacks. Says Socrates: "What a delightful life they lead! They are always doctoring and increasing and complicating their disorders, and always fancying that they will be cured by any nostrum which anybody advises them to try." Answers Adeimantus: "Such cases are very common . . . with invalids of this sort." "Yes," Socrates replies, "and the charming thing is that they deem him their worst enemy who tells them the truth, which is simply that, unless they give up eating and drinking and wenching and idling, neither drug nor cautery nor spell nor amulet nor any other remedy will avail." Says Adeimantus: "Charming . . . I see nothing in going into a passion with a man who tells you what is right." Replies Socrates: "Nor would you praise the behavior of states which act like the men whom I was just now describing. For are they not ill-ordered states in which the citizens are forbidden under pain of death to alter the constitution; and yet he who most sweetly courts those who live under this regime and indulges them and fawns upon them and is skilful in anticipating and gratifying their humors is held

to be a great and good statesman—do not these states resemble the persons whom I was describing?" "Yes," agrees Adeimantus, "the states are as bad as men. . . ."

Quite naturally Plato stressed that aspect of the state in which he was most interested, the social and moral. But even Plato expressed ideas which today are termed geopolitical by the geopoliticians and which are brought into some kind of relationship to geopolitical allusions to the organic theory of the state. In the introduction to his *Geopolitik* Professor Richard Hennig tells us about ancient, and less ancient, predecessors of the geopoliticians of today. "It is hardly saying too much," he writes, "to designate as the first geopolitician Menenius Agrippa, who in 494 B.C. poetized one of the most spirited fables of all times, in which he told the Roman Plebeians who had left Rome to settle on the 'Holy Mountain,' the story of the members of the body which rebelled against the stomach, refused the stomach nourishment, and thus were one and all condemned to debility." And, Hennig continues, "also in Plato do we find many allusions which strongly remind one of modern geopolitical views, as when he described quite well the need for growth on the part of the young state, to wit: 'The soil which once sufficed to nourish its people will become too small and will not be large enough. . . . Hence we shall be compelled to slice off some land from the territory of our neighbors.'" Plato's disciple Aristotle speaks of the state as a "natural institution" which existed "prior to all other institutions." In proof he argues: "The whole must needs be prior to its part. For instance, if you take away the body which is the whole, there will not remain any such thing as a foot or a hand. . . ." ¹ He speaks of the state as being capable of happiness; he identifies the happiness of the state with that of the individual. He does the same with regard to morality.²

Citing antiquity in the Middle Ages, John of Salisbury comments upon Plutarch's idea of the relationship of the state and government to the different parts of the body. Thus he writes in book V of the *Policraticus*: "A commonwealth, according to

¹ *The Politics of Aristotle* . . . , I, 3, translated by J. E. C. Weldon.

² *Ibid.*, IV, 2, 13.

Plutarch, is a certain body which is endowed with life by the benefit of divine favor. . . . The place of the head in the body of the commonwealth is filled by the Prince. . . . The place of the heart is filled by the Senate. . . . The duties of the eyes, ears, and tongue are claimed by the judges and the governors of provinces. Officials and soldiers correspond to the hands. Those who always attend upon the prince are likened to the sides. Financial officers and keepers . . . may be compared with the stomach and intestines, which, if they become congested through avidity, and retain too tenaciously their accumulation, generate innumerable and incurable diseases, so that through their ailment the whole body is threatened with destruction. The husbandmen correspond to the feet. . . . Take away the support of the feet from the strongest body, and it cannot move forward by its own power, but must creep painfully and shamefully on its hands, or else be moved by means of brute animals."³

In the seventeenth century Thomas Hobbes composed the *Leviathan*. In the chapter on "Nutrition and Procreation of a Commonwealth" he writes:

This matter, commonly called commodities, is partly "native," and partly "foreign"; "native," that which is to be had within the territory of the commonwealth; "foreign," that which is imported from without. And because there is no territory under the dominion of one commonwealth, except it be of very vast extent, that produceth all things needful for the maintenance and motion of the whole body; and few that produce not something more than necessary; the superfluous commodities to be had within, become no more superfluous, but supply these wants at home, by importation of that which may be had abroad, either by exchange, or by just war, or by labour.

A more specific allusion to the organic nature of the state is found in his statement concerning the procreative faculty of the state:

The procreation or children of a commonwealth are those we call "plantations" or "colonies," under a conductor or governor, to inhabit a foreign country, either formerly void of inhabitants, or made void by war. And when a colony is settled, they are either a commonwealth

³ *Policraticus*, V, 2, in *The Statesman's Book of John of Salisbury* . . . translated into English by John Dickinson (New York, 1927).

of themselves, discharged of their subjection to their sovereign that sent them . . . , or else they remain united to their metropolis . . . and then they are no commonwealths themselves, but provinces, and parts of the commonwealth that sent them.

Herbert Spencer's allusions to the state as a biological organism are found in his *Principles of Sociology*, particularly in part II, "The Inductions of Sociology," and in part V, "Political Institutions." Spenser resorts to an elaborate analogy between political society and the animal or human body. Individual man, he says, is like the cell in the body. Society is constituted of individual men as the body is constituted of individual cells. Individual cells multiply according to the bodily pattern. In the same way men unite in political society in accordance with a social and political pattern. The relationship between cells and cells, and between cells and the entire body is regulated on functional lines. The same applies to the body social and politic where the various social groups with their various social interests correspond to the various members of the body with the various functions they serve. "That mutual dependence of parts which constitutes organization is thus effectually established. Though discrete instead of concrete, the social aggregate is rendered a living whole." As to the particulars of the analogy, a few samples will suffice. There is, according to Spencer, in both the body and society an increase in mass; there is variation in the growing mass. In both there is community of structure with all the variation. Lastly, there is evident in the body as well as in the socio-political order an increasing inter-dependence between parts corresponding to an increasing trend towards higher types in realms of living organisms and of bodies social and political.

Ranke, the German historian of the nineteenth century, expresses himself as follows: "If I am not in error, there stands out conspicuously in states the continuity of life as we ascribe it to the human race. Men die, one era follows another or is replaced by another. But states which far surpass the life span of individual mortals, enjoy a very long and always uniform life. . . . He who surveys the history of Venice, will feel as if he pursues and sees the ever admirable duration and sequence of a single human life span all through different

eras. . . ." In another connection he says: "The economy of states shows how the organs of state are grown together; it lays bare before our eyes their arteries and veins; the spots where breath and blood are found; it teaches how the healthy condition of the state can be maintained and ill health can be cured."⁴

These illustrations reveal a tendency running through centuries of social and political thinking, to compare the state to living organisms of some kind or other, beast or man. They manifest the fact that the authors have drawn certain conclusions from their analogies or comparisons. But it is equally evident that none of their conclusions is quite so extreme and reaches quite so far as those of Ratzel and Kjellen. It is significant in this connection that even Ratzel cautions against placing too much emphasis upon any specific analogy to or identification with specific biological organisms, particularly of the higher order, such as the human being. Where he indulges in the application of analogies or identification he stresses what he insists is an essential consideration, that the analogy suggested and the identity claimed are to be sought less in the physical but rather in the spiritual and cultural aspect of state life. They are to be sought in the human side, in will, purposefulness, the choice of means, attributed to and manifested by the state. They are to be sought in the effort of the *Volk* to weld itself with blood and sweat together and into the soil upon which it lives. A brief quotation will illustrate the points made. Dealing with the "limitations of the organism within the state" Ratzel writes: "Among animals and plants the organism is in its most perfect status insofar as the members are forced to bring the greatest sacrifices of their independence in the service of the whole. Measured by the same criterion, the man-made state is an extremely imperfect organism; for its members reserved for themselves a degree of independence which is not in evidence among the lower plants and animals. There are algae and sponges which as organized beings stand as high as the man-made state. That which qualifies this imperfect union of

⁴ Quoted by Hennig, p. 3, from Ranke's lecture course at the University of Berlin, 1836, entitled: *Über die Verwandtschaft und den Unterschied der Historie und der Politik*, pp. 285, 290 ff.

humans, imperfect as an organism, for such colossal, singular accomplishments, is the fact that it is a spiritual and moral organism. The spiritual unites that which is physically separated and no biological comparison fits this situation."

In his *Political Geography* Ratzel restated the seven laws of the growth of states in much enlarged form—but in much the same terms. In the earlier version he wrote: "The *Volk* is the organic being, which in the course of history unites ever closer with the soil upon which it lives. Just as the individual struggles with his new piece of land which he sets out to make into an arable acre, so the *Volk* struggles with its soil, which with sweat and blood it makes into its own as something that cannot be detached."⁵ In the later version he said: "The state is for us an organism not only because it is a union of the living *Volk* with a rigid soil, but because the union is strengthened by the effect of one upon the other to the extent that the two can no longer be visualized as separated from each other."⁶ Commenting upon Ratzel's rather cautious attitude concerning the organic nature of the state, the editor of Ratzel's *Political Geography* remarks that political scientists, and this would apply to Kjellen, have misunderstood Ratzel's conception of the organic nature of the state which was intended to be taken figuratively, not literally.⁷ As a matter of fact, in his later and shorter *Grundriss zu einem System der Politik* ("Outline of a System of Politics"),⁸ Kjellen has removed, apparently as scaffolding no longer necessary, all specific reference to the organismic theory of the state, all specific attempts to establish its analogy to or identity with this or that specific biological organism. But he continues to speak of the state as the judge, as the father, as the master. He continues to speak of the realm (*Reich*) as an individual and as a person. He has removed also all specific references to the alleged obligation of the state with regard to the acquisition of extraneous regions in order to secure a full set of organs for the state and through them complete *Autarkie*. Nevertheless, the obligation remains as an

⁵ Ratzel, "Die Gesetze des räumlichen Wachstums der Staaten," p. 102.

⁶ *Politische Geographie*, p. 4.

⁷ For a bibliographical statement on this controversy, see *ibid.*, p. 9.

⁸ Apparently published in German only.

implication throughout the discussion of the state as realm and household. At any rate, there is found in the *Grundriss* no specific revocation of the opinions expressed in the earlier work, *The State as a Form of Life*.

The theory of the organic nature of the state has been challenged by many critics.⁹ It has been challenged by way of denial of the alleged identity or analogy of the state with a biological organism on the ground that there is no agreement as to the particular organism implied in the attempted identification with the state or that there is evident a failure of agreement upon the extent of the analogy, even where there is no dispute as to the particular organism to which analogy is claimed. The geopolitical adherents of the organic theory vary in their choice of the type of organism from the lowest in the form of the deep sea coral to the highest, i. e., the human individual. There is evidence among them of a similar wide disagreement with regard to the degree of the alleged identity or analogy, revealing a confused or artificial construction of the assumed relationship of the state and the living organism of whatever type. Let us indulge in a brief venture into the realm of fantasia, ready to face without flinching what will be in store for us during the performance and prepared for the reaction likely to follow.

The extreme, both in the specification or choice of type of organism and in the extent of alleged identity or analogy is reached probably in Kjellen's *The State as a Form of Life*, where the author speaks of the birth, baptism, death, resurrection, and reincarnation of the state,¹⁰ and in Richard Hennig's *Geopolitik*, where we read of the birth, life functions, and death of states.¹¹ Speaking of the birth of states, Kjellen writes: ". . . In an existing system of states the state does not come into this world with the innocence of a child. It is from birth burdened with the guilt of violating international law. The

* For the historical background and refutation of the organic theory see Richard Hennig, *Geopolitik*, pp. 1 ff.; Francis W. Coker, *Organismic Theories of the State* (New York, 1910); *A History of Political Theories, Recent Times*, ed. Charles Edward Merriam (New York, 1924), section on "Anthropological Theories" by A. A. Goldenweiser; W. W. Willoughby, *An Examination of the Nature of the State* (New York, 1911), pp. 28-38.

¹⁰ Particularly in Chapter V.

¹¹ Also in Chapter V.

existing system with its sharply defined legal conditions must be broken through in order that the newly born may secure space; and where this takes place, a special injustice is done to the neighbor or the neighbors, i. e., those states whose legal and power system is diminished by the arrival of the new state. From the point of view of international law and of morality, the birth of a new state is certainly a scandal and the newly born is to be registered as illegitimate in the civil records of international law."¹² In other words, the new state is the creation not of morality and legality but of will and power. But, adds Kjellen, "this fact does not signify that international law is of no consequence in such a case. On the contrary, after the natural act of birth it will be shown to play a decisive role. The world has progressed in international organization to such an extent that the system of existing states determines whether or not the newly born state shall be received into the community of states." In brief, the existing states determine whether or not to give legal (*de jure*) recognition to the actually (*de facto*) existing new state. But, Kjellen comments, "this situation will not prevent a new state from being born nor from dying; over these functions only history decides, history which is beyond right and wrong."

Still, the answer to the question of the precise time of the birth of the state is apparently not so simple as it may seem. The political obstetricians disagree just as theologians disagree upon the precise time of the birth of the soul in the newly formed or forming body. In 1908 Bulgaria declared her independence. According to the doctrine elaborated above, Bulgaria declared herself as having been born, or having given birth to herself. But Bulgaria could not, at least for a time, secure recognition from the great powers, nor from Turkey from which she had seceded and taken her territory. Thus was raised the question:—Was Bulgaria really born, or was she not born? According to the learned doctrine of Professor Laband, here cited by Kjellen, a law is really born only when it receives sanction, when it is promulgated. On the analogy to this doctrine a state is born really, and not in its own imagi-

¹² *Der Staat als Lebensform*, pp. 178 ff.

nation only, when it has received *de jure* recognition from the other states. Kjellen seeks a way out of the disagreement on this important subject, most important for the state whose real birth is questioned or whose recognition of birth is long overdue. In the first place a newly born state when refused legal recognition may, so to say, by way of a kind of prescription or squatters' sovereignty, gradually grow into the international community of states, even though the opportunities for this method are growing slimmer as time goes on. Kjellen thinks that "thus we may still reach a kind of agreement concerning the form of the birth of the state—or perhaps more correctly of its baptism—." The agreement may be found in the cultural and organizational status of the state seeking recognition. If the petitioner is effectively organized as a state; if the acquisition of its territory is not too much of a loss for its neighbors; if the seeker after recognition is considered capable of contributing independently to the common culture (*Kultur*) of the family of nations—then all these considerations or factors may weigh more heavily than mere legal prerogatives of denying recognition. "Under such conditions," Kjellen writes, "the chances of Albania would sink far below par, while they counted heavily in favor of Norway in 1905."

But enough of the birth and baptism of states. Let us consider some other aspects of their existence, life itself and its vicissitudes, growth, decline, death, and according to Kjellen, resurrection and reincarnation. Speaking of the merger of the Italian states during the middle and second half of the last century, Kjellen writes: "History shows us that the creation of modern Italy cost the life of seven states: Sardinia, the two Sicilies, Tuscany, Parma, Modena, and the Church State." Referring to the establishment of Germany in 1867, "four states lost their lives: Hanover, Hesse, Nassau, and Frankfurt." Elaborating on these deaths and their significance he muses as follows: "This makes a European death list of eleven in recent times, not including such artificial ephemeral state formations as the Napoleonic kingdom of Westphalia, Italy, the creations of the Congress of Vienna, such as Cracow (1815-1846), and the Ionian Islands (1815-1864). In the case of such deaths ancient rights perish. . . ." But "such deaths are

necessary sacrifices which must be brought to secure entrance into the magnificence of complete personality" in the new larger state unit. "When Sardinia voluntarily resigned her existence as a state in order that it might be resurrected in the larger Italy, we see in this process a natural evolution forward and upward. . . . Standing at such graves we should find satisfaction, not grief; for to merge in a larger state life is, for states as well as for individuals, the thought which robs death of its sting and the realm of the dead of its victory."¹⁸

The significance of the dying of states in order that they may be resurrected in a greater and loftier life of a large state creation begins to reveal itself. From the preceding historic evidence Kjellen concludes that "even though there is not yet available a definite tendency in the direction of a combination of different racial units leading toward the absorption of existing national states there is, nevertheless, agreement with our [the geopoliticians'] conceptions that mankind will eventually realize its unity in political form. Into this universal state all state lives must flow as rivers flow into the ocean, even though such rivers will under the symbol of federalism still be differentiated. It is here that we see our biological analogy carried to the end, and, be it stated, without diminution of our hope of the immortality [of the state]." In a long list of deaths of historic states Kjellen points out how in some instances it was a single outside executioner who performed the death dealing act as in the demise of Transvaal, Orange Free State, Korea, etc.; elsewhere it was a combination of assassins who performed the rites for Poland in her various divisions; in still other fatalities, suicide was the cause assigned by history as the recording physician, suicide in the form of loss of vitality, national consciousness, followed by disintegration, such as he thinks might have been the real cause of the death of Poland.

¹⁸ The idea embodied in the preceding and following passages finds a magnificent parallel in item xvi, "the robin and the worm" of *archy and mehitabel* by don marquis (New York, 1928). The robin has swallowed the worm. The worm cries out against his liquidation by his gory feathered assassin. As the process of assimilation proceeds he arrives at the paralyzing truth that even a robin must eat. When the act of transfiguration into the inners of his captor approaches consummation, that which had been a worm yields in blissful surrender his very self in union with the superior existence of the robin.

He concludes his necrology with this warning: "Our natural sympathy with the great suffering must not cause us to overlook the organic element in this fate. The spectacle is not tragic, it is 'only negatively pathetic,' to use this esthetic expression." Speaking of the death of Poland, he maintains that "it was only the normal execution of a superannuated people (*eines überlebten Volkes*) which had passed judgment upon itself."

There seems to be a contradiction in the analogy when Kjellen speaks of both death and immortality of states; but not so for Kjellen. Resurrection and reincarnation are resorted to in order to resolve the apparent paradox. Admitting that at the graves of some states tears might be in place—hope is justified at the graves of others, such as those of the former Transvaal and Orange Free State. For after five years of subjection or death, they received from the victor "the first degree of autonomy, and two years later, full federal freedom." Referring to the re-establishment of Poland, Norway, and Bulgaria, after varying periods of coma or death, he explains their reappearance as states by "the peculiar phenomenon of reincarnation, whose possibility differentiates the passing of the state externally from the death of the individual living being."

It would seem that we have thus passed in review the full cycle of life and life's possibilities for states and the full register of Kjellen's capacity or ingenuity for identification of organic and state life. But lo and behold! There is Professor Hennig with his resort to the process of rejuvenation or whatever else the process should be called. Hennig concedes that China, Japan, and perhaps Persia have "defied without interruption the storm of the times," but he insists, "they succeeded in reaching their great ages only by timely executed processes of shedding their old skins."

Still, neither the possibility of the shedding of skins, nor resurrection, nor reincarnation allow Kjellen the enjoyment of peace of mind when he contemplates the question of the death of states from the angle of the actuality involving one's own beloved state. The demonstration that states have died in the past leaves the gloomy prospect that the states of which we are members may, or even must, die some time in the future. As stated by Kjellen: "Two thousand years ago not one of the

great nations of Europe existed. Will there be a single one of them two thousand years hence? The question is in a certain sense the same as that put by modern zoologists concerning the continued existence of animal species, namely: Has the large scale death in the paleontological world always been occasioned by natural revolutions, or are the species destined to dissolve from within?" Kjellen does not relish the attempt to probe further and deeper for the answer to the question. "At the threshold of the question," he says, "science ceases and belief begins." He admits that "we may not be able at this point to prove the correctness of the organic conception of the state," but he insists that "our opponents cannot bring proof to the contrary, for the existence of a state during thousands of years is in relation to the length of state life no proof of the immortality of the state." Nevertheless, Kjellen finds some hope at least for the longevity of everyone's beloved state in the apparent fact that the life of the state rests in the end in the hands of individuals in whose power it lies to strengthen or weaken, to prolong or to shorten, the life of the state. Kjellen concludes: "We do not know if any one state or any one nation is destined to enjoy eternal life, but we do know that the decision as to whether or not their state will be permitted to enjoy a long life on earth depends decisively upon individuals." It depends upon the individual's conduct in relation to other individuals and above all to the state. In turn the individual's conduct in relation to the state depends upon his respect for the state. Kjellen admits with deep regret that the conduct of states leaves much to be desired from the point of the individual's expectations in the sphere of reason, intellect, and morality. He concedes that the behavior of states sorely tries man's high opinion of the state as a personality considered endowed with reason and intelligence, as the highest personality in fact. "We see how, with important mien, 'the principles of right and justice' are praised at the Peace Palace of the Hague, but in practice we see of justice no more than that it is being violated seventy times seven times." Kjellen cautions that "it would be better to become acquainted with the determining forces which dictate the courses of states, than in impotent bitterness to hold to account and blame the state for

its relapse into sin." He thinks that if we followed his advice we would be more surprised and pleased to see once and a while a glowing spark of international law appear, a phenomenon which in itself may be admitted to be a gain of our times. He warns against despair and cynicism in our attitude to the state. He himself had to conquer his disappointment as he learned to know the difference between abstract teaching of the nature of the state pictured as existing in a vacuum—and reality as demonstrated by the behavior of states in the world of states. Nevertheless, he asks, even if the notion "that the state is the absolute higher being" is a mere fiction, is not this notion "the more ideal and more dignified way of viewing the state?" "Is is not at any rate useful and necessary?"

In answer to his own questions he refers to the Fourth Commandment: "Honor thy Father and thy Mother!" Why are we commanded to honor them? "Because they are higher personalities than you, more advanced in reason and intelligence?"—No, we are to honor them in order "that thy days may be long in the land"—or in the version cited by Kjellen: "That you mayest prosper." Hence the question is not the degree of reason and intelligence of one or the other, nor that of measuring reason and intelligence "by the bushel," but that of acknowledging the necessities of life. "Only he who will honor his mother solely if he sees in her a higher perfection will consider himself justified in looking upon the state with diminished respect." But even so, it behooves the state to earn the respect it demands. "It is the task of the state," writes Kjellen, "to cultivate this respect as its real vital force, so that the state's overpowering strength may not appear to the individual as a strait-jacket, but rather as a natural breath of life." For "in this fashion compulsion is turned into liberty for the individual." On the other hand, "it behooves the individual to accept the limitation of his freedom, a limitation concomitant with every rational form of being." For only if the individual accepts that limitation "can there be the firm development of the state with which the individual's own welfare is fundamentally and insolubly joined."

Such is the "historical" evidence adduced by Kjellen to demonstrate the realism and hence the "scientific" proof for his

new geopolitical science as a system which deals with states not as concepts in a world of thought, but as natural, physical, biological entities in this world of living beings. It is in the light of this "historical" evidence of this "realistic" geopolitical science developed and expounded by Kjellen that we should consider the doctrines and performances of the whole school of his German followers, and in particular the writings of Professor Haushofer. For it may well be that it is this new geopolitical science of Kjellen the Swede, Professor of the "Science of States and Statistics" at the University of Uppsala, which is applied by the one thousand scientists and spies working, as we are told, under the much talked about, and written about and radioed about Professor Dr. Karl Haushofer, in the Geopolitical Institute of Germany, of which even the Germans in Germany are supposed to know little, if anything. In the light of the preceding exposition of Kjellen's new science of states, Professor Haushofer's proclaimed or real proclivities as the geopolitical super necromancer and prize juggler may assume at least a semblance of reality, despite all their alleged abnormality. In view of undeniable historical evidence of an intimate intellectual affinity between Kjellen and Haushofer, we should perhaps believe, difficult as it may seem, that, as we are told, Haushofer, the disciple of Kjellen, made Hitler what Hitler has come to be; that Haushofer inspired or induced Hitler to write his *Mein Kampf* as it has been written; that Haushofer compelled Hitler to do all Hitler did: feign his undying hatred of Soviet Russia as the reeking pest hole of Marxian international communism; turn his sudden but adroit somersault in concluding the Russo-German friendship pact of 1939; somersault back a year and a little later in his unheralded assault upon Tovarish Stalin. As a matter of fact, Haushofer possessed intimate knowledge of Kjellen's works and Kjellen's new science of states. As a matter of further fact, Haushofer was instrumental in re-editing and enlarging one of Kjellen's chief general works: *Die Grossmächte* ("The Great Powers"), in which Kjellen analysed and appraised the policies and politics of the Great Powers of his time in the setting of past and future on the basis of the new geopolitical science of states. For Haushofer, in conjunction with a number of fellow geo-

politicians, prepared a new edition of *Die Grossmächte* as volume I of the German geopolitical camarilla's collective *magnum opus* known as *Macht und Erde* ("Might and Earth"). In a German prospectus announcing the appearance of Haushofer's enlargement of Kjellen's work, we are advised as follows: "*Die Grossmächte* of Rudolf Kjellen appeared in Germany during the years from 1914 to 1918 in nineteen editions, under the title *Die Grossmächte der Gegenwart* ['Great Powers of the Present'], and after the War with a change of title as *Die Grossmächte und die Weltkrise* ['The Great Powers and the World Crisis'] in two more editions. This work, as is well known, is generally recognized as one of the most important of all geopolitical works. Yes, one may quite properly call it the fundamental work, or, in the words of a critic, the Geopolitical Bible." The same prospectus announces volume II of the collective work, *Jenseits der Grossmächte* ("Beyond the Great Powers"), as a continuation of Kjellen's *Die Grossmächte*, and volume III, *Raumüberwindende Mächte* ("Space-Conquering Powers"), as the continuation of the first two. It calls all three volumes: "The Fundamental Geopolitical Work by Kjellen-Haushofer, now complete."¹⁴

¹⁴ For those interested a list of Haushofer's chief works is here given as presented in the 1939 edition of "Kürschner's Deutscher Literatur-Kalender." *Dai Nihon, Betrachtungen über Gross-Japans Wehrkraft, Weltstellung und Zukunft* ("Dai Nihon, Considerations Concerning the Defense Power, World Position, and Future of Greater Japan"), 1913; *Grundrichtungen in der Geographischen Entwicklung des Japanischen Reichs* ("Basic Trends in the Geographical Development of the Japanese Empire"), 1919; *Geopolitik der Selbstbestimmung* ("Geopolitics of Selfdetermination"), 1923; *Japan und die Japaner* ("Japan and the Japanese"), 1923; *Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans* ("Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean"), 1925; *Grenzen* ("Frontiers"), 1922; *Japans Reichserneuerung* ("The Rejuvenation of the Japanese Empire"), 1931; *Geopolitik der Pan-Ideen* ("Geopolitics of the Pan-isms"), 1931; *Wehr Geopolitik* ("Military Geopolitics"), 1932; *Japans Werdegang als Weltmacht und Empire* ("The Development of Japan as Worldpower and Empire"), 1933; *Alt Japan* ("Old Japan"), 1933; *Mutsuhito, Napoleon I, Kitchener, Foch*, 1933-34; *Der Nationalsozialistische Gedanke in der Welt* ("The National-Socialist Idea in the World"), 1934; *Wehrwille als Volksziel* ("Will to Military Defense as a Popular Aim"), 1934; *Weltpolitik von heute* ("World Politics of Today"), 1934; *Weltmeere und Weltmächte* ("World Oceans and World Powers"), 1934.

Haushofer is joint author of: *Bausteine zur Geopolitik* ("Building Stones for Geopolitics"), 1928; *Deutschlands Weg an der Zeitwende* ("Germany's Road at the Crossing of the Time"), 1931; *Die Welt in Gärung* ("The World in

In conclusion one might be tempted to inquire into the question of the general adequacy of Kjellen's and Hennig's doctrine of the analogy of the state to a biological organism, or of the identity of the state with a living being. One might be tempted to discuss the question whether Kjellen and Hennig are consistent in the application of their doctrine. They are patently not in agreement as to the particular biological organism to which the state should or might be compared, by analogy or otherwise. But why go to the trouble of doing that which the intelligent reader can and will do on the basis of the case history furnished? Of much greater importance than the comparison of the state to a biological organism are the conclusions drawn by Kjellen and his followers from these comparisons for the behavior of states, conclusions which are presented not only as indicative of the actual behavior of states past and present, but as normative, i. e., binding for their conduct in the future. What is of prime importance is the answer to the question whether the conclusions as drawn by Kjellen are the conclusions which must logically follow from the comparison of the state with the biological organism, especially if the biological organism chosen for comparison is *homo sapiens*, the human being. Before we consider this aspect of the subject, let us look at the geopoliticians in action, or rather let us in the chapter to follow, look at states in action, as the geopoliticians say they must or should normally act in accordance with their alleged organic nature.

Ferment"), 1936. He is editor of: *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, the journal of the school; *Der Rhein, sein Lebensraum, sein Schicksal* ("The Rhine, its Living Space and its Fate"), 1928; *Grossmächte vor und nach dem Weltkrieg* ("The Great Powers Before and After the World War"), 1930; *Jenseits der Grossmächte* ("Beyond the Great Powers"), 1932; *Macht und Erde* ("Might and Earth"), 1935.

CHAPTER VIII

GEOPOLITIK MEETS GEOPOLITIK

Several years ago the author published an essay entitled "If the Geopoliticians Have Their Way."¹ At that time the present war had not yet commenced, at least not in the form of actual belligerence. The geopoliticians had not yet gotten their way in the sense in which that term was used in the essay in question and is to be used in our subsequent discussion. The term geopoliticians has been made clear, at least as far as good intentions and honest endeavors may succeed in making anything clear. We have seen geography expand its Lebensraum to become modern anthropogeography, climatology, physiography, economic geography, political geography, and what not. Over a number of its offspring geography still seems to claim and exercise a kind of parental suzerainty. To others it has yielded the autonomy of their own households. We have seen political geography being turned into Geopolitik, the new geopolitical science of the state or of states. We have seen emerge from this new geopolitical science, by way of identification of the state with a biological organism, certain conclusions offered as the norms of the behavior of states. We have seen adduced historic evidence of the past to bolster the conclusions offered. We have seen the conclusions thus bolstered held out as normative for the behavior of states of the present and of the future. We recall that the conclusions and the practices propounded centered around the subject of national self-sufficiency and the method of achieving that status. Hence it is hardly surprising that Geopolitik, as expounded by geopoliticians, such as Kjellen and followers, is primarily the new geopolitical science of the so-called "have-not" states in search for national self-sufficiency and empire. In substantiation of this assertion, attention may be called to the stress placed upon the acquisition of the needed organs in the form of regions containing the resources in which states find themselves deficient. To be sure, Kjellen speaks of loss of such regions as a calamity, as a violation of

¹ *The Commonweal* of April 28, 1939.

the person of the state thus affected, but his concern with the despoiled state goes no further than to advise doubled efforts to squeeze the most out of the remaining regions. He does not advise retaking the lost regions. He approaches the subject from the point of view of the "have-not" state taking from the state which "has"—thus leaving the reader with the implied assumption that the despoiled state still will have enough left, and consequently that before the spoliation it had more than it actually needed.

But who is to be the judge as to whether the state from which the "have-nots" propose to take what they lack has more than it needs, or that it will have sufficient after it loses what is to be taken or has been taken? What is to happen when the "have" state admittedly has more than it needs or, at any rate, more than the "have-nots" have, but refuses to part with even a little of what it has? The answer to that question is impliedly or indirectly given by the "have-not" geopoliticians in their demand or rather command to take what is needed—if necessary by war. But we have a direct answer to that question by a geopolitician who speaks from the "have" side of the fence.

During the closing days of the year many of the academic professions hold their annual convocations. On these occasions they announce their latest achievements by way of discoveries, inventions, experiments, investigations, and what not. They proffer their new cures for the ills of the world, or they attest to the futility of trying cures, as the case may be. At the Fifty-fifth Annual Meeting of the Geological Society of America, in December, 1938, a distinguished American geologist delivered the closing paper of the event. The geologist in question is a noted expert on the mineral and oil resources of the world and of their distribution, or rather, maldistribution among the nations of this earth. The content of his paper has been widely publicized, quoted, paraphrased, and commented upon in the daily press.²

² The geologist is Dr. Charles Kenneth Leith, Professor of Geology at the University of Wisconsin; mineral adviser to the Shipping and War Industries Boards, 1918, and to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 1919; chairman of the Mineral Inquiry since 1929; member of the Business Advisory and Planning Council for the Department of Commerce, etc., etc. Cf. *Who's*

The geologist turning politician begins with the assurance that "the world's mineral supplies are large enough for all if they were equally distributed among the nations," but, he adds, "unfortunately they are not." He accepts the pattern of a world divided on the basis of the unequal division of the world's mineral supplies, as expressed by the much overworked terms of the "have" and the "have-not" nations. The "haves" are those whom the earth has favored with a plentiful supply of mineral and oil resources necessary for industrialization. They "are the ones which in modern times have taken a commanding position in world affairs." Who are the "have" nations thus blessed? "The control of the larger part of the world's mineral wealth," the geologist states,

now centers in nations bordering the North Atlantic Basin, where the Industrial Revolution started. The possession of coal and iron and accessory minerals permitted the huge industrial development of these countries, and from this development started the principal exploitation of the supplementary mineral resources in other parts of the world. A great preponderance of the world's industrial power is concentrated along an axis extending from the Great Lakes in the United States eastward through Central England and West Central Europe. . . . England and the United States alone control in about equal proportions nearly three-fourths of the world production of minerals; not less important, they control the seas over which these products must pass. Classed with the "have" nations also are France and her colonies, and Russia.

This dominant position of the "have" nations, he states, is now seriously challenged by a number of "less privileged" nations, the "have-nots." Of their number "three nations have announced by word and deed that there can be no permanent peace until material resources have been redistributed among the nations." The three in question are the three dictator nations. The geologist is aware of the fact that their "demand is sometimes camouflaged by political objectives . . . and the general desire for prestige," but, he adds, "in the last analysis . . . the acquirement of larger supplies of raw materials is a basic pre-

Who in America. The discussion of Dr. Leith's address is based on the report of the Baltimore *Sun* of December 30, 1938, and what seems to be a slightly abbreviated text published in the *Bulletin* of the Geological Society of America, March 1, 1939.

requisite to the accomplishment of these ends, and the dictators are frank to say so." The challenge of the "have-nots" is aggravated by the circumstance that "it is not temporary and not merely due to the whim of individuals, but is based on conditions which mean greater intensity in the drive during a long future." This statement the geologist supports by the following significant observations reminiscent of Ratzel and Kjellen and their modern "have-not" followers.

When population pressure outstrips capacity for food production, the only way to maintain or improve the standard of living is to provide means of purchasing food outside through the growth of industry or through the forcible acquisition of more territory. The military power necessary for national expansion is also based on industrial capacity. With the rapidly increasing scale of industry the demand for the necessary raw materials becomes concentrated on the few large resources of mineral supplies capable of meeting the new scale. These sources are far too few to go around among the nations, hence, the growing dependence of the deficient nations on more distant sources of supply, and the growing necessity of controlled access to them in peace and war. Partial success in obtaining supplies merely builds up the demand for complete equalization. If all the mineral supplies of the world outside of the British Empire and the United States were to be included, they would be less than those of the dominant group. Opportunity to purchase the necessary supplies during peace times is not regarded by the "have-not" nations as sufficient protection to their national interests, partly because the terms are dictated by the more fortunate nations, partly because the means of purchase are limited, but very largely because the supplies could be shut off during war or during economic boycotts.

With rare candor the geologist grants that:

It is not easy for us living in a nation abundantly supplied with mineral resources to realize the urgency of the demand by the less privileged nations, and we are likely to regard their efforts as marauding which must be suppressed. We have been more or less smug about our favored position and failed to make even serious efforts to solve the problem of equalizing access of the less favored nations to natural resources. If we were put in the position of the "have-not" nations, however, the cause doubtless would seem a more reasonable one based on real needs, to be supported by force if necessary.

With equal frankness he stresses the fact that the "have-not" dictatorships have made serious attempts to overcome their

deficiencies in mineral and oil resources by searching for new domestic supplies and by way of new processes designed to improve low-grade yields, and that "all possible substitutes are used for minerals in deficient supply." He asserts that "such efforts have gone far enough to demonstrate their essential futility." As expressed by the geologist, "the inevitable consequence is the pressure for control of more supplies outside through acquisition of territory. Parallel with the drive for more territory is the drive for commercial control of minerals, principally by the method of barter, and also by blocked exchange and bilateral treaties. The barter campaign is proving successful in various quarters. It will not solve the problem of insuring self-sufficiency in time of war but it will help in this direction." Hence, the geologist is convinced, "the nations rich in mineral resources are . . . confronted by a threat which cannot be met by a policy of laissez faire without seriously jeopardizing their positions in the world." "Affirmative decisions will have to be reached which will profoundly affect the question of future standards of living and of peace and war." He does not "presume to know the answer," but proceeds to "present certain alternatives which seem to be inherent in the situation."

After a brief survey of the raw material situation in Germany, Italy, and Japan and of their efforts to alleviate their deficiency in such materials by measures short of war, he concludes that:

From such facts as these, and there are more, it seems a fairly safe conclusion that the results of the autarchic efforts in the field of mineral resources are falling short of their objectives. . . . On the other hand, there is no indication of any cessation of the effort. The problem will not be settled by any changes pending in present disturbances in Europe and Asia. It is larger than that and will grow steadily more acute until the ultimate question of world control of war materials is settled.

To the question: "How shall the problem be met? By a policy of appeasement, through division of our political and commercial control of resources, or by defense of the status quo?"—he gives two alternative answers, one of a long-range solution and one of immediate treatment. The long-range answer which

he prefers, or would prefer if it were practicable and possible, is that of world control of the raw materials of this earth and ultimate appeasement of the "have-nots" by way of collective guarantee of free access to the raw materials needed by them. As he states:

This would require the public recognition by the "have nations" of the concept that their fortunate raw material position is one of trust to be administered not only for their own material advancement but for that of others, thereby lessening causes of world friction. The practical working out of this concept is enormously difficult. It would require a degree of objective thinking and of correlation of activities at home and abroad which is far beyond anything yet attempted or regarded as practical. Considerations of temporary and local self-interest will certainly postpone the attainment of this Utopian goal too long to be of material help in solving the immediate problem.

The other alternative is that of an immediate solution. But even this immediate solution has two possibilities, at least in theory, that of immediate appeasement or that of defending by force if necessary the favorable position of the "have" nations. A solution by way of immediate appeasement he eliminates as "impossible from the standpoint of practical politics" on the basis of the following argument:

The cession of all the colonies would not accomplish much for the reason that the sum total of their mineral resources, which have been carefully listed, is far short of the requirements of the "have-not" nations. The acquirement of Abyssinia, Austria, Manchuria, and large parts of China and Czechoslovakia, . . . [has] done little to meet the mineral requirements of the "have-not" nations. Real appeasement by this method should require the ceding of considerable parts of self-governing nations, including English-speaking, French, and Russian domains, as well as supplies controlled commercially by the English-speaking people outside their borders. Still further, it would mean division of control of the sea to assure continuity of movements from distant territories. In short, the scale of the transfer is unthinkable from a political standpoint, and it seems to be a safe assumption that before it goes much further it will be resisted by the armed force of the "have" nations, as illustrated by our recent announcement of policy to protect the Western Hemisphere.

Much is said about the possibility of appeasement through the elimination of trade barriers and restoration of free circulation of raw materials between countries. The effort being made by means of the Hull reciprocity treaties is regarded in many quarters as a possible

solution of the problem. It certainly will help. In essence, however, it is merely an effort to restore the old status, in which the balance of power is retained by the "have" nations by virtue of their possession of the larger share of the world's universal resources, and it leaves the "have-not" nations in their old inferior position. . . . Appeasement by this method, to be effective, would have to go further than anything yet seriously planned. . . .

Hence the geologist reaches "with reluctance" the conclusion that "appeasement for the present will fail . . . , [that] the privileged position of the 'have' nations will be protected . . . , [that] ultimate control will remain where it is, . . . [that] might will continue to be right." He admits that the "have" nations may attempt to check threatened and actual aggressions of the "have-not" nations by the application of mineral embargoes. But he doubts whether this device would have any other effect than that of an immediate resort to armed force by the "have-nots." As far as the "have" nations are concerned, the geologist points out, "the necessity of protecting democratic institutions will greatly stiffen the defense of our material position," and "the military preparation for this defense is already well under way." In the final sentences of his address the geologist grants that "geologists cannot settle these questions so vital to world peace." But as he insists,

Knowing as they do their physical background, they are in a position to make highly significant contributions to both the immediate problem [of defending our resources against attack by the "have-not" nations] and the long range problem of using our mineral power in trust for world welfare. The responsibility should not be avoided.

We are thus left with a situation in which the geopoliticians of the "have-nots" assume or assert the "inevitability" of war as the only means of securing, under certain conditions, what the "have-not" states lack but need, just as the "have" geologist-politician insists upon the necessity of war as the only means, under these conditions, of defending what the "haves" possess and do not want to surrender to the "have-nots."

At the time when this was written essentially as here presented, there still seemed to exist at least a ray of hope that the geopoliticians might not get their way. That ray of hope was seen or thought to be seen in the fact that there were apparent

in the doctrines of the geopoliticians of both the "have" and "have-not" nations a number of fallacies which vitiate the conclusions derived from these doctrines and in turn the assumptions erected upon these conclusions. Dealing first with the "have-not" followers of the school of Geopolitik, one finds the analogy between the state and the biological organism too vague and too ridiculously naïve. It ranges from analogy with the beehive, the ant-heap, coral-colony, the skin-shedding animal, to the human being, as the exigencies of argument seem to demand. Where the analogy is definitely that with the human being, some authorities speak of birth, legitimate and illegitimate, of baptism, growth, decay, and death of states; others even venture into the realm of resurrection and reincarnation. One asserts that, "from the standpoint of international law and morality, the birth of every new state is certainly a scandal and the newly-born is to be registered as illegitimate in the records of international law." In the second place, the application of the analogy is lamentably faulty and unscientific. The alleged duty of the deficient state, "to secure the organs which it lacks but needs for full stature" has no analogy in human or subhuman practice. Certain animals, such as crabs, replace certain lost organs by regeneration; but, if they are born defective, they remain so. Human beings born defective do not go out to seize a perfect specimen with the object of amputating from the perfect body the organs needed. Modern blood transfusions and transplantations of organs are not accomplished by forcefully despoiling the donors. The analogy, if correctly applied, would decry, inhibit, and preclude enforced annexations of territory; it would, on the contrary, suggest, demand, and assure, as the only intelligent remedy, a peaceful pooling and equitable distribution of the resources of all the countries of the globe and the reasonable exchange of participation in their use for services or for manufactured goods. In other words, the geopoliticians may and, as must be admitted, do describe correctly the manner in which states have behaved in the past and are behaving at the present. But such behavior finds its explanation, or justification if you will, in nature's basic law of self-preservation, rightly or wrongly interpreted by the

individual state in the particular case. Under no condition can such behavior be explained or justified on the basis of an alleged analogy or identity of the state with the living organism, particularly the human being.

On the other hand, the present "have-not" nations, proceeding upon the teaching of the geopolitical doctrinaires, assume with assurance that they will be victorious in the struggle for conquest of the coveted treasures of their betters. In other words, we are confronted with the paradox that both "haves" and "have-nots" anticipate victory in the struggle they visualize as inevitable. But fate may decide against the "have-nots"; and if it does they will not only be frustrated in their objective; they will most likely stand to lose, in the process of fighting, and in the end to the victor, a part of their present limited resources. For wars, be they of defense or aggression, are carried on by instruments and means produced extensively from the very resources to be defended or to be acquired. To a large extent the resources thus employed are wasted and consequently forever lost to defenders and attackers alike. In fact, they are employed, wherever possible, to destroy the available resources of the respective enemies. In case of inevitable retreat resources are destroyed by the retreating armies in order that the advancing enemy may not benefit from their capture. In other words, we are face to face with another paradox: that of both sides resorting to wholesale waste and destruction of the very objects which they aim to save and secure, with the inescapable result that at the termination of a lengthy chain of attempted reversals of previous defeats, the ultimate victor and the vanquished, both, will find themselves in a world despoiled of the very things essential to what they both call or called civilization. They will find themselves in a world willfully, stupidly, and criminally despoiled by man who arrogates to himself the title of trustee of all that was created for him and his use.

Last, but not least, the little ray of hope that shone before the outbreak of the present war seemed to find support in some other pertinent considerations, considerations which seemed to expose in all their nakedness and superciliousness the allegedly basic assumptions and assertions of the "have" and the "have-

not" geopoliticians, particularly the assumption of the necessity and inevitability of war as the only means of achieving their ends, be these ends the conquest of that which the one side lacks, be it defense of what the other side has. There exist (or existed at least at the time), in addition to the "have" and the "have-not" nations, a number of highly respectable, industrious, and tolerably prosperous nations which are or were lacking in some or many of the essential mineral and oil deposits required for the modern industrial economic system. These nations do not or did not subscribe to the "have-not" geopolitician's creed. They are or were not bent upon securing political control of such resources outside their own territories or realms. Not being suspected of nurturing predatory designs upon their neighbors' riches, they seemed to enjoy friendly relationships which in turn seemed to assure them the necessary exchange of some kind of raw materials for another kind, and of the missing resources in return for their own manufactured goods or for the services rendered. They did not acquire, nor did they aspire to envy-arousing wealth, but they were not paupers. As a result they seemed to be immune equally to the consequences of the "have-not" and the "have" geopoliticians' doctrines.

Furthermore, history is forced to record against some of the "have" nations a waste of the riches of the soil, particularly of mineral and oil resources, of such gigantic extent that its consequences tend to endanger the welfare and safety of their own future generations; a waste so colossal that access to and use of a fraction of the resources wasted would have placed some of the "have-nots" in a position of comfort so far unknown to them. On the other hand, there exist, or existed, within the confines of some of the "have" nations millions of "have-nots" of another description, millions who are or were unemployed and thus beyond the reach and benefits assumed to accrue from the physical possession of the mineral and oil resources of their own "have" states. Proof sufficient of this undeniable fact seems to be that physical possession of all the essential resources is not the whole answer to the clamors of the "have-nots" for relief from the consequences of their "have-not" position.

These considerations suggest that in the assumption or assertion of the alleged inevitable character of armed conflict between the "haves" and the "have-nots" there is involved more than the economic aspect. These undeniable facts of waste and unemployment point to the existence of a something for which the claim of economic necessity seems to be at least in part a disingenuous shield; a something which would seem to be clearly beyond the treatment of geographers, geologists, political scientists; something which would seem to call for the services of the psychopathologist and, contrary to modern inclinations, of the moralist.

The ray of hope supported by a rational way of looking at the incongruities of the geopolitical doctrine of the "have-not" description and the fatalistic rejection of all means short of armed conflict by the geopoliticians of the "have" states, seemed to justify the expectation that a way might be found, before it was too late, to avoid the somber consequences of the geopoliticians' conclusions and predicated actions. It was the expectation that within both the "have" and "have-not" nations a sufficiently large number of determined individuals and groups would be found who in the name of morality or enlightened self-interest would refuse to abide by the jungle amorality of the geopoliticians; individuals and groups whose sense of reality would lead them to reject the *a priori* assertion of the inefficacy of means other than those proposed by the geopoliticians; individuals and groups with an historic perspective which compels the admission that the great empires of the past are mere memories of today—and the concession of at least the possibility that the great empires of today may become nothing but sad memories of tomorrow.

As matters stand today—the geopoliticians of both sides have had their way! The armed conflict for the securing of Lebensraum and the resources involved as well as for the defense of cherished possessions is in full swing. The conflict now raging and the outcome of that conflict, whatever it may be, will be the story of Geopolitik versus Geopolitik. The question which remains to be answered, if answered it can be, now is After Geopolitik—What?

CHAPTER IX

AFTER GEOPOLITIK—WHAT?

After Geopolitik—What? To answer that question, as far as an answer seems possible, we must proceed on the basis of certain premises. Let us accept for the moment the premises posed by the geologist turning to politics, speaking as he does for the present "have" states. These premises are to the effect that might makes right and that might will remain right. They are to the effect that the possession of the resources makes might—and that the resources will remain in the hands of the present possessors. In other words, these premises are to the effect that the present possessors of the resources will win the present conflict. This sounds reasonable as far as it goes, or if we stop where these premises stop, i. e., at the time when the conflict had not yet become actual belligerency. Since then the facts seem to warrant the statement that the "have-not" nations have in a series of conquests laid hands upon additional resources. Thereby they have increased their "might," and, according to geopolitical logic, must one not add, their "right"? It would seem within the possibilities of events that they could bring under their political control resources so vast that their might may equal or even surpass that of the "have" group, at least for a time. In that case the "have-nots" would then, according to "have" geopolitical reasoning, be entitled to count the odds in their favor.

But be that as it may! For the sake of the discussion to follow it may well be assumed that the result of a complete victory of one side over the other will be the same in either case with regard to spoliation of the vanquished by the victor—if the terms of peace are to be dictated on the basis of Geopolitik or rather, on the basis of a specific kind of Geopolitik.

We have seen that the geologist politician of one of the "have" states has declared most emphatically that the "privileged position of the 'have' nations will be protected," that "ultimate control will remain where it is, and might will continue to make right." The geologist pointed out that the "have-

not" states have announced through their leaders that there could and would be no permanent peace unless a redistribution of the riches of the world were to take place. He warned his hearers that the claims to a share of the riches of the earth by the "have-nots" are not the invention of the dictators; that "the challenge is not temporary and not merely the whim of individual dictators or countries but is based on conditions which will mean greater intensity in the drive during a long future." He warned the "have" nations, Russia, France, and the English-speaking group, that "the nations rich in mineral resources are confronted by a threat which is not temporary or academic and cannot be met by a policy of laissez faire without seriously jeopardizing their positions in the world. Affirmative decisions will have to be reached which will profoundly affect the question . . . of future peace and war."

As we know today—these affirmative decisions have been taken: England and France declared war on "have-not" Germany for the purpose of stopping further application of the geopolitical doctrine of securing the organs found lacking by the National-Socialist "have-not" *Reich* and since that declaration all the great "have" states are joined in war against the three great, and many of the lesser, "have-not" countries. So far there has not appeared a single utterance from the "have" states to offer the shadow of an assumption that as victor they would entertain a kind of peace which would include the cession of territories containing the resources coveted by the "have-nots." On the other hand, Herr Hitler, speaking for the Axis paupers, insists with equal show of determination that nothing short of the redistribution of the resources of the world will be acceptable as a basis of peace, if and when victory has come their way. Speaking at the National-Socialist Convention of 1936, Hitler reviewed the shortages of raw materials in the *Reich*. He promised relief by way of *Ersatz* products to be brought forth in the four year plan for the establishment of self-sufficiency. But in typical Hitlerian fashion he blurted out his and the nation's longing for more than *Ersatz* when, as reported by the Associated Press, he exclaimed: "If we had the Urals, if we possessed Siberia, if we had the Ukraine, National-

Socialist Germany would be swimming in surplus prosperity." In a speech of October, 1939, Hitler declared: "We want to participate in the distribution of raw materials. This is the demand of economic reason and common sense." In December, 1940, he repeated the same idea. Speaking of the acquisition of the great resources by the "have" nations, particularly by Great Britain, he said: "Britain has put together a tremendous empire by force The distribution was undertaken by humans themselves Rich regions yield better returns domestically than poor ones Similarly internal possession of rich regions is important." Strange to contemplate, Hitler, the professed sworn foe of Marxian international socialism, does not disdain the preaching of revolutionary international socialism when such preaching would seem to support his argument in favor of distribution of international resources. This is what he said in the speech cited: "Just as within nations too great contrasts between rich and poor must be adjusted, if necessary by force, so also internationally it won't do for a few to have all the possessions while others are suppressed We tried to solve the problem by appeals to common sense. We tried to bridge the chasm between those who had too much and those with too little We preferred common sense to force. The right to live belongs to all nations. It won't do for one people to say, 'We'll let you others take part in our life!' It isn't a question of charity The right to live includes the right to soil Bloody sacrifices are better than gradually dying off" Finally, in March, 1941, he asserted: "The world is not here for a few people, and an order based eternally on the distribution between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots' does not exist any more because the 'have-nots' have determined to lay claim to their portion of God's earth."

These statements clearly justify the assumption that a peace dictated by the victorious "have-not" nations will mean the cession by the present owners of part of their resources, a cession which the "have" geologist-politician asserted shall not and will not take place—because the present "haves," and not the "have-nots" will be the victors. Considering the even-

tuality of the loss of the war by the "have-nots," Hitler formally warned, in his speech of October, 1939, that "if they should succeed against us, it will just lay the basis of a new conflict." Thus the cycle visualized by the geologist-politician is closed. The struggle will go on. How long? Evidently until one or the other side has become, as the permanent "have-not," incapable of struggling on—because it is too exhausted to do so; or until one side has completely annihilated the other in the fashion in which Carthage, after several indecisive trade wars, was finally exterminated by the Roman victor.

There are those who hold that German resurgence and the present armed conflict could and would have been avoided if the victors of the First World War had dismembered defeated and prostrate Germany and had distributed the pieces among its neighbors. There are those who advocate that procedure when victory over National-Socialist Germany has been won. There are those who can see "peace" for the future only in the total destruction of the Germans as a people, as a racially conscious group. They hold that at the occasion of the next peace the victorious "haves" will be compelled, in sheer self-defense, to do to the Germans and perhaps to the Japanese and the Italians what the Romans did after their third victory over the Carthaginians: to effect their physical extirpation. Some suggest that this be done by way of sterilization of all women of child-bearing age. There are others who advise that this process of extermination would be too slow and uncertain. They advocate various methods of more immediately effective liquidation of the nation as such. Formal proposals of the kind here discussed are to be found in numerous books, articles, and speeches by persons in official or otherwise influential positions. So far the most drastic of all these admonitions, which promises to become a classic of its kind, is contained in a little book by Theodore N. Kaufman, with the title: *Germany Must Perish*.¹ The outstanding article of this type is probably one by Reginald Hargreaves: "War Aims, the Real Answer," in which the author expresses the opinion that "*bluntly, this war cannot be looked upon as won until at least three million Nazi soldiers*

¹ Newark, N. J., 1941.

have been put permanently out of action, and the victors are in a position to insist upon the break-up of the Third Reich into the thirty-one small, independent States of which Germany was originally composed.² Among public addresses of this sort the one deserving to be recorded here is that by Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Professor of History at the University of Chicago. Speaking on "The Terms of a Peace Settlement," Professor Schmitt stated that in his study of the background of the present war and consideration of the conduct of the war he finds it "not surprising that many people advocate literally the destruction of the German people." "In various magazines and newspapers" he has "read letters advocating medical treatment of the Germans in order ultimately to bring about their disappearance." He has read Theodore Kaufman's book *Germany Must Perish*, "advocating this policy" and he has "many friends who advocate and express similar views." He personally believes that "obviously it is impossible as a practical measure to effect the disappearance of 80 million people." But he holds that "there are certain things which can be done. . . ." He describes in some detail some of these things. Thus he says Germany should be forced to live within her own resources and be deprived of access to "iron and other materials of war until we are convinced that she will not misuse them." He recognizes "that this would cause great suffering among the German people and would probably lead to considerable reduction" in their numbers. But "unfortunately there are, when compared with the rest of Europe, too many Germans; 45 million

² *National Review*, No. 116 (June, 1941), 703-706. Italics given as in text.

In this connection see J. A. R. Marriott, "And After," *The Quarterly Review*, No. 276 (January, 1941), pp. 30-41. In this article the author discusses seven books dealing with the question of the reconstruction of Europe after the present war. Of the seven there are two which deal specifically with the dismemberment of the present, and as a matter of fact of pre-Hitler, Germany. They are: Sebastian Haffner, *Germany: Jekyll and Hyde*; and Edgar Stern-Rubarth, *Exit Prussia: A Plan for Europe*. "Dr. Stern-Rubarth describes himself as 'European by birth, upbringing and career, loving the country of Germany, adoring the beauty and spirit of France, feeling at home with the soul of Britain,' and a former German patriot turned into an alien, a refugee from, and an enemy of, a so-called German government." "Dr. Haffner is described by his publishers as an 'Aryan' German under forty years of age, who has lived all his life in Germany. He was trained as a lawyer and worked for six years under the Nazi régime. . . ."

British, 45 million Italians, 40 million French, and 80 million Germans. If there were only 50 million Germans the balance would be much more even." No particular punitive treatment is proposed for the Italians. As for the Japanese, who at the time had not yet launched their attack upon the United States, prior to a formal declaration of war, Professor Schmitt is of the opinion that "if we treat the Germans rough there is no reason why we should not treat the Japanese equally rough, though the Chinese may be relied upon to do that, if they are given sufficient material aid."³

In line with these extreme views is a report of the Institute of Public Opinion of a date as far back as December 9, 1939. According to this report a majority or 58 per cent of those consulted favored already at that time a treaty of peace which would be more severe for Germany (the sole belligerent on the other side at that date) than that of 1918. A minority or 36 per cent held that the next treaty should be less severe, and a mere 6 per cent were of the opinion that the terms should be about the same.⁴

To be sure, all plans for the permanent elimination of the apparently endless threats emanating from the "have-nots," including those for the biological extermination of the entire "have-not" helotry, appear to be rather simple of execution when propounded pen in hand, or in oratory from the speaker's

³ Professor Schmitt's address was one of a symposium on International Relations held in conjunction with the inauguration of Elijah Wilson Lyon as the sixth president of Pomona College, in October, 1941, and was published in the *Pomona College Bulletin*, November, 1941. The following item appeared in the *Springfield Leader-Press* of April 16, 1942: "Post-war creation of a 'synthetic race of German people' made up of non-Germans from other countries of the world to replace the present stock in the reich was suggested today by Dr. Earnest A. Hooton, Harvard anthropologist, as 'the only means of preventing a recurrence of world-wide conflict.'"

"The allied victory we so confidently hope for,' Hooton declared in an interview, 'would be meaningless unless we can completely drive from Germany the breed that tends only to militarism and nationalism, and replace it with a stock that will at least be calm.'"

"Interviewed at the opening session of a meeting of the American Association of Physical Anthropology at Harvard, Hooton said the first step in the process would be 'the realistic wiping out of Germany's present military leaders and their fanatic followers, and the subsequent dispersal throughout the world of the rest of the German people.'"

⁴ *Baltimore Sun*, December 10, 1939.

table, by those far removed from any personal responsibility for the actual realization of their proposals. Who then could be depended upon to perform the sordid task? The victorious army would certainly balk at the performance of post-war bloody rites, if such rites are to be. Perhaps sufficient civilian talent might be found to render such a service to the rest of humanity. Perhaps too, the Germans' and the Japanese' well-known proclivity for suicidal escape from an all too hopeless situation might be counted upon as a measure of reducing the extent and strain of the task.

But there is just a possibility that there will be left at the end of this war, as there was left at the end of the preceding one, a shred of esthetic conscience, not to say of moral sensibility which might make men shrink from the extremes suggested by some and perhaps tacitly approved by many more. The situation reminds one of a story quite pertinent to the dilemma in which all those find themselves who desire the accomplishment of the extreme results but shy from the application of the extreme measures required to accomplish those results. The story is found in Gilbert Murray's book: *The Ordeal of This Generation*.⁵ This is what it tells:

About the beginning of this century, in the time of the young Turks, it was decided by the Turkish government that the pariah dogs which filled the streets of Constantinople must be removed. To kill them would have been repugnant to Turkish feelings; so the dogs were collected in some thousands, put on board ship and deported to an uninhabited island in the sea of Marmora. There was nothing much to eat on the island; only a few rats, rabbits and the like. . . . The hungry dogs first ate the other animals and then one another. Then they starved and fought and died, until after a time . . . the howling ceased.

Of course, there is available no island large enough to which the defeated "have-nots" might be transferred. But the attempt might at least be made to create a situation which would offer the opportunity for disposing of the "have-nots" in a fashion similar to the disposal of the Turkish pariah dogs. The defeated "have-nots" might be surrounded by a *cordon*

⁵ London, G. Allen Unwin, Ltd., 1929, pp. 15-16.

militaire so strong that any future attempted *sortie* would be impossible in fact as well as in theory. Their constantly growing weakness would gradually lessen the strain of the effort of military quarantine. Eventually they would be compelled to do as did the dogs in the story, and in the end there would be peace ever after—at least in the lands of "have-nots."

Someone is sure to object that it is too preposterous even to consider the absurdity of physical extermination—be it by the bloody and speedy method or by the gentler and slower procedures. Not as preposterous as it would seem, will have to be the answer! Certainly not, if we accept, as we may have to accept, as a fact what we have been told and are being told about what is transpiring in some of the regions which have come under the political control of the at least temporarily victorious "have-nots," particularly in conquered Poland; certainly not if we accept the fact, because it is a fact, that National-Socialist Germany has for years been engaged in a process of physical elimination, if not extermination, of one of its unwanted minorities, the Jews, and of a not inconsiderable number of its own racial kind, such as Liberals, Socialists, Communists, and Christians persisting in the retention of their fundamentalist version of Christianity. In the face of these realities the many proposals for the physical elimination of the Germans not only as a political and military power but as a racial or national unit should be understandable, if not pardonable. After all, "An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" is still an attractive proposition for him who has lost an eye and a tooth.

But enough of the geopoliticians of both the "haves" and the "have-nots," of their aims, the possible and impossible methods of achieving them, and their way of attempting to "end" the "endless" struggle between "have-nots" and "haves." In a statement emanating from the Associated Press of July 8 as presented by the Baltimore *Sun* of July 9, 1941, we are given what appears to be a more hopeful view of what is to come when peace once more is to be made.

President Roosevelt . . . urged Americans to work and pray for a new international order "in which the spirit of Christ shall rule." His

plea was contained in a message read as the International Society of Christian Endeavor opened its sixtieth anniversary convention. . . . "We as a people of many origins and diverse cultures and spiritual allegiances," the President's message read, "can in full loyalty to our individual convictions, work and pray for the establishment of an international order in which the spirit of Christ shall rule. In such an order alone will our cherished freedoms, including freedom of conscience, be secure. Let us unite in labor and in prayer to hasten its coming." Saying that "at a time of grave crisis in the affairs of the nation and of the world all we hold dearest in our national heritage is challenged," Mr. Roosevelt added: "Justice, mercy, truth and freedom are all under attack by totalitarianism which outrages the inherent dignity of human personality. Only in union shall we find strength to combat the menace which threatens free people everywhere—the tyranny of force over the lives and consciences of men."

Any one who has salvaged a spark of confidence in the potentialities of Christian faith, hope, and charity would gladly see President Roosevelt succeed in bringing about the rule of the spirit of Christ in international relations. But one should add the caution that no lone living human, no matter how exalted his position, or how sincere his intentions may be, is likely to succeed where Christ himself, his "Vicar" on Earth, and all the other professors of the *Imitatio Christi* of past and present have failed—at least so far. In the first place, one is compelled to ask: What is the spirit of Christ? If President Roosevelt's message is taken in its entirety, it is clear that he is thinking of the concepts of justice, fairness, tolerance, compassion, and charity, as the basic note of Christ's teaching. But historic evidence demonstrates that these general concepts, even when they are accepted and professed, find different interpretations whenever the necessity arises of putting specific contents into their broad frames. The "haves" and the "have-nots," the rich and the poor, the powerful and the weak, the well and the sick, differ as to what justice, fairness, tolerance, compassion, and charity mean when put to the test in the actual applications to specific situations. For nearly two thousand years Christian leaders have striven to harmonize conflicting interpretations of the spirit of Christ in the promise of "Peace on Earth to all Men of Good Will." But where have been, through the centuries, and among the leaders of nations, of the "have-

nots " and the "haves," the men of good will, or enough men of good will? By what token shall we distinguish the men of good will from those not of good will? By their professions or by their deeds?

Thus we are still left with the question: After Geopolitik—What? And the question still remains to be answered. The realities of life seem to point to only one certainty, namely: that there can be no answer to that question if by answer we mean a kind of blueprint solution of the problem of the relation of the "haves" and "have-nots," assuming as the geopoliticians seem to do, that this relationship is basic for the problem involved. For in the search for the answer to the question before us we are dealing with a situation similar to that of finding the pattern for an effective form of government, effective in the sense that it provides for a "just" distribution of the means of living of the people under its rule, and for the adequate opportunity for securing these means by one's own labor. What a "just" distribution of the means of living and an "adequate" opportunity for securing these means is, cannot be demonstrated by prescriptive formulas and abstract statistics. It can be determined only by the manifestation of actual results. On this basis that distribution may be called just and adequate which does not create a situation in which there is found on the one side unneeded wealth and on the other side intolerable poverty combined with the lack of opportunity of overcoming that poverty by way of the socially recognized methods of doing so. In other words, that distribution may be called just and adequate which does not create or does not lead to jealousy, hatred, and strife within a social group or a body politic. For such jealousy, hatred, and strife opens the gates for the entry of revolutionary doctrines and movements which eventually cannot but lead to the forceful overthrow of the government which has failed in its task of governing effectively. From time immemorial men have devised new and ever newer forms of government, each one supposed and expected to be better than the preceding governments which the new ones displaced: better in the sense of being more effective in accomplishing that which the earlier governments had failed to accomplish.

Perhaps some day it will become more commonly realized that a government cannot be better and cannot be more effective than its personnel; that the personnel cannot be better and more effective than the milieu from which it is recruited; and that the milieu cannot be better and more effective than the social and moral, or the a-social and a-moral standard of the age. But social and moral standards are conditioned by situations—just as in turn situations are conditioned by social and moral standards. The sum total of these considerations would seem to be leading us around in a circle, a vicious circle as it appears. The viciousness may be removed or lessened if we come to understand that in the last analysis situations, however created, are, or at least can be, controlled and modified by man. If this be so, then it is not the formal pattern of government which counts the most, and most decisively, but rather the type, the character, the social and moral standard, of the men who compose and conduct the government and, last but not least, of the multitude from which those who compose and conduct the government are chosen and receive their sanction.

What has here been said about domestic relations applies with equal persuasion and force to the relations of governments with governments and of nations with nations. This consideration brings us back to the question which we have still left unanswered, except for the warning that blueprint specifications would not be offered. The question, as will be remembered, was in effect this: What should or must be done to put an end to the endless see-saw of wars of conquest and of defense, when victory has been won once more, this time, or sometime, by the "have" nations, or by the "have-nots," as the case may be? To put it another way: How shall the victors organize the nations of the world, those of the British Empire, those of the Western Hemisphere, those of Asia, particularly those of Europe, in their relationship with each other, in order that in the future peace and order and amity within and among them be assured?

It is accepted as axiomatic that it is easier to advise what not to do than what to do, what should not be done than what should be done. Let us, at this point, choose the easier

path. Thus we may state as our belief that the answer is not to be found in the kind of totalitarianism which forces into its prescribed pattern all of man's ideas and actions, political, economic, social, religious, and ethical. It is not found in the liquidation of undesired political, religious, and racial groups, as practiced in various degrees in the totalitarian systems of our time. It is not found in the enforcement upon others of the four freedoms in accompaniment with conditions which cannot but turn these freedoms into a mockery rather than a blessing. It is not found in the enunciation of fourteen or any number of points and their total or partial sabotage when they have served the victor's purpose. It is not found in the striving for self-sufficiency for every political unit of the globe when a sober judgment forces the admission that the much coveted self-sufficiency is a dream rather than a reality even for great empires and for whole continents. It is not found in the surrender by the "haves" to the "have-nots" of territory including the natural resources in question. It is not found in the practices of the "haves" of extending their economic and political control over the all too meagre resources of the "have-nots," such as the modest oil deposits of Rumania and Jugoslavia which, with the puny oil wells of Poland, constitute the total known oil resources of Europe. It is not found in the application by the "have-nots" of the doctrine which justifies the going into the world's highways and byways seeking to seize the wanted resources where they may be seized, even at the price of war. It is not found in the "have" nations' categorical rejection of measures short of war as possible means for the establishment of a *modus vivendi* between the "haves" and the "have-nots." It is not found in the policy of selling to the outside world as much as possible and of buying as little as possible from abroad. It is not found in the cornering of the bulk of the gold of the world and the refusal to trade with the goldless except on the basis of payment in gold. It is not found in the denial of the kind of economic solidarity for the nations of Europe which is found indispensable for the forty-eight units of the United States. It is not found in the enforcement of the political balkanization of Europe which denies to that continent the kind

of political union which it was found necessary to enforce in a bloody five years of war between our North and South; a political union which is found beneficial in the relations of the component parts of the British Commonwealth of Nations. It is not found in the creation of the kind of peace which will lead to another orgy of destruction of the very resources coveted by the one side and defended by the other. It is not found in the establishment of the kind of peace which will require more and stronger sanctions and a police force to ensure the efficacy of these sanctions and the maintenance of such a peace. It is not found in the substitution of the spirit of Wotan for the spirit of Christ; nor is it found in the invocation of the spirit of Christ without the application of that spirit by those who invoke it.

As to the positive aspects of the answer sought to the question still before us, these positive aspects are written, at least by implication, and as far as positive aspects can be ventured, into every chapter and every paragraph of this sordid epic or tragedy-comedy of human errors. They are there to be found by every one who has eyes to see and is willing to see; by every one endowed with intelligence who is willing to apply the intelligence which is his; by every one who has the capacity and the courage to think; by every one who is blessed or burdened with a conscience and is willing to heed the voices which issue from that conscience.

To be sure, these positive aspects are not to be measured on the bases of immediate advantages alone. They are not conceived as being bounded by the winning of the war. They are premised upon the winning of the peace as well. They are concerned with the welfare of this generation, of the next generation, and of still later generations, as far as human intelligence can intelligently operate. Viewed in that perspective there is nothing vague, nothing mystic, nothing Utopian about these positive aspects; on the contrary, they are precise, realistic, and practical.

EPILOGUE

A group of young critics followed the manuscript of this book in its growing stages. One of them, commenting upon the concluding chapter, wrote as follows: "Concerning the question as to what should be done to avoid a repetition of another war between the 'haves' and the 'have nots' when this war has once more been won by the 'haves,' there is offered an impressive list of those things that should not be done. But in the matter of positive proposals you let one down so at the end—and, as one feels—by design! 'With what has been given—go seek'—Oh, what a job!" To this challenging plaint there can be but one reply: Unless the very "job" complained of here be done; unless those who do this "job" become articulate and commanding in their articulation, all that "has been given" will have been given in vain. For that "job" is child's play compared with the problem that will face the world when, at the end of a long and bitter war, the victors are confronted once more with the victors' responsibility for making peace.

Those who will then dictate the actual terms of peace are not the only individuals responsible for the kind of peace to be made and for that which ensues from that peace. Theirs is in a formal sense the political responsibility. But political accountability does not spell the full measure of liability in an issue which involves the making of peace. There is above all a moral responsibility, far greater and weightier, which rests upon the conscience of all those endowed with the capacity of seeing—before it is too late—beyond the exigencies of the last battle won, the armistice signed, and the terms of peace enforced. Nowhere should there be greater appreciation of this verity than in the United States. For if there is such a thing as a national destiny, and if such a destiny is manifest, then there can be only one manifest destiny for the United States, that of seeking and working for the establishment of living conditions which will make peace a blessing instead of a nightmare for all the parent stocks from which its own peoples have come.

If, on the contrary, another victors' peace be made, be it one dictated by the Allied Nations or by the Axis Powers, then that

peace will be a peace in name only. For no peace, however restrictive in its terms, no machinery of enforcement, however relentless in its control, can ever guarantee permanent submission to conditions imposed upon the vanquished by the victor. There will follow as the result of another victors' peace more and bigger Manifest Destiny of the conventional type, more and weightier White Man's and perhaps Yellow Man's Burden of the well known brand, more and more brutal Power Politics, more and more scientific Dialectic Materialism, more and craftier Geopolitik versus more and craftier Geopolitik, more and more destructive wars—until, some day, the extent of the exhaustion of the raw materials of the world will match the degree of the intellectual and moral deficiencies of those who persist in making a victors' peace.

The task complained of by our young critic is a difficult task—but if we wish to save for generations to come more than the mere dregs of that which has been the pride of the "haves" and the envy of the "have-nots"—then that task must be done!

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